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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
The Chinese insurance industry revived in 1980 when the first insurance company, the People’s 
Insurance Company of China, came into being.1 After 24 years high-speed development, there 
have been 54 insurance companies by the end of October 2002.2  The annual premiums has 
increased 459 times from 1980’s RMB 0.46 billion3  to 2001’s RMB 210.94 billion with an 
average annual increasing rate of more than 30%.4 The achievements are significant. However, the 
law of insurance did not match the fast development of the insurance industry, and some problems 
have arisen due to the deficiencies and incomplete formulation of the law. One of these problems 
that is undermining the root of the insurance industry is the want of trust of the public in the 
                                                        
1 It is called “revival”, because the insurance industry already existed in China since the late Qing dynasty 
when “the Western concept of insurance was introduced to China by foreign businessmen, [who] used the 
insurance policies which were commonly used in their own countries at that time.” (Clement Shum, 
“Insurance Companies in China” (1996) 8 Insurance Law Journal 37 at 37.) In 1805, the English merchants 
opened the Canton Insurance Society in Guangzhou, but the earliest Chinese insurance companies were 
established in 1885. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the insurance industry continued 
to develop until the end of 1958. During the period from 1949 to 1958, the State Council and its departments 
and commissions promulgated many regulations, such as the Ship Compulsory Insurance Regulation 1951, 
the Railway Vehicles Compulsory Insurance Regulation 1951, the Regulation of Compulsory Insurance of 
the Academic Injury to the Passengers of Ship, Railway and Airplane 1951, and the Regulations of 
Voluntary Insurance of Citizens’ Property 1957 (None of these regulations are enforced now), at the end of 
1958, the national income of insurance reached RMB 1.6 billion. But from 1958 on, until 1979, nearly all of 
the insurance business was stopped due to the extremely “left” policy. The only survived insurance business 
during that period was international underwriting which was also extremely limited. Little wonder that few 
statute was published on the insurance during those 21 years. In 1979, economic reform took place and the 
insurance industry reappeared. See Clement Shum, ibid; Li Yuquan & He Shaojun, Zhong Guo Shang Fa 
(China Commercial Law) (Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 1995) at 303-304; Si Yuzhuo, et al, Xin Bian 
Hai Shang Fa Xue (New Edited Maritime Law) (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 1999) at 465-466; 
Alberto Monti, “The Law of Insurance Contracts in the People’s Republic of China: A Comparative 
Analysis of Policyholders’ Rights”, online: the International Centre for Economic Research 
<http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2001/monti28-01.pdf> at 4-8. 
2 Xu Xiao, “San Jia Wai Guo Bao Xian Gong Si Huo Zhun Jin Ru Zhong Guo Shi Chang (Three Foreign 
Insurance Companies have been Approved into China’s Market)”, Zhong Guo Bao Xian Bao (China 
Insurance News), November 5, 2002; Ding Tao, “San Jia Wai Guo Gong Si Zhun Ru, Zai Hua Wai Zi Bao 
Xian Gong Si Yi Da 34 Jia (Three Foreign Insurance Companies have been Approved; 34 Foreign Insurance 
Companies have been in China)”, Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Securities News), November 4, 2002. 
As for why China’s insurance industry has developed so fast, see Alberto Monti, ibid. 
3 RMB 100 is roughly S$ 21. 
4
 Li Youlin, “Zhong Guo Shou Xian Shi Chang Zai Xin Pai (China Life Insurance Market: Being Re-
ruffled)”, Zhong Guo Bao Xian Bao (China Insurance News), February 28, 2002. The annual premiums 
income of 2002 is RMB 305.31 billion, and the increasing rate is 44.7%, according to the web site of the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission <http://www.circ.gov.cn/assay/index.htm>. 
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dishonest insurers who, from time to time, reject reasonable claims under the policies.5 One of the 
most disputed issues is the principle of utmost good faith.6 Several features of the Chinese legal 
system have contributed to the disputes on the principle of utmost good faith. 
 
Firstly, there are quite a few ambiguities in the wording of the law. In China, the insurance 
contracts are governed by two main statutes. The Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of 
China (1992)7 applies to marine insurance contracts while the Insurance Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (1995, revised in 2002)8 applies to non-marine insurance contracts, with an 
exception that where the Maritime Code does not have specific rules on certain matters, the 
Insurance Law will apply to those matters. The marine insurance law of China was greatly 
influenced by the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.)9 and it in turn influenced the non-marine 
insurance law.10 The concepts borrowed from the common law, such as the materiality, have no 
parallel terms in the system of civil law,11 so they lack the backup from the civil law.12 In addition, 
                                                        
5
 The insured often complain that “the insurance is easy to apply, but the claim is hard to settle.” See e.g. 
Chen Qian & Peng Tingting, “Wo Guo Bao Xian Ye Xian Zhuang Tou Shi (Perspective on Our Country’s 
Insurance Industry)”, Qing Nian Shi Xun (Young’s News), March 1, 2001, online: the People’s Net 
<http://www.people.com.cn/digest/200103/02/jj030218.html>. 
6
 See Wang Yugui, “Dui Wo Guo Bao Xian Fa Lv Zhi Du De Fen Xi Yu Ping Jia (Analysis and Evaluation 
on Our Country’s Insurance Law)”, (1999) Issue 7, Transaction of Centre Finance University 52 at 54; 
Zhang Peihua, “Ru He Zheng Que Li Jie Shou Xian Zhong De ‘Ru Shi Gao Zhi’ (How to Understand 
‘Truthful Disclosure’ in Life Insurance)”, (2001) Issue 8, Shanghai Insurance 42. 
7
 Hereafter the Maritime Code. 
8
 Hereafter the Insurance Law. In this thesis, unless otherwise mentioned, “the Insurance Law” means the 
version as revised in 2002. 
9
 The western concept of insurance was introduced to China by foreign businesspersons who used the 
insurance policies which were commonly used in their own countries at that time since the 19th century. See 
supra note 1. Britain, as the most influential marine insurance market at that time, has had her insurance 
theories and concepts spread to China through the practice of international business. In the latter half of the 
19th century and the early 20th century, the British investment had a dominating, and before 1889 even 
monopolistic, control over the finance industry and the shipping industry in China. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, 
The Rise of Modern China, 16th ed. (New York: Oxford, 2000) at 432-434. 
10
 The Insurance Law is promulgated later than the Maritime Code and, under the influence of the latter, has 
changed much compared with the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1981, which is the precursor of 
the Insurance Law. 
11
 Even the duty of disclosure is alien to the Chinese law. Its requirement has surpassed the principle of good 
faith in the civil law which does not require voluntary disclosure of material information to the other party. 
12
 In China’s civil law system, the law governs general matters are called “the general law” while a special 
law governs more special matters. The special law has precedence over the general law but when an article 
of a special law is ambiguous or when a special law lacks some necessary content, the court usually resorts 
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both of the statutes are not very elaborate and need thorough interpretations to make their 
meanings clear. Thus the insured and the insurer often have their own understandings as to how 
the words should be interpreted. Sometimes, their understandings differ a lot. For example, as to 
what is the insurer’s liability for his failure to make general explanation,13 even the lawyers are not 
quite confident of the answer. 14  Moreover, while the imperfect law requires more skilful 
interpretation, the quality of the judges in the People’s Court compounds the problem.15 Although 
the quality of the judges is not the issue that the thesis is going to resolve, it is hoped that the thesis 
can go some way towards clarification and development of the law. 
 
The second problem is concerned with the pyramidal construction of Chinese legal system. The 
statutes passed by the Nation People’s Congress or its Standing Committee stand at the top of the 
pyramid and they are of high authority, but their number is much lower than that of the 
subordinate administrative regulations promulgated by the State Council, its departments and 
commissions, and the local governments. While the subordinate regulations are inferior to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
to the general law, most commonly the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986. See also Alberto Monti, 
“The Law of Insurance Contracts in the People’s Republic of China: A Comparative Analysis of 
Policyholders’ Rights”, online: the International Centre for Economic Research 
<http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2001/monti28-01.pdf> at 14.  
13
 The insurer is under the duty to make general explanation as to the terms and clauses of the insurance 
contract according to article 17 of the Insurance Law. See page 163ff., below. 
14
 See page 165ff., below. 
15
 In China, a large number of judges do not have a bachelor degree in law. It has been reported that only 
about 10% has a bachelor degree (not necessarily in law) and many of judges only get three-to-six-months 
temporary legal training before they become judges. Those who are not trained in law come from the army, 
the police offices, and some other departments of the government. In order to resolve the unemployment 
problem of the soldiers deactivated from army, the nation has stuffed many deactivated soldiers into the 
court, among which some are even illiterate, disabled, or psychoneurotic! Fortunately, since the unification 
judicial examination was held in 2002, the door for those who are not qualified with a bachelor degree has 
been closed, but there is still a long way to go. See e.g. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Zhong Guo De Si Fa Gai Ge 
(China’s Reform on the Judicial System)”, online: The British Broadcasting Corporation 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/chinese/China_news/newsid_2149000/21492061.stm>; Tang Ji & Liu Jun, “Shou 
Wei She Hui Gong Zheng Zui Hou Fang Xian: Zhong Guo Fa Guan Su Zhi Ling Ren You (Guarding the 
Last Defending Line of Social Justice: The Quality of Chinese Judges Are Worrying)”, online: New China 
Net (Xinhua Net) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2003-09/25/content_1099095.htm>; He Weifang, 
“Fu Zhuan Jun Ren Jin Fa Yuan (Deactivated Soldiers Come into the Courts)”, Southern Weekends, January 
2, 1998; Zhang Zhiming, “Dui Wo Guo Fa Guan Pei Xun De Liang Ge Jiao Du De Si Kao (Considerations 
from Two Approaches on the Training of Our Country’s Judges)”, online: China Legal Science Net 
<http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=243>. 
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statutes in their validity, they can complement the gap when the principles in the statutes are too 
general, and they can to a certain degree extend or limit the application of the statutes.16 The 
Supreme People’s Court of China also promulgates interpretations of the statute to make the 
general rules practicable or to rectify the flaws. These judicial interpretations play an important 
role in Chinese legal system. So far as the law of insurance is concerned, one should not only 
know the rules of the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code, but also the interpretations by the 
Supreme People’s Court17 and the regulations made by the Insurance Regulatory Commission.18 
There are numerous regulations that would influence the insurance contract from many aspects.19 
                                                        
16
 For example, according to the Regulations Regarding Information Disclosure Regarding New Personal 
Insurance promulgated by the Insurance Regulatory Commission (the CIRC), in making a new contract of 
“investment linked insurance”, the insured is required to disclose the achievements of investment account 
linked with that insurance within last ten years. If there were not such a regulation, the insurer would not be 
obliged to disclose it unless that data is part of the contract because the insurer has the duty to explain the 
terms of the contract according to article 17 of the Insurance Contract Law. (This Regulation is available 
online: CIRC <http://www.circ.gov.cn/policy/list_detail.asp?auto_id=171>.) For another example, the 
Beijing Insurance Regulatory Commission made local regulations requiring the insurance companies to 
prompt the insured of certain matters before the contract has been concluded. See news report in Jing Hua 
Shi Bao (Beijing China News), March 13, 2004, section 18.  
17
 The Supreme People’s Court has not promulgated an all-around interpretation on the Insurance Law or the 
Maritime Code. However, it is working on a draft of judicial interpretation on the Insurance Law. It is 
believed that this interpretation will be promulgated soon, but the exact time of promulgation has not been 
determined. The Supreme People’s Court has worked out a proposed draft for public review and is 
consulting opinions from all circles. See The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several 
Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com 
<http://www.law-lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. Hereafter, the proposed  
18
 The People’s Bank of China was the department in charge of the insurance industry before the 
establishment of China’s Insurance Regulatory Commission in 1998. Since 1983, the People’s Bank of 
China has been the centre bank of China in charge of national currency, banking & finance industry and 
state treasury (before 1983, the People’s Bank of China also acted as a commercial bank). The position of 
the People’s Bank of China as the centre bank was confirmed by The People’s Bank of China Act 1995. 
Since 1949, the insurance industry was in the charge of the People’s Bank of China until 1998. After 1998, 
China’s Insurance Regulatory Commission took charge of supervision of the insurance industry. See “The 
People’s Bank of China”, online: the Information Network Centre of Macau 
<http://dawning.iist.unu.edu/China/ceec-e/zgjrjg/rmyh/indexxf1.html>. as for the administrative regulations 
promulgated by the CIRC, see supra note 16. 
19
 For example, on May 21, 1997, the People’s Bank of China, the authority governing the insurance 
industry, in an official reply (the Reply on “the Inquiry Concerning the Interpretation on the Term of ‘All 
Risk’ in Marine Cargo Insurance” (Yin Han [1997] No. 210)) to the People’s Insurance Company, 
interpreted the meaning of “all risk” in marine cargo insurance. Such documents are suspectable on their 
validity as authorities. For example, the judges said, in Shenzhen Hualian Food & Cooking Oil Co. v. 
Hua’an Property Insurance Company, reported online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime 
Trial <http://www.ccmt.org.cn//hs/news/show.php?cId=939>, “[the Reply has given ‘all risk’ an 
interpretation much narrower than usually understood]… but the people outside China’s insurance industry 
will not know this; they usually get their understanding of insurance through, or only through, the terms of 
the insurance policy. Where the insurance company did not [interpret ‘all risk’], nor did the company attach 
 5
If the insured has known these regulations, he would at least reconsider whether to buy that type of 
insurance, but not all of the interpretations and the administrative regulations are easily accessible 
to the ordinary insurance consumers.20 Therefore, it may be appropriate to impose on the insurer a 
duty to disclose to the insured the subordinate regulations, the application of which would 
influence the insured’s decision on whether to buy the insurance.21 
 
Thirdly, in the Insurance Law, there are some peculiar rules full of Chinese characteristics, such as 
the duty of explanation (a kind of disclosure) of the insurer to the insured.22 Many of these peculiar 
rules are intended to protect the insured or to mitigate the harshness of the duty of disclosure23 as 
the English way of interpretation of utmost good faith has been criticized for a long time for its 
lack of flexibility and its bias towards the insurer.24 These ameliorating rules have laudable aims, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the Reply of the People’s Bank of China to the policy, nor did the company explain this term when it 
accepted the insurance… in such circumstances, the term on which the dispute arises should be interpreted 
in according to the usual understanding.” See Zhang Xianwei, “Marine Insurance in China: Coverage of the 
PICC All Risks Clauses”, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial (English version) 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/english/explore/exploreDetial.php?sId=267>. For another example, see supra note 
16. 
20
 Usually, the statutes are easily found in bookstores, but the judicial interpretations can only be found in 
certain professional periodicals which the ordinary people seldom hear. Furthermore, according to the 
Supreme People’s Court’s rule as per October 28, 1986, the People’s Court is not suggested to cite the 
judicial interpretations in the judgement although it actually decides according to it. A fortiori, some of the 
administrative regulations are not published at all. Some promulgations are even as informal as a reply to an 
insurance company on a particular matter. (See e.g. the Reply on “the Inquiry Concerning the Interpretation 
on the Term of ‘All Risk’ in Marine Cargo Insurance” (Yin Han [1997] No. 210), ibid.) 
21
 Discussed in more detail at page 178ff., below. 
22
 The rule contained in article 18 of the Insurance Law is seldom found in any other countries’ insurance 
law. Li Yuquan, Bao Xian Fa (Insurance Law), 2nd ed. (Beijing: The Law Press, 2003) at 60; Mu Shengting 
& Xu Liang, “Guan Yu Bao Xian He Tong Fa Zhong De Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze Ren Ti (On the 
Problem of the Principle of Utmost Good Faith in the Insurance Contract Law)” (2003) 56:3 Wuhan 
University Journal (Social Science Edition) 287 at 290. 
23
 The Chinese scholars have criticised that the marine insurance law of U.K. is too harsh on the insured. For 
example, see Wang Haiming, “Lun Bao Xian Yao Zhun Xun Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze (The Insurance 
Must Observe the Principle of Utmost Good Faith)”, [1999] 10 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual 
of China Maritime Law) 282 at 291-292; Gao Wei, “Lun Hai Shang Bao Xian Fa De Zui Da Cheng Xin 
Yuan Ze (On the Principle of Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance Law)” [1997] Zhong Guo Hai Shang 
Fa Nian Kan (Annual of China Maritime Law), vol. 8, 163 at 169-170, (Gao Wei commented on two 
English cases: Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.); 
affirming [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 (C.A.); affirming [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 (Comm. Ct.) and 
Container Transport International Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) [1984] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 476.) 
24
 Criticisms are from many aspects and will be mentioned in respective later parts of this thesis. For 
example, the test of materiality imposes so hard a duty on the insured that an insured could not reasonably 
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but again being very general rules, their functional efficacy may be weakened. So the problem is 
how to interpret them so that they can function well in the whole legal system of the insurance 
contract law? 
 
In addition, there are practical resistance to the enforcement of the law on duty of disclosure. The 
insured, especially those consumers, have never thought of there being such a duty of disclosure 
that would render the policy a piece of waste paper when they have paid premium for years.25 
They often let the insurance agent,26 or employee, fill in the application form for them and even 
sign for them.27 On the other hand, the insurance companies, in order to compete with each other, 
push their personnel to explore the market with every effort.28 As a result, the marketing personnel, 
with their anxiety to conclude the contract to earn the commission, sometimes lure the insured to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
notice what the insurer would regard material. Avoidance of the contract is an inflexible and draconian 
remedy in cases of inadvertent and borderline breaches of the duty. The remedy for the insurer’s breach of 
the duty of disclosure is strictly limited to rescission of the contract which gives little help to the insured. 
The expert evidence is more accessible to the insurer. For these criticisms, see Nicholas Legh-Jones, gen. ed., 
MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 10th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at paras. 17-96, 17-100, 17-101; 
Hwee Ying Yeo, “Uberrima Fides - Reciprocity of Duty in Insurance Contracts” (1988) 2 R.I.B.L. 271 at 
273; H. Y. Yeo, “Of Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts” (1991) 11 LS 
131; Yeo Hwee Ying, “Common Law Materiality – An Australian Alternative” [1990] J.B.L. 97; U.K., the 
Law Commission, Insurance Law - Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, Law Com. No. 104, Cmnd 
8064 (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) at paras. 3.17-3.22; U.K., the Law Reform Committee, Conditions and 
Exceptions in Insurance Policies, Law Reform Committee No. 5, Cmnd. 62 (London: H.M.S.O., 1957) para. 
4; R. A. Hasson, “The Doctrine of Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law - A Critical Evaluation” (1969), 32 M. 
L. R. 615.  
25
 For example, see the case reported online: China-Insuance.com <http://www.China-
insurance.com/faguidaquan/content.asp?id=16290>. There is never an indisputable clause in any insurance 
contract in China. The undisputable clause will be discussed in more detail at page 137ff., below. 
26
 Here, the insurance agent means the agent hired by the insurance companies. In China, there are two kinds 
of insurance agent. One is independent agent, or contracting agent, such as a branch of the bank, which helps 
the insurance company to reach contract with their customers. The other is hired by the insurance companies. 
This kind of agent is quite akin to the company’s employee. The insurance broker is highly undeveloped. 
See the text accompanying infra note 294. 
27
 There are many disputes as to the validity of the contract signed by person authorized by the insured. 
However, this issue will not be discussed as it is not covered by the topic of utmost good faith. Interested 
people may refer to An Na & Tao Xudong, “Cong He Tong Fa Jiao Du Kan Dai Qian Ming Bao Dan De Fa 
Lv Xiao Li (The Legal Effect of Signing on Behalf of Others: from the View of the Contract Law)”, 
International Finance News, August 16, 2001, section 6, online: the People’s Net 
<http://www1.people.com.cn/BIG5/paper66/4010/475518.html>. 
28
 These marketing personnel usually do not have fixed salaries, or very low fixed salaries. Their income 
depends on, or mainly on, their selling of insurance. They sometimes fail to be distinguished from the 
insurance company’s agents. 
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sign the contract by exaggerating the benefit of the insurance,29 concealing the exemption clauses30 
or even preventing the insured from performing the duty of disclosure.31  However, this is a 
universal problem rather than a particular Chinese one. 
 
As a result, the principle of utmost good faith has become one of the most disputed issues of the 
insurance law. The statutes made by the Congress tend to protect the insured.32 However, since 
these statutes are too general to fully cover the complexity of the reality,33 the legal resources that 
are the most functionally effective are actually those subordinate regulations, which, on the 
contrary, tend to protect the insurer,34 because the insurance companies are the game player, the 
rule maker and the umpire all in one!35 Therefore, the law reformers should, on the one hand, 
                                                        
29
 See Ren Guoping, “Tou Bao Ren Wei Bei Gao Zhi, Chu Xian Shui Fu Ze? (Who Is Liable Where The 
Insurance Applicant Was Not Informed?)” International Finance News (March 17, 2004) section 11, online: 
the People’s Net <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper66/11564/1042705.html>. In this article, a case is 
reported in which the insurance agent exaggerated that the compensation was 10,000 RMB but the agent did 
not show the insured all the terms of the insurance contract among which there was a term limited the 




 Hu Bao, “Wei Ru Shi Gai Zhi Ze Ren Zai Shui? (Whose Liability is it where the Disclosure is not True?)”, 
International Finance News (March 24, 2004) section 10, online: the People’s Net 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper66/11619/1047347.html>. In this case, the insurance agent, eager to 
conclude the contract, told the insured that the insured’s illness did not need to be disclosed because the 
agent knew that the insurance company would not accept the application had the illness been disclosed. The 
insured had difficulties in proving that the agent had so instructed him. 
32
 The Explanations of the Draft of the Insurance Law of People’s Republic of China (1995), online: Jilee 
Insurance Company <http://www.jilee.com/professional/reference/insurancelaw/3-4-5.htm>. In its fifth 
paragraph, it was written that: “the drafting of the law has insisted three principles: … the second is to 
protect the insured’s legal right and interest… and to promote the stability of the enterprise’s business and 
the people’s life.” 
33
 It is described as a “skeleton awaiting flesh”. Ian Lancaster, “Insurance Law Commentary”, online: the 
Chubb Insurance Company <http://www.chubb.com/China/laws/inslaw-commentary.htm>. 
34
 For example, as to how the insurer should perform his duty of explanation, the People’s Bank of China 
has made a rule that if the insurer has completely and accurately printed the contractual terms on the back of 
the policy, the insurer is deemed to have performed the duty of explanation. This rule is stipulated in the 
Reply as to the Questions of the Meaning of the Clear Explanation in the Auto-Mobile Insurance Business 
Yin Fa Tiao [1997] No. 35 (promulgated on June 17, 1997). This explanation does not stand with the spirit 
of the insurance law, and it is almost impossible for the insured, especially the consumer insured which this 
rule is aimed at, to know this reply. Therefore, the People’s Courts are very reluctant to enforce it. See 
LongDa Trade v. PICC Dalian Economic & Technology Development Zone Branch (the People’s Middle 
Court of Dalian) reported in Ren Min Fa Yuan An Li Xuan Jing Bian Ben (Selected Cases of the People’s 
Court), vol. 1 (Beijing: Xin Hua Press, 2001) 663 at 667. 
35
 This can be inferred from the history of the People’s Insurance Company, China’s first and biggest 
insurance company. In 1949, the People’s Insurance Company was established by the People’s Bank of 
China. The first manager in general of the People’s Insurance Company was the associate president of the 
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refine the statutes and make them functional in light of the legislative intention to create a fair 
market environment for both the insurer and the insured,36 and, on the other hand, examine the 
validity and the appropriateness of the subordinate regulations in light of the legislative intention. 
It may also be appropriate to impose on the insurer a duty to disclose these subordinate regulations 
to the insured before the contract has been concluded. It is in this sense that the long-awaited 
judicial interpretation made by the Supreme People’s Court37 on the Insurance Law is highly 
expected to target this goal. In December 2003, the Supreme People’s Court published a proposed 
draft of this interpretation and has been consulting for comments or suggestions from all circles. 
One of the seven most disputable problems in this draft is the principle of utmost good faith.38 
 
The thesis is intended to clarify the ambiguities of the law on the pre-contract utmost good faith 
for the following reasons: (1) this area is one of the most disputable problems in the practice;39 (2) 
the continuing utmost good faith is of different nature to the pre-contract one40 and it is mainly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
People’s Bank of China. In December, 1958, when the domestic insurance business of the People’s 
Insurance Company was wholly banned (except in Shanghai and Harbin between 1958 and 1966) due to the 
extremely “left” policy, the external insurance business and the subsequent work of domestic insurance were 
left to the People’s Bank of China. When the economy reform took place in 1978, it was also under the 
leadership of the People’s Bank of China that the domestic insurance business of the People’s Insurance 
Company was recovered. In 1991, headed by the People’s Bank of China, the work team began drafting the 
Insurance Law. See also Hu Jihua, gen. ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Bao Xian Fa Shi Yi Ji Shi 
Yong Zhi Nan (The Paraphrase and Practical Guide of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China) 
(Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Press, 2002) at 59-61. 
36
 The Explanations of the Draft of the Insurance Law of People’s Republic of China (1995), online: Jilee 
Insurance Company <http://www.jilee.com/professional/reference/insurancelaw/3-4-5.htm>. The latter part 
of its third paragraph mentioned the unfair competition between insurance companies and the disorderliness 
of the market, which motivated the making of the Insurance Law. 
37
 The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance 
Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
38
 Chen Ken, “Bao Xian Fa Si Fa Jie Shi Zheng Bian Shi Mo (The Disputes in the Judicial Interpretation of 
the Insurance Law)”, Economic News of 21st Century, 17 Dec, 2003, online: Southern Daily 
<http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20031218/jr/200312170601.asp>. 
39
 Chen Ken, ibid; The Second Civil Tribunal of the People’s High Court of Fujian Province, “Bao Xian He 
Tong Jiu Fen An Jian Ruo Gan Fa Lv Wen Ti Yan Jiu (Research on Some Legal Problem of Insurance 
Contract Dispute Cases)”, in Wang Liming et al, eds., Pan Jie Yan Jiu (Judgement Research), vol. 9 
(Beijing: The People’s Court Press, 2002) 61 at 65. 
40
 The pre-contract duty of utmost good faith in China is the operation of law, i.e., it is a statutory duty. See 
Sun Jilu, “Tou Bao Ren Gao Zhi Yi Wu Yan Jiu (Research on the Insurance Applicant’s Duty of 
Disclosure)”, (2003) 21:3 Tribune of Political Science and Law (Journal of China University of Political 
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governed by the principle of good faith which is stipulated in the Contract Law 1999 of China.41 
The thesis will try to clarify the ambiguities of law as to the principle of utmost good faith in the 
following aspects: the definition of the principle and its relationship with the good faith in the 
general contract law,42 the scope of disclosure,43  the test of materiality and inducement,44  the 
remedies for the insured’s breach of the duty of disclosure,45 the scope of the insurer’s duty of 
utmost good faith, and the remedies for the insurer’s breach.46 The author also wishes that this 
thesis would amend the flaws in the judicial interpretation of the Insurance Law that is currently in 
draft and also contribute to the reform of China’s insurance law. 
 
The English insurance law, especially the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), has greatly 
influenced the legislation of China,47 which is commonly regarded as a civil law country.48 The 
English model of principle of utmost good faith has operated for hundreds of years and its success 
has witnessed the prosperity of London insurance market, so a comparative study between Chinese 
law and English law will give some beneficial insights into the reform of Chinese law on the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Science and Law) 59. But the post-contract duty of utmost good faith in the insurance law, if exists at all, is 
contractual duty. See infra note 221. The law of U.K. also takes this view. See infra note 214. 
41
 Discussed in more detail at page 38, below. 
42
 Discussed in more detail at page 36ff., below. 
43
 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, below.  
44
 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 & Chapter 5 , below. 
45
 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, below. 
46
 Discussed in more detail at Chapter 7, below. 
47
 The Insurance Law 1995 and the Marine Code 1992, in which the marine insurance law is codified, are 
codification of internationally recognised principles. See Alberto Monti, “The Law of Insurance Contracts in 
the People’s Republic of China: A Comparative Analysis of Policyholders’ Rights”, online: the International 
Centre for Economic Research <http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2001/monti28-01.pdf> at 10 (on the Insurance 
Law 1995); Si Yuzhuo, et al, Xin Bian Hai Shang Fa Xue (New Edited Maritime Law) (Dalian: Dalian 
Maritime University Press, 1999) at 33-34, 464, (on the Marine Code 1992). In China, when talking about 
the insurance law, especially the marine insurance law, scholars frequently cite the position of the English 
insurance law to support their opinions. see e.g. Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang 
Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 80-
81; Wang Xin, “Lun Zhong Ying Liang Guo Hai Shang Bao Xian Fa Gao Zhi Yi Wu Zhong ‘Zhong Yao 
Qing Kuang’ De Biao Zhun (On the Standard of ‘Materiality’ in the Marine Insurance Laws of China and 
U.K.)”, (2002) Issue 11, Contemporary Legal Science 155; Yao Peng & Jin Youxiang, “Lun Zui Da Cheng 
Xin Yuan Ze Yu Wo Guo Hai Shang Bao Xian Zhi Du (On the Principle of Utmost Good Faith and Our 
Country’s Marine Insurance System)” (2003) 2:1 Journal of Dalian Maritime University (Social Science 
Edition) 18 at 19-20. See also the influence of the common law on China’s insurance law, supra note 1, 7. 
48
 Alberto Monti, ibid, at 3. 
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principle of utmost good faith. Besides the English law, the Australian law, which is the revised 
model of the English law, will also be drawn upon. 
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Chapter 2. General Considerations of the Principle of Utmost Good Faith 
 
I. The History of the Principle of Utmost Good Faith 
 
1. The Origin of the Principle in Ancient Roman Law 
 
In western countries, the principle of good faith which originated from ancient Roman law. It is 
called “bona fide” in Latin. “Fide” means “what has been done”. Cicero49 explained “fides” as 
“dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas (truthfully abiding by our words and 
agreements).”50 “Bona” means “good”. Under this principle, the concealment of any material facts 
of which the other party was ignorant was prohibited in all kinds of contracts and the breach of 
this duty entitled the aggrieved party to rescind contract.51 In Roman law, the principle of good 
faith was also a discretionary doctrine that helped the judge to interpret and supplement the 
contracts.52 
 
2. The Development of the Principle in England 
 
i. The Landmark of Carter v. Boehm53 
 
                                                        
49 Cicero: Marcis Tullius Cicero (BC106-BC43), the famous thinker in Ancient Rome. 
50
 Marcis Tullius Cicero, On Obligations (De Officiis), translated with an introduction and notes by P.G. 
Walsh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 10; Cicero also explained “fides” as “what is promised 
becomes fact”. See P.G. Walsh ibid. See also Marcis Tullius Cicero, On Obligations (De Officiis), with an 
English translation by Walter Miller (London: William Heinemann, 1913) at para. 23, online: The 
Constitution Society <http://www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm>. Walter Miller translated “fides” 
into “truth and fidelity to promises and agreements”. 
51
 Christopher Tay, “The Duty of Disclosure and Materiality in Insurance Contracts – A True Descendant of 
the Duty of Utmost Good Faith?” (2002) 13 Insurance Law Journal 183 at 186. 
52
 Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: the Civilian Tradition Today 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 84. 
53
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
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The principle of good faith originated in Roman law was revived by Italian merchants during the 
twelfth and fourth centuries.54 At this time, the English maritime industry and the related insurance 
business were dominated by the Lombard merchants, and the Court of Admiralty handling trade 
and shipping disputes applied civil law principles to suit the foreign traders.55 By the late sixteenth 
century, under the influence of the increasing commercial trade with Italian city-states, the 
principle of good faith, an alien concept of civil law, had gradually come into the English law and 
began to develop in certain contracts, such as insurance contract and contract of fiduciary 
relationship.56 The earliest and the most famous case on the principle of good faith in insurance is 
Lord Mansfield’s decision in Carter v. Boehm.57 Many of what he said is still the law of U.K. 
nowadays. 
 
ii. The Reasons for the Principle of Utmost Good Faith 
 
The facts of Carter v. Boehm58 were that after the capture of Fort Marlborough, the governor of 
the fort claimed under the policy but the insurer pleaded, as a defence against the claim, that the 
insured did not disclose material facts that the fort was not solid enough to withstand attack from 
enemy and that the French would attach this fort. Lord Mansfield said that: 
 
“Insurance is a contract upon speculation. The special facts, upon which the contingent 
chance is to be found, lie more commonly in the knowledge of the insured only: the 
                                                        
54
 Christopher Tay, “The Duty of Disclosure and Materiality in Insurance Contracts – A True Descendant of 




 Rene David & John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens, 
1985) at 311-314; Christopher Tay, “The Duty of Disclosure and Materiality in Insurance Contracts – A 
True Descendant of the Duty of Utmost Good Faith?” (2002) 13 Insurance Law Journal 183 at 186-187. 
57
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. It is asserted that the doctrine of good faith already existed in English common law 
before the case and what Lord Mansfield did was just recognition of the existence of the principle. See 
Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) 
19-20. 
58
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
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underwriter trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not 
keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter into a belief that 
the circumstances does not exist. The keeping back of such a circumstance is a fraud and 
therefore the policy is void. Although the suppression should happen through mistake, 
without fraudulent intention; yet still the underwriter is deceived, and the policy is void; 
because the risqué run is really different from the risqué understood and intended to be run 
at the time of the agreement.”59 
 
According to Lord Mansfield, the reason why such a duty should be imposed is the mutual trust 
and confidence between the parties, which composes the bases of insurance contracts. “Good faith 
forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain, from 
his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary.”60 From then on, the duty of disclosure 
became the essential part of the principle of utmost good faith. The historical background was that 
the insurer had little means to gain any information about the circumstances of the insured 
property or the insured person61 especially when the subject matter was outside of the insurer’s 
country. Nowadays, when modern communication and high technology have enabled the insurer 
to gain most of the relevant material circumstances, the principle of utmost good faith still exist 
because of the fact that it is much easier and less costly for the insured, who knows of the subject 
matter much better, to gain the knowledge of the material circumstances than for the insurer to 
discover them; and then the saved cost will in return benefit the insured with a lower premium. 
The principle of utmost good faith has become the requirement of economic efficiency.62 
 
iii. Necessity of Fraud, Effect of Breach of the Duty and Nature of Reciprocity 
                                                        
59
 Ibid, at 1905. 
60
 (1776) 3 Burr 1905 at 1909-1910. 
61
 See Poh Chu Chai, Principles of Insurance Law, 5th ed. (Singapore: Butterworths, 2000) at 104. 
62
 See generally Julie-Anne Tarr, Disclosure and Concealment in Consumer Insurance Contracts (London: 
Cavendish, 2002) at chapter 2. 
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As to whether the existence of fraud is essential to decide a breach of the duty of disclosure, it 
could be concluded from the above paragraph that Lord Mansfield emphasized on the mere fact of 
whether the insurer has been misled or not. In other words, whether there is fraud does not affect 
the result that the contract is avoidable at the option of the insurer.63 Although Lord Mansfield 
modified his view in the later case of Mayne v. Walter64 where he said “it must be a fraudulent 
concealment of circumstances that will vitiate a policy”,65 this view was not followed by later 
judges66 while the former view of Carter v. Boehm67 has persisted. 
 
Lord Mansfield said that a breach of the duty of disclosure renders a contract void “in favour of 
the party misled by his ignorance of the thing concealed”.68  This means that the contract is 
avoidable at the option of the aggrieved party. Section 18(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
(U.K.) stipulates that: “If the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the 
contract.” 
 
Lord Mansfield underlined that this duty equally applies to the insurer. He said: 
 
“The policy would be equally void, against the underwriter, if he concealed; if he insured 
a ship on her voyage, which he privately knew to be arrived; and an action would lie to 
recover the premium… Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately 
knows. To draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing 
                                                        
63
 Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 
1996) at 23. 
64
 (1872) 3 Doug K.B. 79. 
65
 See the report in Parks, The Law of Marine Insurance (1787) at 220, cited in Semin Park, The Duty of 
Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 23. 
66
 For example, see Lindenau v. Desborough (1828) 8 B. & C. 586; Elton v. Larkins (1832) 5 C. & P. 385; 
Bates v. Hewitt (1867) 2 Q. B. 595; Anderson v. Pacific Fire and Marine Ins. (1872) 7 C. P. 65. 
67
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
68
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1910. 
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the contrary… this definition of concealment,…will generally hold to make it void, in 
favour of the party misled by his ignorance of the thing concealed.” 
 
Nonetheless, the tendency of the courts and the customary practice in the insurance market on the 
issue of reciprocity has been such that this duty has rarely been applied to an insurer.69 This is 
partly because the insurer is unlikely to have something particularly in his knowledge that would 
influence the insured on whether to have the insurance contract or on what terms to have the 
contract. What counts as more weight is that the remedy for the breach of the utmost good faith 
under the English law is avoidance of the contract and return of the premium70 which usually 
would be of little benefit to the insured as “the insured is more concerned with ensuring that his 
goods remain adequately covered than with recouping his premium contributions”.71 
 
iv. The Application of the Principle in Other Contracts 
 
Lord Mansfield said that the principle of good faith is “applicable to all contracts and dealings”72 
and some other judges of his time also believed so.73 However, from about the 1870s onwards, the 
                                                        
69
 See H. Y. Yeo, “Of Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts” (1991) 11 LS 
131 at 131. 
70
 Joel v. Law Union & Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 K.B.863; Locker & Woolf v. Western Australian 
Insurance Co. [1936] 1 K.B. 408 at 415; Cornhill Insurance Co. v. Assenheim (1937) 58 Ll.L.Rep. 27 at 31; 
Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. v. 
Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); affirming [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 (C.A.); 
reversing [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.). 
71
 H. Y. Yeo, “Of Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts” (1991) 11 LS 131 
at 144. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC 
Report No. 91 (Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at para. 10.145-10.148. A recent development on this issue 
was demonstrated in two cases: Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. 
Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); affirming 
[1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 (C.A.); reversing [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.) and Bank of Nova Scotia v. 
Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd. (The Good Luck) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (H.L.); 
reversing [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 238 (C.A.); reversing [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 540 (Note) (Comm. Ct.). The 
first case is discussed in more detail at page 114ff., below. The second case is discussed in more detail in 
infra note 661 
72 (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1910. 
73 Such as, Lord St Leonards in Lumley v. Wagner [1852] 1 Deg. M. & G. 604; Sir Wood in Blisset v. Daniel 
(1853) 10 Hare 493. 
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general requirement of good faith in all contracts faded out74 coinciding with the rise of the 
doctrine of “caveat emptor”,75 and the principle of good faith remained only in certain kinds of 
contracts, such as the insurance contract.76 
 
v. Statutory Authorities 
 
The principle of utmost good faith initiated by Lord Mansfield was later codified in the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.). Sections 17 to 20 set out the general principle that “A contract of 
marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith”, and specify its application in 
two central areas, i.e., misrepresentation and non-disclosure. The principles concerning utmost 
good faith codified in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) was said to have expressed the law 
applicable to both marine and non-marine insurance.77 
 
3. The Principle of Utmost Good Faith in China 
 
i. The Economic Contract Law 198178  and the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 
198379 
                                                        
74
 Smith v. Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597; Bell v. Lever Brothers Limited [1932] A.C. 161 (In this case, 
caveat emptor was stated to be a principle of universal validity.); White & Carter (Councils) v. McGregor 
[1962] A.C. 413; Reziya Harrison, Good Faith in Sales (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 7. 
75
 The rise of “caveat emptor” was not attributed to one factor. “The goods were becoming too many, their 
uses too numerous, and their qualities too diverse to” make a measurement common to all. “As the 
bourgeois came to be powerful they could not remain quietly tolerant of a studies supervision of their 
activities. They were not to be ‘over-thwarted by preachers and others that cannot skill of their dealings.’” 
Moreover, Adam Smith’s argument that “each person, in aiming only at his own advantage, ‘is led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his intention’ won a growing approval.” Walton H. 
Hamilton, “The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor” (1931) 40 Yale Law Journal, 1133 at 1170-1171; Thomas 
Wilson, A Discourse on Usury, with an introduction, by R. H. Tawney (London: George Bell, 1925) at 64. 
76
 See Poh Chu Chai, Principles of Insurance Law, 5th ed. (Singapore: Butterworths, 2000) at 103. 
77
 Highlands Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 109; reaffirmed by Pan 
Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.). 
78
 The Economic Contract Law 1981 was abolished on October 1, 1999, by article 428 of the Contract Law 
1999. 
79
 The Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983 was abolished on October 6, 2001, by the Decision of 
the State Council on Abolishing Some of the Administrative Regulations Promulgated Before 2000. 
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After the founding of the People’s Republic of China,80 the law on the matter of good faith, 
together with the insurance industry, was wiped out for a long time due to the communism 
ideology and its centrally planned economy.81 Economic reform took place in 1979,82 and China 
began to implement the “Socialist Market Economy” throughout the following decade. As a result, 
dramatic changes occurred in two aspects stimulating the growth of the insurance. The individuals, 
on one hand, began to be entitled to property rights, and the private property was protected by law, 
and later by the Constitution.83 On the other hand, “the Communist State began its slow but 
inexorable retreat and it ceased to take care of every aspect of the life of the Chinese People … the 
insurance contract is predestined to become the most important legal and economic tool available 
to those individuals who are not willing and/or able to bear the entirety of the risks associated with 
the implementation of the modern economic reforms.” 84  With the fast development of the 
insurance industry,85 the need for a modern and sophisticated legal framework to regulate rights 
                                                        
80
 The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party overthrew “the 
Republic of China”. The law of the Republic of China still remains in force in Taiwan, which is claimed to 
be part of China. In 1929, the parliament of the Republic of China promulgated the Insurance Law of the 
Republic of China. The principle of utmost good faith (duty of disclosure) was incorparated in this insurance 
law. It was a fairly complete rule of the duty of disclosure, and it even had some virtues for the insurance 
law nowadays to learn from. For example, the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China nowadays 
has not yet set up the time limitation to the insurer’s right to terminate the contract on ground of the breach 
of utmost good faith and article 16(2) of the Insurance Law of the Republic of China is worthy of reference. 
However, all the laws made by the Republic of China became abolished as soon as the foundation of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949 because the Communist Party believed that those laws were of 
Capitalism nature. Therefore, the legal system of the People’s Republic of China started afresh. 
81 Supra note 1. 
82
 After Mao Zedong died in 1976, the national economics was at the edge of collapse. Deng Xiaoping and 
other Chinese leaders began to realise that they must immediately stop the class struggle and devote to the 
economic development. Two years after the death of Mao, in 1978, in the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the policies of economic reform and opening to the 
outside were established and these policies have been pursued until today. 
83
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was amended in 2004 to protect the private property 
rights. 
84
 See Alberto Monti, “The Law of Insurance Contracts in the People’s Republic of China: A Comparative 
Analysis of Policyholders’ Rights”, online: the International Centre for Economic Research 
<http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2001/monti28-01.pdf> at 2. 
85
 See the text accompanying supra note 2 and note 4.  
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and duties of the parties of insurance contracts became clear and compelling.86  In 1981, the 
Economic Contract Law of China 1981 first established the duty of disclosure in the insurance 
contract in its article 46(2)87 although it was a very ambiguous rule. Soon after that, in 1983, 
article 46 was complemented and refined by the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983, 
article 7 of which became the precursor to the utmost good faith in the Insurance Law.88 
 
Although the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983 was still a rough rule and it no longer 
stands with the Insurance Law now, it had contained the major characters of the principle of 
utmost good faith in China’s non-marine insurance law. (1) The Property Insurance Contract 
Regulation 1983 established the duty of disclosure as a duty of law.89 (2) The Regulation created 
the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith, i.e. the duty to inform the insurance applicant of “the 
affairs as to the insurance contract”.90 This was a very broad term compared with the phrases in 
article 17 of the Insurance Law.91 It failed to give detailed guidance as to what the insurer should 
disclose and it also failed to provide the remedy for the breach of this duty, but this broad ambit of 
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 Alberto Monti, “The Law of Insurance Contracts in the People’s Republic of China: A Comparative 
Analysis of Policyholders’ Rights”, online: the International Centre for Economic Research 
<http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2001/monti28-01.pdf> at 2. 
87
 Article 46(2) of the Economic Contract Law 1981 stipulated: “the insured’s responsibility: if the insured 
conceals the truth about the insured property, the insurer has the right to rescind the contract or is not liable 
in compensation.” [Translated in Statutes and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 
looseleaf (Hong Kong: University of East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese law, 1987-1990) Ch. 811213.1, 
at 8.] The Economic Contract Law 1981 was revised in 1993, and article 46 was changed to article 41, but 
the content of this article was unchanged. 
88
 For an English translation of the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983, see Statutes and 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 2, looseleaf (Hong Kong: University of East Asia Press 
and Institute of Chinese law, 1987-1990) Ch. 830901.  
Article 7 of the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983 stipulates that: “In making an insurance 
contract, the insurer shall inform the insurance applicant of the matters relating to the insurance contract; the 
applicant shall, in accordance with the insurer’s requirements, disclose the major risks which are necessary 
for the insurer to know in determining the premiums or whether to accept the insurance. 
“After the conclusion of the insurance contract, if the insurer finds that the applicant has failed to disclose 
such major risks as stated in the above section, the insurer has the right to terminate the contract or he shall 
bear no obligation for indemnification.” 
These paragraphs are translated by the author, because article 7 of the translation text in Statutes and 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, ibid is not neatly phrased. 
89
 See Li Feng, “Lun Gao Zhi Yi Wu (On the Duty of Disclosure)”, (1998) Issue 3, Maritime Trial 8 at 9. 
90
 Article 7 of the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983, ibid. 
91
 The parallel phrases of article 17 of the Insurance Law reads “the insurer shall explain the contract terms 
to the applicant”. 
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the insurer’s duty of disclosure should have been reserved in the Insurance Law together with the 
detailed rules of articles 17 and 18.92 (3) The Regulation had adopted the proposition that the 
insured need only disclose those facts that the insurer requests. This proposition has been called 
“the inquiry-disclosure principle” in contrast with “the voluntary disclosure principle”, or “the 
active disclosure principle”,93 which is widely adopted in common law countries. However, it also 
contained a few ideas of common law, for instance, the rule that the insured is obliged to disclose 
only major risks which are necessary for the insurer to know has combined the idea of materiality. 
The Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983 was intended to apply to both marine and non-
marine insurance contract,94 but after the promulgation of the Maritime Code, the marine and non-
marine insurance began to operate in different legal systems.95 
 
ii. The Maritime Code 
 
In 1992, the Maritime Code ratified by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
adopted the principle of utmost good faith as one of the internationally recognized principles. The 
Maritime Code codified almost every aspects of the maritime law including marine insurance in 
light of international practice.96  Although the Maritime Code does not use the expression of 
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 Discussed in more detail at page 178ff., below. 
93
 Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd ed. 
(Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 79. They are also described respectively as the passive 
and the active duty of disclosure. Trine-Lisewilhelmsen, “Duty of Disclosure, Duty of Good Faith, 
Alteration of Risk and Warranties: An analysis of the Replies to the CMI Questionnaire”, [2000] CMI 
Yearbook 332 at 353. 
94
 Article 22 of the Regulation: “Unless otherwise specified by law, this Regulation applies to the marine 
insurance contract.” 
95
 For the reasons of the separate operation of the two systems, see page 30ff., below. 
96
 For example, in the Maritime Code, the law of bill of lading was based on the Hague-Visby Rules with a 
few changes in light of the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (the Hansberger 
Rules); the law of salvage was almost the reprint of the International Convention on Salvage 1989; many 
other conventions were also referred to, such as the York Antwerp Rules 1974, the Athens Rules 1974, etc. as 
far as the marine insurance was concerned, the Lloyd’s S. G. policy was referred to as the international 
insurance contract model and the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) was referred to as the internationally 
recognised practice. Si Yuzhuo, et al, Xin Bian Hai Shang Fa Xue (New Edited Maritime Law) (Dalian: 
Dalian Maritime University Press, 1999) at 33-34, 464. 
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“utmost good faith”, articles 222 and 223 stipulate the duty of disclosure, which is the main 
content of the principle of utmost good faith. 
 
Article 222 “Before the contract is concluded, the insured shall truthfully disclose to the 
insurer the material circumstances which the insured has knowledge of or ought to have 
knowledge of in the ordinary business practice and which have a bearing on the insurer in 
deciding the premium or whether be agrees to insure or not. 
 
“The insured need not inform the insurer of the facts which the insurer has known of or 
the insurer ought to have knowledge of in the ordinary business practice if the insurer 
made no inquiry.”97 
 
Article 223 “Upon intentional failure of the insured to truthfully inform the insurer of the 
material circumstances set forth in paragraph 1 of article 222 of this Code, the insurer has 
the right to terminate the contract without refunding the premium. The insurer shall not be 
liable for any loss arising from the perils insured against before the contract is terminated. 
  
“If, not due to the insured’s intentional act, the insured did not truthfully disclose to the 
insurer the material circumstances set out in paragraph 1 of article 222 of this Code, the 
insurer has the right to terminate the contract or to demand a corresponding increase in the 
premium. In case the contract is terminated by the insurer, the insurer shall be liable for 
the loss arising from the perils insured against which occurred prior to the termination of 
                                                        
97
 Translated by the author with reference to the following versions of translation. The Maritime Code of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2nd ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 1993) at 60; Stephen 
FitzGerald, ed. China Laws for Foreign Business, vol. 3, looseleaf (North Ryde, N.S.W.: CCH Australia Ltd, 
1985-1987) para. 15-642 at para. 15-642(224). 
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the contract, except where the material circumstances uninformed or wrongly informed of 
have an impact on the occurrence of such perils.”98 
 
It is appropriate to briefly introduce the position of the Maritime Code in respect of utmost good 
faith, although the details will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. According to 
the Maritime Code, the insured should make truthful disclosure of material circumstances. 
“Truthful” here means that the circumstances disclosed must be true and the insurer can neither 
conceal the truth nor make misrepresentation. The duty is to disclose what the insured knows or 
ought to know, but he does not need to disclose what the insurer knows or ought to know. If the 
insured intentionally, in the sense that he knows that his act would be a breach of his duty, 
breaches the duty of disclosure, the insurer may terminate the contract and forfeit the premium, 
and the insurer is not liable for any loss rising from the perils insured against, whether or not the 
loss occurs before or after the termination. If the insured unintentionally, the insurer may terminate 
the contract but he must refund the premium. The insurer is not liable for the loss occurring after 
the termination, but he is still liable to compensate for the loss occurring before the termination 
unless the non-disclosure has an impact on the occurrence of the loss. “An impact” means that the 
undisclosed circumstances must at least have some connection with the occurrence of the loss. 
 
iii. The Insurance Law 
 
The Insurance Law was regarded as the landmark in the development of the insurance law in 
China. It is a codification of internationally recognised insurance principles.99 It was later amended 
in 2002 to comply with the commitments made by the Chinese government in entering the World 
                                                        
98
 The Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, 2nd ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 
1993) at 60-61 
99
 Edward J. Epstein & Andrew Hallworth, “The New Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China” 
[1996] 2 Int. Insurance Law Review 61. 
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Trade Organization. The main amendment was made on the governance of the insurance 
companies, including allowing the foreign investment into the insurance industry. The problems of 
the insurance contract were almost untouched and were left to be resolved by the judicial 
interpretation.100 However, a new article 5 was inserted to improve the good faith between the 
parties.101 Articles 17 and 18102 of the amended insurance law deal with the principle of utmost 
good faith. 
 
Article 5 “When exercising rights or performing obligations, parties in insurance activities 
shall be consistent with the principle of honesty and good faith.103 
 
Article 17 “In concluding an insurance contract, the insurer shall explain the contract 
terms to the applicant, and the insurer may inquire about the relevant circumstances 
concerning the subject matter of the insurance or concerning the insured. The applicant 
shall make a truthful disclosure. 
 
“The insurer shall have the right to terminate the insurance, if the applicant intentionally 
conceals the facts and does not perform his duty of truthful disclosure, or if the insured 
negligently fails to make disclosure thereby which is sufficient to affecting the insurer’s 
decision on whether or not to provide the insurance or whether to increase the premium 
rate. 
                                                        
100
 See Tian Yanmian, “Latest Amendment of Chinese Insurance Law”, (2002) Issue 6, China Law 60 at 60-
61; Xu Chongmiao, “Ju Jiao ‘Bao Xian Fa’ Xiu Gai (Focus on the Revision of ‘the Insurance Law’)”, 
Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao (China Securities Newspaper), October 28, 2002, online: the People’s Net 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/34/167/20021028/852247.html>. 
101
 In the Congress debates, the lack of good faith of the insurance companies became one of the focuses and 
as a result, article 5 was inserted. See Hu Jihua, gen. ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Bao Xian Fa 
Shi Yi Ji Shi Yong Zhi Nan (The Paraphrase and Practical Guide of the Insurance Law of the People’s 
Republic of China) (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Press, 2002), ay 50-51. 
102
 Before the amendment was made in 2002, the articles dealing with the duty of disclosure were articles 16 
and 17. They were renumbered to be 17 and 18, but the content was unchanged. 
103
 According to the Chinese original text, “honesty and good faith” is the same as “good faith”. 
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“If an applicant intentionally fails to perform his obligation of making a truthful disclosure, 
as regards the insured event which occurs prior to the rescission of the contract, the insurer 
shall bear no obligation for indemnification or payment of the insured amount, or for 
returning the premiums paid. 
 
“If an applicant negligently fails to perform his obligation of making a truthful disclosure 
and this has a severe impact on the occurrence of an insured event, the insurer shall, in 
connection with the insured event which occurred prior to the rescission of the contract, 
bear no obligation for indemnification or payment of the insured amount but may return 
the premiums paid. 
 
“By insured event is meant an event falling within the scope of cover under the insurance 
contract.” 
 
Article 18 “If there are exclusion clauses provided by the insurer in the insurance contract, 
then the insurer shall make precise and clear explanations in respect thereof to the 
applicant when concluding the insurance contract, otherwise such clauses shall have not 
effect.”104 
 
It is appropriate to briefly introduce the position of the Insurance Law in respect of utmost good 
faith, although the details will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. According to 
the Insurance Law, the insurer should explain the terms of the contract to the insured, and he 
should clearly explain the exemption clauses to the insured, failing which the exemption clauses 
                                                        
104
 “Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China”, (2002) Issue 6, China Law 103 at 104. Paragraph 1 
and 2 of article 17 has been modified by the author in accordance to the Chinese original language. 
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are not valid. The insured’s duty to disclose is based on the inquiry of the insurer and he should 
truthfully disclose what is asked. If the insured intentionally breaches the duty, the insurer may 
terminate the contract and he is not liable for any loss whether or not the loss occurs before or after 
the termination. If the insured negligently, in the sense that a reasonable person in his position 
would have disclosed it, breaches the duty the insurer may also terminate the contract as long as 
the non-disclosure is material. Where breach is negligent, the insurer is liable for the loss 
occurring before the termination unless the non-disclosure has a grave impact on the occurrence of 
the loss. 
 




The Insurance Law and the Maritime Code are two main statutes currently in force governing 
insurance contracts and both contain the principle of utmost good faith. The rules of utmost good 
faith in the two statutes are quite different from each other in quite a few aspects. 
 
First, there are some differences as to the breach of the duty of disclosure. The Insurance Law does 
not afford any remedy to the insurer where the insured breach the duty without negligence, while 
under the Maritime Code the insurer can terminate the contract for innocent non-disclosure.105 The 
Maritime Code provides that the insurer may claim for additional premium in lieu of terminating 
the contract, but there is no similar rule in the Insurance Law.106 The marine insurer will be 
discharged of his liability under the policy if the circumstance undisclosed has “an impact” on the 
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 Discussed in more detail at page 129ff. and 134ff., below. 
106
 Discussed in more detail at page 148ff., below. 
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loss, but the insurer in non-marine insurance has to prove that the impact is grave before he is 
entitled to reject to compensate for the loss.107 
 
(b) The Insurance Applicant v. the Insured 
 
As to who is obliged to disclose to the insurer, the two statutes are different in the phrasing.108 The 
Insurance Law insists that the insurance applicant is one of the parties to the contract and it is the 
applicant’s duty to make truthful disclosure. 109  The conceptions of “the insured” and “the 
insurance applicant” are also defined as different individuals. “The [insurance] applicant refers to 
the party who enters into an insurance contract with an insurer and [who] is obliged to pay the 
premiums under the insurance contract.”110 “The insured refers to a person whose property or life 
or body is protected by the insurance contract and who is entitled to claim for the insurance money. 
The applicant may also be the insured”111 but they are sometimes different individuals and in this 
situation the insured becomes the third party to the contract.112 The difference between the insured 
and the applicant means that the insurer cannot terminate the contract for the insured’s non-
disclosure or misrepresentation, nor can he terminate for the applicant’s non-disclosure of what the 
insured knows but the applicant does not know. Therefore, there are arguments that the law should 
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 Discussed in more detail at page 131ff., below. 
108
 It has never been a problem in the common law where the position is simple and clear. The party who 
contracts with the insurer is the insured. Before the conclusion of the insurance contract, he is also called the 
insurance applicant. There is no difference whether the duty is imposed on the insured or on the insurance 
applicant because they are exactly the same principal. 
109
 See article 17 of the Insurance Law, at page 22, above. 
110
 Article 10(2) of the Insurance Law. 
111
 Article 22(2) of the Insurance Law. 
112
 Hu Jihua gives some examples in which the insured are not the applicant. In property insurance, the 
owner may insure the subject matter for the interest of the mortgagee and consequently the mortgagee may 
become the insured; the manager or the charterer of the subject matter may insure for the owner’s interest 
and consequently the owner may become the insured. In life insurance, the father may apply for the 
insurance of the health of his son and make his son the insured. Hu Jihua, gen. ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min 
Gong He Guo Bao Xian Fa Shi Yi Ji Shi Yong Zhi Nan (The Paraphrase and Practical Guide of the 
Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Press, 
2002) at 110-111. Another example is “the Terms on the Credit Insurance of Consuming Loan of 
Automobiles” which is standard terms published for uniform use of all insurance companies. In the standard 
terms, the insurance applicant is the consumer who buys the automobile and the insured is the bank who 
loans to the consumer. 
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also impose a duty of disclosure on the insured, although he is the third party of the contract.113 
However, if the insured were obliged to disclose, should the remedy available to the insurer be the 
termination of the contract? And would it be proper to impose such a duty on the third party while 
the breach would cause the contract to be terminated? In addition, because of the application of the 
inquiry-disclosure doctrine mentioned below, the insurer is able to ask the applicant to enquire 
from the insured if the applicant really does not know certain material circumstances, and if the 
insurer does not ask, the applicant is not obliged to disclose even if he knew it.114 
 
The Maritime Code, however, stipulates that “the insured” is obliged to make the disclosure,115 but 
the meaning of “the insured” in the Maritime Code is different to that of “the insured” in the 
Insurance Law. Although in the Maritime Code does not define what “the insured” means, “the 
insured” should be interpreted as the same concept as “the insurance applicant” in the Insurance 
Law, because in the context of the Maritime Code, the phrase “the insured” is always used as the 
counter part to the insurer116 in whole chapter of marine insurance while it never uses the phrase 
“the insurance applicant”. It is sometimes misleading that the same phrase “the insured” has 
different meanings in these two relevant statutes.117 
                                                        
113
 See e.g. Weng Desun, “Bao Xian Fa Zhong Gao Zhi Yi Wu Zhi Wo Jian (Opinions on the Duty of 
Disclosure in the Insurance Law)” (2000) 14:2 Transaction of Fujian Police High Academy 55 at 56; Zhou 
Yuhua, “Bao Xian Fa Shang De Gao Zhi Yi Wu (The Duty of Disclosure on the Insurance Law)”, (2001) 
Issue 10, Lawyer’s World 4. 
114
 If the insurance applicant actually knows a circumstance but does not disclose because the insurer does 
not inquire, it does not necessarily constitute fraud because the applicant’s failure to disclose may be due to 
his unconsciousness of the materiality of that circumstances. 
115
 See article 222 and 223 of the Maritime Code, at page 20, above. 
116
 For example, article 216 of the Maritime Code defines the marine insurance contract as “a contract 
whereby the insurer undertakes, as agreed, to indemnify the loss to the subject matter insured and the 
liability of the insured caused by the perils covered by the insurance against the payment of an insurance 
premium by the insured.” in the Maritime Code, it is the main duty of the insured to pay the premium and in 
the Insurance Law, the applicant means the party who is obliged to pay the premium. Therefore, “the 
insured” in the Maritime Code actually has the same meaning as “the insurance applicant” in the Insurance 
Law. 
117
 For example, Shao Changcheng alleged that the definition of “the insured” made by the Insurance Law 
(that the insured is the person whose property is insured) should apply to the marine insurance contract and 
“the insured” in the Maritime Code has to be interpreted according to the definition made by the Insurance 
Law because article 153 of the Insurance Law provides that for matters not specified in the Maritime Code, 
the relevant provisions of the Insurance Law shall apply. Since the Maritime Code does not define who the 
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It is suggested that the two statutes unify the expressions as to the contractual party; it may be 
unified to the expression “the insured” as well so that the Chinese expression will be identical with 
international usage. Therefore, in this thesis, unless otherwise specified, “the insured” will be used 
in circumstances of both marine and non-marine insurance to mean the party with whom the 
insurer enters into the contract. 
 
(c) Inquiry-Disclosure v. Voluntary Disclosure 
 
The Insurance Law followed its precursor the Property Insurance Contract Regulation 1983 in the 
principle of inquiry-disclosure.118 The doctrine of “inquiry-disclosure” means that the insured has 
no duty to disclose anything unless asked by the insurer even if the insured knows something 
which is material in fact but the insured does not know its materiality. However, if the insured 
actually knows the materiality of a circumstance which the insurer does not inquire, the 
concealment of the circumstance may constitute fraud in the general contract. In addition, the 
insured cannot give an answer without reasonable ground to believe its truth,119 but he can answer 
in the questionnaire with “I am not clear about it” if he really does not know it. If the insurer 
insists on the relevant answer, the insured can make further investigation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
insured is, the definition in the Insurance Law shall apply. Therefore the insured in the Maritime Code is not 
the party of the insurance contract. Shao continued to suggest that the maritime code should change the 
insured to the applicant to correspond with the definition of the Insurance Law. See Shao Changcheng, “Dui 
‘Hai Shang Fa’ Ji ‘Bao Xian Fa’ You Guan Ru Shi Gao Zhi Yi Wu Gui Ding De Si Kao (Considerations on 
the Rule of Truthful Disclosure in the Maritime Code and the Insurance Law)”, (2000) April, CMLA News 
Letter 17at 19-20. Scholars also suggest imposing on the insured (as defined in the Insurance Law) the same 
duty of disclosure. Zhao Qijin, “Lun Bao Xian Fa De Gao Zhi Yi Wu (On the Duty of Disclosure of the 
Insurance Law)”, (1996) Issue 3, Legal Science 56 at 56. 
118
 Also called passive duty of disclosure, see Trine-Lisewilhelmsen, “Duty of Disclosure, Duty of Good 
Faith, Alteration of Risk and Warranties: An analysis of the Replies to the CMI Questionnaire”, [2000] CMI 
Yearbook 332 at 353. 
119
 Otherwise the insured may breach the duty in negligence. For the meaning of negligence, see page 126, 
below. In China, the law does not differentiate a statement of an opinion from a statement of the fact. This 
problem is discussed in more detail at page 45ff., above. 
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It seems that the insurer should prove that he has asked about the relevant questions. The 
application form and the risk inquiry form designed by the insurer, should be regarded as the 
written form of the insurer’s inquiry.120 
 
On the contrary, as a result of learning from the common law,121 the Maritime Code adopts “the 
voluntary disclosure”.122 The marine insured should voluntarily disclose what he knows or ought 
to know even if the insurer does not inquire. The scope of the voluntary disclosure is defined in a 
similar way as the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.). Many of these conceptions may have come 
from the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), such as the constructive knowledge and the 
materiality. 
 
(d) Reasons for Adopting the Principle of “Inquiry-Disclosure” 
 
The reasons for adopting such a principle in non-marine insurance could be found in the legislative 
documents. The insurance in China was a brand-new creature after economic reform, which took 
place in 1979,123 and the common people were quite unfamiliar with it and its rules. The duty of 
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 Article 9(2) of The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the 
Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
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 The legislation of China insurance laws has made frequent reference to the law of U.K. See Wang 
Haiming, “Lun Bao Xian Yao Zhun Xun Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze (The Insurance Must Observe the 
Principle of Utmost Good Faith)”, [1999] 10 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of China 
Maritime Law) 282 at 282. 
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 Also called active duty of disclosure, see Trine-Lisewilhelmsen, “Duty of Disclosure, Duty of Good Faith, 
Alteration of Risk and Warranties: An analysis of the Replies to the CMI Questionnaire”, [2000] CMI 
Yearbook 332 at 353. 
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 Before economic reform, under the Unitarianism, the state was the big brother looking after every person. 
All factories, enterprises, schools, communities, and all kinds of organizations were all the organs of the 
state. These organs took care of every person on behalf of the state from every aspect, from birth to death, 
from house to illness, from accidents to the education of children. Insurance was thought as useless at that 
time. However, when economic reform took place, the market economic requires the enterprises to be 
independent, profit-earning and pure economic organizations. These “organs” began to give up the 
obligation of taking care of everything of their employees. And when the marketization was carried on 
irreversibly, the medical treatment became no longer free, and then the houses followed, and then was the 
education… In addition, inflation has prompted people’s to find more investment approaches other than just 
putting money in the banks and insurance became one of the attracting investment approaches. Moreover, 
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disclosure, which was outside the contract and which could avoid the contract, seemed so strange 
to them that they seldom realized the existence of such a duty until the insurance company rejected 
the claim on the ground of the breach of the duty. In addition, the insurance companies were not 
bothered with the facts that should be disclosed until the occurrence of the loss and, often, they 
even tried to induce the insured to keep silent on the material facts.124 When the Insurance Law 
was proposed to the National Congress 1995, the sponsor stated the circumstances of the insurance 
industry and the existing problems125 and made the protection of the insured as one of the guiding 
ideologies of the Insurance Law. 126  He argued that, due to unfair competition between the 
insurance companies, the insured’s, especially the consumer insured’s, right and interest had been 
unlawfully encroached upon, so one of the main purposes of the Insurance Law was to reinforce 
protection for the insured127 and this ideology was unchallenged by the congress.128 Based on the 
reality that the insured was treated with injustice in regard to the duty of disclosure and the 
tendency to protect the insured, the Insurance Law adopted the principle of “inquiry-disclosure”. It 
seems that the adoption of the principle of inquiry-disclosure was influenced by the 
consumerism.129 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the more and more wealthier people begun to have their own property and some begun to operate their own 
business. The need of apportionment of risks has been witnessed by the accelerating development of the 
insurance industry. See generally, Alberto Monti, “The Law of Insurance Contracts in the People’s Republic 
of China: A Comparative Analysis of Policyholders’ Rights”, online: the International Centre for Economic 
Research <http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2001/monti28-01.pdf>; Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern 
China, 16th ed. (New York: Oxford, 2000) at 811, 950-957. 
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 See supra note 31 at page 7. 
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 The Explanations of the Draft of the Insurance Law of People’s Republic of China (1995), online: Jilee 
Insurance Company <http://www.jilee.com/professional/reference/insurancelaw/3-4-5.htm>, para. 3. 
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 Ibid, para. 5. 
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 Ibid, para. 3 and para. 5. 
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 The Report of the Law Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Result of the Deliberation of 
the Insurance Law of People’s Republic of China (Draft) (1995), online: stockwin.com 
<http://www.stockwin.com.cn/html/baoxian000falufagui000youguanxinxi0003.htm>. 
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 It can be inferred from the context of the Law Commission’s Report, ibid, that when the law commission 
talked about the protection of the insured, it meant the consumer insured. 
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In 2002, when the Insurance Law was amended, the consumer protectionism was reinforced. The 
state council at first intended to make no amendment on the part of insurance contract.130 However, 
when the bill was discussed in the People’s Congress, about half length of the suggestions went 
against the dishonesty of the insurance companies, 131  among which the insurer’s agent was 
forbidden from concealing material circumstances from the insured, hindering the insured from 
performing the duty of disclosure, and other improper conducts.132 
 
The adoption of the principle of inquiry-disclosure has created one of the main differences 
between the marine and non-marine insurance law. 
 
(e) Whether the Two Doctrines should Be Combined into One? 
 
There are arguments that the two statutes should integrate at least as to the rules of utmost good 
faith, but these arguments have divided into three kinds. The advocators of the first view argue 
that the voluntary disclosure principle of the Maritime Code has demanded such a high standard of 
obligation that it has overstepped China’s reality that the insured, even the merchant insured in 
marine insurance, has not gained the necessary knowledge to judge whether a particular 
circumstance is material to the risk.133 They conclude that since the insured in China is not as 
experienced as their counterparts in England, China’s marine insurance should not have copied the 
                                                        
130
 The purpose of the amendment had been to abide by China’s commitment as to her enter into the World 
Trade Organization, and to make the insurance market more competitive, so the suggested amendments were 
all on the supervision of the insurance industry. See The Explanations of the Draft of the Insurance Law of 
People’s Republic of China (Draft) (2002), in Hu Jihua, gen. ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Bao 
Xian Fa Shi Yi Ji Shi Yong Zhi Nan (The Paraphrase and Practical Guide of the Insurance Law of the 
People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Press, 2002) 44. 
131
 The Report of the Law Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Amendment of “Bill of 
Amendment of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)” (2002), in Hu Jihua, gen. ed., 
Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Bao Xian Fa Shi Yi Ji Shi Yong Zhi Nan (The Paraphrase and Practical 
Guide of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal 
System Press, 2002) 48, suggestion 3, 4 and 5. 
132
 Ibid, suggestion 3. 
133
 See Jin Zhaohua, “Lun Hai Shang Bao Xian De Cheng Shi Xin Yong Yuan Ze (On the Principle of Good 
Faith in Marine Insurance)”, (1999) May, Hai Shang Fa Xi Hui Tong Xun (CMLA News Letter) 11 at 15. 
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rule of the voluntary disclosure from England.134 In their view, the rules of utmost good faith in the 
Maritime Code should change to those of the Insurance Law.135 
 
The second view is diametrically opposed to the first one. The advocators of this view held that 
the inquiry-disclosure doctrine is adverse to the actuarial evaluation of the risk and it has impeded 
the development of the infant insurance industry. 136  In their view, the doctrine of voluntary 
disclosure should apply universally in marine and non-marine insurance. The last view that the 
inquiry-disclosure principle should be complemented by the principle of voluntary disclosure is 
actually quite akin to the second one.137 
 
The divergence of these arguments in themselves seems to justify the current mechanics that the 
inquiry-disclosure applies to non-marine insurance while the voluntary disclosure applies to 
marine insurance. Actually, there are good reasons for the different principles to apply in different 
kinds of insurance. The consumer insured generally need more protection than the commercial 
marine insured.138 On the other hand, the marine insured, compared with the insurer, is not as 






 Wang Haiming, “Lun Bao Xian Yao Zhun Xun Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze (The Insurance Must 
Observe the Principle of Utmost Good Faith)”, [1999] 10 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of 
China Maritime Law) 282 at 290-291. 
137
 Zhao Qijin, “Lun Bao Xian Fa De Gao Zhi Yi Wu (On the Duty of Disclosure of the Insurance Law)”, 
(1996) Issue 3, Legal Science 56 at 57, where Zhao suggested that, in non-marine insurance, the insured 
should voluntarily disclose it to the insurer if a circumstance is really material and the insured knows the 
materiality to the insurer’s evaluation of the risks. (Under the current law, even though the insured knows 
the materiality of the circumstances, he is not obliged to disclose under article 17 of the Insurance Law 
unless he is asked by the insurer. However, such deed of the insured may constitute fraud in the civil law or 
in the general contract law and fraud entitles the insurer more severe remedies.) This view may be 
challenged by two problems. First, Zhao did not explain what “really material” means. It seems that the 
words “really material” add nothing more than the meaning of “material”. Second, if the insured has 
appreciated the materiality but still conceals the information, his conduct may have constituted fraud. The 
insurer can avoid the contract on ground of fraud regulated by article 58 of the General Principles of the 
Civil Law 1986. (As for definition of fraud, see also article 68 of the Opinions of the People’s Supreme 
Court’s on Several Questions of the Enforcement of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986 
(provisional).) 
138
 It is true that non-marine insured may also be commercial insured, but the marine insured are generally 
more experienced with underwriting matters as the insurance has long been an essential part of the marine 
industry. In addition, unless China law had set up a new category of the consumer insurance and made 
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weak as suggested by the advocators of the inquiry-disclosure doctrine. Some big shipowners are 
often in a better bargaining position than the insurer. Even if there are many inexperienced small 
companies engaged in marine industry and maritime trade, the insurance brokage will develop to 
help them139 and the insured will grow more and more experienced. So even if the voluntary 
disclosure principle had overstepped the reality, it will be suitable for the future, and perhaps in the 
near future. 
 
Secondly, the subject matters of non-marine insurance are comparatively easy to be investigated 
by the insurer, while the marine industry is of such a nature140 that it is much more difficult for the 
marine insurer to find out every material circumstance by his own investigation, and, though it is 
not technically impossible, it will cause considerable economic loss to the carrier if he follows the 
insurer’s instructions to make an inspection on the vessel before the insurer will underwrite the 
risk. 
 
Moreover, the marine insurance is more of an international character and it is important to 
harmonise with the international practice, the voluntary disclosure, for China’s insurance industry 
to grow internationally. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
separate regulations protecting the consumer insured, the consumer insured has to get protection from the 
general insurance law. See also page 28ff., below, where the author mentions why the consumer insured 
need more protection in China. See especially U.K., the Law Commission, Insurance Law - Non-Disclosure 
and Breach of Warranty, Law Com. No. 104, Cmnd 8064 (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) at paras. 4.34-4.40, 
where the Law Commission thoroughly explained why they reject the dichotomy of consumer insurance and 
non-consumer insurance. 
139
 Actually, the insurance brokage just began from 1999 but it has developed fast in recent years. See Xu 
Tao, “Bao Xian Zhong Jie Shi Chang Mian Lin Da Hao Fa Zhan Ji Yu (The Insurance Brokage Market 
Facing Excellent Developing Opportunity)”, online: XinHua Net <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2003-
08/11/content_1020234.htm>. 
140
 Although the modern communication is quite advanced and the insurance companies have their agents all 
over the world, it is still difficult, say for an insurer living in China to investigate the situation of a ship 
sailing in the Persian Gulf. It is much easier and less costly to let the insured to disclose, say the situation of 
that ship. 
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Finally, some other countries, such as the U.S.A141 and the Australia,142 also have different rules 
regulating the disclosure in marine and non-marine insurance contract, and they operate well. 
 
At first blush, the different application of law in marine and non-marine insurance seems to have 
made the law more complex, but this has enabled the law to have different rules to adapt to 
different areas where the balance point between the parties is different. As it is not difficult to 
differentiate between a marine insurance contract and a non-marine one,143 the current system is 
not as bewildering as imagined.144 In practice, not much dispute arises as to whether an insurance 
contract is marine or non-marine due to the procedure reasons.145 
 
As long as the divergence between the Insurance Law and Maritime Law 1992 in itself is not a 
problem, the only necessary modification to the principle of utmost good faith should be limited 
                                                        
141
 In the U.S.A., the principle of utmost good faith has followed the British approach in marine insurance, 
while, in most states, the principle applied in the non-marine insurance is totally different. A significant 
difference is that “in most jurisdictions in the United States the insurer must show that the applicant 
intentionally concealed material information” before he is entitled to avoid the contract. Julie-Anne Tarr, 
Disclosure and Concealment in Consumer Insurance Contracts (London: Cavendish, 2002) at 97. See also 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Key Divergences between English and American Law of Marine Insurance: a 
Comparative Study (Centreville, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1999) at 94-98. 
142
 In Australia, significant reform has been made to the duty of disclosure in the Insurance Contracts Act 
1984 (Australia) which applies to non-marine insurance contract, while the marine insurance contract is still 
governed by the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth), which reproduces the British counterpart. 
However, the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth) is also in review and significant changes may be 
made to it. The Australian Law Reform Commission’s suggestions in Review of the Marine Insurance Act 
1909, ALRC Report No. 91 (Sydney: The Commission, 2001), if adopted, will make the law of marine and 
non-marine insurance basically consistent again. Even so, there will still be differences. Compare section 
26B(3)(b)(ii) of the proposed revised Marine Insurance Act and section 28(3) of the Insurance Contracts 
Act 1984. See also Julie-Anne Tarr, Disclosure and Concealment in Consumer Insurance Contracts 
(London: Cavendish, 2002) at 58. 
143
 See page 34, above. 
144
 Gibbs v. Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Aust) [2003] HCA 39, 199 A.L.R. 497 has shown that question of 
whether an insurance contract is of marine or non-marine nature does not easily arise. In this case, the ship 
was operated at the estuary of the Swan River and this position was at the boundary of the sea and inland 
water, so it was rather a geography question than a legal problem. 
145
 In China, maritime cases are under a separate jurisdiction from other civil cases. It has to be decided 
whether a case is a marine one before the court can have the jurisdiction over it. It is a procedural question to 
be predetermined before the substantial disputes. Therefore, even if the principles as to the duty of 
disclosure were the same in marine and non-marine insurance, the court has to decide on whether the 
contract is marine or non-marine wherever the parties cannot agree on it. That is to say, the difference in the 
principles of duty of disclosure will not add to the dispute as to the nature of the contract. See also the text 
accompanying supra note 150. 
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within the existing frameworks, i.e., the divergence between the Insurance Law and Maritime Law 
1992. If the current problems of the principles in respectively marine and non-marine insurance 
law were resolved and all the ambiguity were clarified, the framework of the current law would be 
feasible by and large, and then, there would be no need to change it just to unify the rules. 
 
v. The Application of the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code 
 
Article 153 of the Insurance Law146 stipulates that the Maritime Code shall be applicable to marine 
insurance, while this Insurance Law 1995 shall apply to non-marine, but the Insurance Law shall 
also apply to marine insurance where the Maritime Code does not specify. For example, no articles 
in the Maritime Code have provided for the insurer’s duty of disclosure, but this doesn’t mean 
there is no such a duty imposed on the marine insurer. Instead, the insurer’s duty of disclosure, 
which is stipulated in article 17 and 18 of the Insurance Law, shall apply since the Maritime Code 
does not cover this area. 
 
Since the law applying to the marine insurance contract differs from that to the non-marine 
insurance contract, it is important to distinguish between the marine and non-marine insurance 
contract.147 According to article 216 of the Maritime Code,148 whether an insurance contract is 
                                                        
146
 Article 153 of the Insurance Law: “The Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China shall be 
applicable to marine insurance. For matters where the Maritime Code does not specify, this Law shall 
apply.” 
147
 In the law of U.K., it is also very important to distinguish the marine insurance and non-marine insurance 
but so far as duty of disclosure is concerned, the difference is not great. In Australia, the distinction 
nonetheless became crucial since the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (Australia), which applies to non-marine 
insurance contract only, differs significantly from the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth). See 
Gibbs v. Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Aust) [2003] HCA 39, 199 A.L.R. 497; Kate Lewins, “Where Is the 
Boundary between Marine Insurance and General Insurance? Gibbs v. MMI Reaches the High Court” (2003) 
15 Insurance Law Journal, 89. 
148
 Article 216 of the Maritime Code: “A contract of marine insurance is a contract whereby the insurer 
undertakes, as agreed, to indemnify the loss to the subject matter insured and the liability of the insured 
caused by perils covered by the insurance against the payment of an insurance premium by the insured.  
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marine or non-marine is judged by the perils covered by the contract. If the covered perils are 
marine perils, the contract is marine insurance contract. Article 216 defines marine perils as any 
maritime perils including perils occurring in inland rivers or on land which is related to a maritime 
adventure.149 Where a comprehensive insurance contract covers both marine and non-marine perils, 
Chinese law has no answer as to what kind of contract it is. One may consider all the relevant 
circumstances, say the purpose of the contract, the main risk or risks covered and the contractual 
terms, and decide whether the marine risk is appended to the non-marine risk or vice versa. In 
practice, if the case goes to the Maritime Court, then it must be a marine insurance contract; 
otherwise it is under the jurisdiction of the People’s Middle Court or the People’s Primary Court, 
as the case may be.150 
 
II. The Content of the Principle of Utmost Good Faith 
 
1. The Meaning of Utmost Good Faith 
 
i. The Meaning of Utmost Good Faith under the Common Law 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The covered perils referred to in the preceding paragraph mean any maritime perils agreed upon between the 
insurer and the insured, including perils occurring in inland rivers or on land which is related to a maritime 
adventure.” 
149
 As to what “maritime perils” means, the Maritime Code gives no hints. Wang Pengnan suggests that 
section 1 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) should be referred in considering the meaning of 
“maritime perils” in the Maritime Code. Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On 
Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 45-46 
150
 According to articles 18 and 19 of the Civil Procedure Law, and article 1.2 of the Opinions of the 
People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions in the Application of the Civil Procedure Law, maritime or 
admiralty cases are under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Court. So any dispute as to marine insurance 
contract is under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Court while disputes as to non-marine insurance contract 
are under the jurisdiction of the People’s Court. If the non-marine insurance dispute is momentous foreign 
related case or if it has momentous influence in the jurisdiction, it goes to the People’s Middle Court, 
otherwise it goes to the People’s Primary Court. 
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It has been said that “the word ‘utmost’ may add very little as it is the examination of ‘good faith’ 
that goes to the heart of the concept”.151 It has been observed that good faith means “different 
things to different peoples in different moods at different times and in difference places”,152 but an 
anthology of meanings has been provided as: 
 
“[Good faith means] fairness, fair conduct, reasonable standards of air dealing, decency, 
reasonableness, decent behaviour, a common ethical sense, a spirit of solidarity, 
community standards of fairness, decency and reasonableness.”153 
 
ii. The Meaning of Good Faith under the Chinese Law 
 
(a) Two Principles with the Same Name 
 
In the Chinese law, there are two principles both titled with the same name of “good faith”. One is 
the principle applied in general contract law and all kinds of civil activities, and the other is the 
principle in the insurance contract law which mainly embodied by the duty of disclosure. The 
latter is sometimes called “the principle of utmost good faith” while sometimes without the 
adjective “utmost”.154 
                                                        
151
 Scotford, “The Insurer’s Duty of Utmost Good Faith: Implications for Australian Insurers” (1988) 1(2) 
Insurance Law Journal 83. 
152
 Bridge, “Does Anglo-Canadian Contract Law Need A Doctrine of Good Faith?” (1984) 9 Can. Bus. L.J. 
385 at 407. 
153
 H. K. Lücke, “Good Faith and Contractual Performance”, in P. D. Finn, ed., Essays on Contract (Sydney: 
Law Book Company, 1987) 155 at 160. 
154
 Most of the scholars have titled the principle as “utmost good faith”. See e.g. Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang 
Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime 
University Press, 2003) at 41; Zhang Xianglan, Hai Shang Bao Xian Fa (Marine Insurance Law), The 
Unified Textbooks for High Institutes of Politics and Legal Science (Beijing: China Politics and Legal 
Science University Press, 1996) at 28; Li Yuquan, Bao Xian Fa (Insurance Law), 2nd ed. (Beijing: The Law 
Press, 2003) at 56. See also Li Zhengming & Jia Linqing, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong De Yuan Li Yu Shi 
Wu (The Theory and the Practice of the Marine Insurance Contract) (Beijing: China Politics and Law 
University Press, 1994) at 30, Wang Huaijiang, Hai Shang Bao Xian Fa De Li Lun Yu Shi Wu (The Theory 
and the Practice of the Marine Insurance Law) (Beijing: The People’s Transportation Press, 1997) at 19, (Li 
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(b) The Principle of Good Faith in the Civil Law 
 
In Chinese civil law, all civil activities, 155  including contractual activities, must observe the 
principle of good faith.156 This principle has been called as “the monarchal principle” of the civil 
law, 157  but it has very obscure meanings, 158  and in different civil law countries its detailed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Zhengming and Wang Huaijiang both use the phrase of “the absolute good faith”, which is akin to utmost 
good faith); Huang Huaming, Zhong Guo Bao Xian Fa Li Lun Yu Shi Wu (The Theory and the Practice of 
China Insurance Law) (Beijing: The Economics Science Press, 1996) at 35, (Huang Huaming uses both 
“good faith” and “utmost good faith” in the same sense); Wang Pengnan, Wang Pengnan, “Gao Zhi Yi Wu 
Ji Wei Fan Gai Yi Wu De Fa Lv Hou Guo (The Duty of Disclosure and the Legal Result of the Breach of 
This Duty)”, [1993] 4 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of China Maritime Law) 158 at 159, 
(Wang Pengnan says that the principle of utmost good faith in the insurance contract requires a higher level 
of good faith than that in the general civil law. However, article 5 of the Insurance Law stipulates that 
“When exercising rights or performing obligations, parties in insurance activities shall be consistent with the 
principle of honesty and good faith.” [emphasis added] 
155
 Civil activities mean any activity between any equal civil subjects. Civil subjects means nature person or 
legal person (artificial person). 
156
 Article 4 of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986: “In civil activities, the principles of 
voluntariness, fairness, making compensation for equal value, honesty and credibility shall be observed.” 
The Law Bureau of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, trans., Laws and Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China Governing Foreign-Related Matters (Beijing: the Law Press, 1991). See also 
Statutes and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 3, looseleaf (Hong Kong: University of 
East Asia Press and Institute of Chinese Law, 1987-1990) Ch. 860412.1.  
Here the expression of “honesty and credibility” should be substituted by “good faith”, because in the 
Chinese version of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986, the expression is “Cheng Xin” and “Cheng 
Xin” is translated as “good faith” in most cases. For example, in the Contract Law 1999, “Cheng Xin” is 
translated into “good faith”. The Office of the Law Commission of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress, trans., Laws of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: The Law Press, 1999). See also 
Bian Xin, Ying Han Guo Ji Shang Fa Ci Dian (An English-Chinese Dictionary of International Commercial 
Law) (Dalian: The Press of Dalian Marine College, 1993) at 150, 439, where “Cheng Xin” is translated into 
“good faith”. 
157
 Wang Zejian, Min Fa Xue Shuo Yu Pan Li Yan Jiu (The Study on Theories and Cases of Civil Law), vol. 
1 (Beijing: China Politics and Legal Science University Press, 1998) at 303; Zhen Yubo, Min Fa Zhai Bian 
Zong Lun (Civil Law: The General Introduction to Debt) (Taibei: Taiwan Sanmin Publishing House, 1978) 
at 262; Shi Shangkuan, Min Fa Zong Lun (General Introduction to Civil Law) (Taibei: Taiwan Zhengda 
Publishing House, 1980) at 300; Wei Zhenying, Min Fa (The Civil Law) (Beijing: Beijing University Press 
& High Education Press, 2000) at 26. 
158
 Peng Wanlin observed that the principle of good faith is no more than the compulsory maintenance of the 
balance of the interest of both parties in civil activities and the balance of the interest of the parties and the 
society. Peng Wanlin, Min Fa Xue (The Civil Law) (Beijing: China Politics and Legal Science University 
Press, 1999) at 63-64. Liang Huixing observed that the principle of good faith requires that people in the 
market should strictly keep their promise, maintain good credit, be honest, and pursue their profit without 
harming the profit of others and the society. Liang Huixing, “Cheng Shi Xin Yong Yu Lou Dong Bu Chong 
(Good Faith and the Complement for the Loopholes)”, in Liang Huixing, gen. ed., Civil and Commercial 
Law Review, vol. 2 (Beijing: The Law Press, 1999) 60. Xu Guodong observed that, in all circumstances, 
good faith is in fact used in two senses of meanings. In the field of property right, the principle of good faith 
means to behave with honest belief that his behaviour does not harm others. It is called “the subjective good 
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application is quite different.159 Nonetheless, the substance of the principle of good faith in the 
civil law is that “where arise the new circumstances or new problems, which were not foreseen 
when the law was made, the court may exercise the discretionary power according to the principle 
of good faith and directly regulate the parties’ rights and obligations.”160 This principle is “no 
more than the equity law mastered by the civil law judges.”161 
 
(c) The Principle of Good Faith in the General Contract Law 
 
The Contract Law 1999 also requires a duty of good faith to be observed in the negotiation, in the 
performance of the contract and even after the performance of the contract.162 Articles 6,163 39,164 
                                                                                                                                                                      
faith” which emphasizes the subjective mind of the behaviour. In the field of debt relation, good faith means 
the reasonableness of one’s behaviour. It is called “the objective good faith” as the reasonableness is judged 
from the outside behaviour and the test is what a reasonable person will do in the particular circumstances. 
Xu Guodong, “Ke Guan Cheng Xin Yu Zhu Guan Cheng Xin De Dui Li Tong Yi Wen Ti (The 
Contradiction and Unity of Objective Good Faith and Subjective Good Faith)”, (2001) Issue 6, Zhong Guo 
She Hui Ke Xue (China Social Science) 97. 
159
 A reach on the principle of good faith analysing thirty typical sets of facts according to the laws of 
fourteen western European jurisdictions has shown that the differences among some of the civilian systems 
were as great as those between English law and the law of any of the civilian jurisdictions. See Reinhard 
Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: the Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) at 170-171. 
160
 Zhang Xinbao, Min Shi Huo Dong De Ji Ben Yuan Ze (The Basic Principles of the Civil Activities) 
(Beijing: The Law Press, 1986) at 26. 
161
 Li Gongguo, Min Fa Ben Lun (Cadre of the Civil Law) (Lanzhou: Press of the Lanzhou University, 1998) 
at 99, citing Rudolf Stammler. 
162 See generally, Alberto Monti, “The Law of Insurance Contracts in the People’s Republic of China: A 
Comparative Analysis of Policyholders’ Rights”, online: the International Centre for Economic Research 
<http://www.icer.it/docs/wp2001/monti28-01.pdf> at 13-16. 
163
 Article 6 is the general requirement of the principle of good faith in contract law; it is the reiteration of 
that principle of the civil law in the special circumstances of the contract law. It stipulates that “The parties 
shall observe the principle of good faith in exercising their rights and fulfilling their obligations.” 
164
 Article 39 is also related to the good faith in insurance contract. It stipulates that “where a contract is 
concluded by way of standard terms, the party supplying the standard terms shall abide by the principle of 
fairness in prescribing the rights and obligations of the parties and shall, in a reasonable manner, call the 
other party’s attention to the provision(s) whereby such party’s liabilities are excluded or limited, and shall 
explain such provision(s) upon request by the other party.” However, this article is unimportant in practice 
because the Insurance Law is more favourable to the insured in that the insurer should explain the terms of 
the contract (not limited to the terms that excluded or limited the insurer’s liability, article 17 of the 
Insurance Law) and the insurer should clearly explain the exception clauses (article 18 of the Insurance 
Law). In addition, the terms of the insurance contract must be approved by the insurance supervision 
authority to ensure its fairness (article 107 of the Insurance Law). 
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42,165  60,166  92,167  and 125(1)168  are all relevant to the principle of good faith in the general 
contract law and they apply to all kinds of contracts, including the insurance contract, except 
where the insurance law provides otherwise. These rules basically embody the general meaning of 
the principle of good faith of the civil law but they are specified guides in the circumstance of the 
contract law. In especial, the Contract Law 1999 has created the pre-contract duty of good faith.169 
 
(d) The Principle of Utmost Good Faith of the Insurance Law 
 
The good faith in the insurance law is of a higher standard than in the general contract law or in 
the general civil law,170 that is to say, the requirement of the insurance law is much higher and 
stricter than that of the contract law. First, in the marine insurance law, the parties are required to 
                                                        
165
 Article 42: “In the making of a contract, the party that falls under any of the following circumstances, 
causing thus loss to the other party, shall be liable to compensate for the loss. (1) engaging in consultation 
with malicious intention in name of making a contract; (2) concealing intentionally key facts related to the 
making of the contract or providing false information; or (3) taking any other act contrary to the principle of 
good faith.” 
166
 Article 60: The parties shall fulfil their respective obligations as contracted. The parties shall observe the 
principle of good faith and fulfil the obligations of notification, assistance and confidentiality in accordance 
with the nature and aims of the contract and trade practices. 
167
 Article 92: After the termination of right and obligations under a contract, the parties shall perform the 
duties of notification, assistance and confidentiality in light of the principle of good faith and in accordance 
with trade practices. 
168
 Article 125(1) provides that the terms of the contract should be interpreted in accordance to good faith. it 
provides that “In event that the parties dispute about the understanding of a clause of the contract, the actual 
meaning of the clause shall be inferred and determined on the basis of the words and sentences used in the 
contract, related clauses of the contract, aim of the contract, trade practice and the principle of good faith.” 
All these articles in the preceding notes are translated by the Office of the Law Commission of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, trans., Laws of the People’s Republic of China [1999] 
(Beijing: The Law Press, 1999). 
169
 There was no pre-contract duty of good faith, i.e., good faith in the negotiation of the contract, in the laws 
preceding the Contract Law 1999. Liang Huixing, one of the drafters of this statute, believed that the pre-
contract good faith is first created in this statute. See Liang Huixing, “Guan Yu Zhong Guo Tong Yi He 
Tong Fa Cao An Di San Gao (On the Third Draft of the Unified Contract Law of China)”, (1997) Issue 2, 
Legal Science 47 at 26. But it is also alleged that the pre-contract good faith has been implied in the spirit of 
the preceding statutes. See Lu Tongming, “Di Yue Guo Shi Ze Ren Li Lun Ji Qi Zai Shen Pan Shi Jian 
Zhong De Ying Yong (Theory of the Liability of the Negligence in the Contract Negotiation and Its 
Application in the Trial)”, (1999) Issue 1, Shandong Legal Science 46 at 47. 
170
 Wang Pengnan, “Gao Zhi Yi Wu Ji Wei Fan Gai Yi Wu De Fa Lv Hou Guo (The Duty of Disclosure and 
the Legal Result of the Breach of This Duty)”, [1993] 4 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of 
China Maritime Law) 158 at 159; Wang Pengnan, “Lue Lun Hai Shang Bao Xian Fa De Li Lun Ti Xi (A 
Brief Discussion on the Theory Structure of the Marine Insurance Law)”, (1999) May, Hai Shang Fa Xi Hui 
Tong Xun (CMLA News Letter) 1 at 2; Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On 
Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 41. 
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voluntarily disclose anything material to the other party, and, in the non-marine insurance, the 
parties are required to make true disclosure according to the insurer’s question, while in general 
contract, the parties are not obliged to make disclosure and there is no misrepresentation law in 
China.171 Second, the liability in the insurance law and marine insurance law available for the 
breach of the duty of utmost good faith is termination of the contract, while the breach of good 
faith in the contract law does not render the contract terminatable at the option of the party not in 
breach.172 Third, in the contract law, the breach must be causal connected with the loss before the 
aggrieved party can claim damage while, in the insurance contract law, the insurer can terminate 
the contract where the breach nonetheless does not contribute to the loss. Finally, the party who 
provides standard contract is under a heavier duty in the insurance law than in the contract law.173 
Therefore, it is suggested to use the phrase of “utmost good faith” in the insurance law and the 
phrase of “good faith” in general contract law and the civil law. 
 
When the Insurance Law was modified in 2002, the new-added article 5 clearly stated that 
“[w]hen exercising rights or performing obligations, parties in insurance activities shall be 
consistent with the principle of good faith.”174 It used the phrase of “good faith” instead of “utmost 
good faith”. Since the insurance contract requires a higher standard of good faith than the contract 
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law, article 5 should be changed in light of section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) 
and clearly stipulate that “a contract of insurance is a contract based upon utmost good faith…” 
 
2. Misrepresentations and Non-Disclosure 
 
i. Misrepresentations and Non-Disclosure in the Common Law 
 
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) states the rules of misrepresentations and non-disclosure in 
section 18 and 20 respectively and many classic textbooks on insurance law put the two in 
different chapters. 175  Misrepresentation and non-disclosure are conceptually different. 176 
Misrepresentation is actionable not only in the insurance contract but in all kinds of contracts. 
Misrepresentation applies to the insurance contract in almost the same way as it applies to other 
contracts. However, one major difference between the rules of misrepresentation in the insurance 
contract and in general contracts is whether a representation of opinion should be made on 
reasonable grounds. 177  The Misrepresentation Act 1967 (U.K.) may operate in the insurance 
context. As the result of the operation of section 2(2) of the act, the court has the discretion to 
award damages in lieu of rescission of the insurance contract. In Highlands Insurance Co. v. 
Continental Insurance Co., 178  it was held that, obiter, the discretion would not be used in 
commercial contracts of insurance, but the possibility cannot be excluded in individual insurance 
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contract.179 Actually, the insurance ombudsman has stated that he may use it in cases coming 
before him. 180  On the contrary, non-disclosure is not actionable in contracts which are not 
uberrima fides except in very particular cases.181 Non-disclosure is much more tightly connected 
with the insurance contract and it is clear that the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (U.K.) does not 
apply to non-disclosure.182 
 
However, except the fact that in misrepresentation the court has the discretion to award damages in 
lieu of rescission while in non-disclosure the court has not, the distinction between 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure may not be material. In practice, an insurer, where possible, 
will plead both of non-disclosure and misrepresentation and “cases have frequently failed to 
distinguish between the two defences taken by an insurer.”183 Furthermore, the legal issues that 
arise in the context of misrepresentation or non-disclosure, such as the test of materiality, the test 
of a prudent insurer, the requirement of inducement, and the liability for misrepresentation or non-
disclosure, are exactly the same.184 
 
ii. No Distinction between Misrepresentations and Non-Disclosure under the Chinese Law 
 
In China, neither the Insurance Law nor the Maritime Code distinguishes the difference between 
representations and non-disclosure. Article 222 of the Maritime Code says “the insured shall 
truthfully inform the insurer...” and article 17 of the Insurance Law says “the applicant shall make 
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an honest disclosure”. The expression of “truthfully inform” or “an honest disclosure” in their 
Chinese original expressions does not means that the law only forbids fraudulent 
misrepresentation or concealment; instead, the Chinese original words should have been translated 
into “to make a statement which reflects the true facts”.185 This means the insured should not only 
make disclosure but also disclose the truth. He can neither keep the truth from the insurer nor 
make misrepresentations. There may be two reasons why the Chinese law does not distinguish 
misrepresentation from non-disclosure. The first reason is the similarity of misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure. As mentioned above, it is hard to discriminate between them.186 The other reason 
is that there is not such a complete rule of misrepresentation in the general contract law in the 
Chinese law187 and both misrepresentation and non-disclosure only appear in the insurance law, so 
it is much less necessary for China to distinguish the two rules. 
 
iii. Facts and Opinions 
 
(a) Economides v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. plc188 
 
A misrepresentation is a statement of the facts; a statement of opinion may be transformed into 
one of facts in the sense that it is a statement of fact that he actually held that opinion when he 
made the statement. Thus “the inaccuracy of the expressed opinion would, in and of itself, 
engender liability in misrepresentation.”189 Section 20(5) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) 
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clearly states that a “representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is true if it be made in 
good faith”. This section was interpreted by a recent case, Economides v. Commercial Union 
Assurance Co. plc.190 
 
The plaintiff insured in this case, a 21-year-old student from Cyprus, affected a household 
insurance with the defendant insurer in 1988. The plaintiff stated that the sum insured for contents 
was to be £12,000 and he represented that the valuables did not exceed one-third of that sum. He 
also declared that the statements given in the application form are to the best of his knowledge and 
belief, true and complete and that that proposal should form the basis of the contract. In 1990 the 
plaintiff’s parents came to live with him and had brought with them silverware and jewellery. On 
the advice of his father, the plaintiff increased his contents insurance to £16,000. In 1991, the flat 
was burgled and items worth £31,000 stolen. The valuables stolen greatly exceeded the one-third 
limit. The plaintiff claimed on his insurance. The insurer sought to avoid for misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure. 
 
In this case, the representation as to the value of the jewellery is merely a statement of opinion 
rather than that of the facts,191 and it is clear that a statement of opinion is true if it is made in good 
faith.192 Consequently, the defendant insurer alleged that the plaintiff, in stating the value of the 
jewellery, should have reasonable grounds which the plaintiff did not have. The reasonable ground 
for one’s opinion is required in general contract law without which a representation will constitute 
a misrepresentation.193 However, Simon Brown L.J., who gave the leading judgment in the Court 
of Appeal, held that a representation of belief had to have some basis before it could be said to be 
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made in good faith, but it does not mean that an objective test had to be applied to the basis upon 
which the representation was made because section 20(5) the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) 
required only honesty not reasonable grounds.194 In addition, Simon Brown L.J. concluded that the 
test for non-disclosure was the same as that for misrepresentation, namely that of honesty.195 Peter 
Gibson L.J., who reached the same conclusion but with a different approach, was of the view that 
good faith in section 20(5) the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) should be judged subjectively.196 
 
(b) Facts and Opinions under the Chinese Law 
 
The Chinese insurance law does not distinguish a representation of facts from that of opinions, but 
the Chinese scholars so far have paid little attention to this problem.197 The word “circumstances” 
in article 17 of the Insurance Law198 and articles 222 and 223199 of the Maritime Code is not 
defined by either of the statutes. In case reports, the insurer often rejects claims for the insured’s 
non-disclosure of material opinions.200 In these cases, the insured all had some grounds to support 
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their belief that they were healthy, but the insurer rejected the claim nonetheless.201 The position of 
the court is unclear partly because the case ended in conciliation202 and partly because the report 
does not provide enough information on the attitude of the court. In deciding whether the word 
“circumstances” has the meaning of “opinions”, there would be a dilemma. If the meaning of 
“circumstances” had not included opinions, expectations, or belief of the insured, the insurer 
would not get such material information for his evaluation of the risk, but if the meaning of 
“circumstances” had included the “opinions”, the insured would be unreasonably under the 
onerous duty to ascertain the accuracy of his opinion as if it were a statement of a fact. 
Comparatively, the position of the common law is more balanced. The insured should disclose 
material opinions but a statement of opinion is true as far as it is made in good faith, or the 
representor has some grounds for it.203 It seems that the insurance law of China should also adopt 
this position.204 
 
III. Duration of the Duty of Disclosure 
 
1. Continuing Duty of Utmost Good Faith 
 
The duty of utmost good faith is not restricted to the pre-contract stage.205 In U.K., notable cases 
have embraced the position that utmost good faith should be observed throughout the contract,206 
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while the details of the doctrine are far from settled. The situations in which the insured owes a 
post-contractual duty of utmost good faith may well be confined to some categories.207 These 
categories at least208 include that the insured should avoid making any fraudulent claim or any 
other fraudulent acts,209 and that the insured owes a duty of disclosure in any situation in which the 
insured is required to give information to the insurer under the terms of the policy (e.g., where 
there is an increase of risk).210 Besides the duty to avoid fraud, it seems that the other categories 
are all contractual duties. In Manifest Shipping Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. (the “Star 
Sea”),211 Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough distinguished a lack of good faith which is material to 
the making of the contract itself from a lack of good faith during the performance of the contract, 
and said, “[t]he latter can derive from express or implied terms of the contract; it would be a 
contractual obligation arising from the contract and the remedies are the contractual remedies 
provided by the law of contract.”212 In Australia, the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (Australia) has 
been amended to accept the duty of good faith as an implied term of the contract “requiring each 
party to [the contract] to act towards the other party, in respect of any matter arising under or in 
relation to [the contract], with the utmost good faith”.213 
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In U.K., several issues have been decided including that the continuing duty of utmost good faith 
is of the contractual nature,214 that that duty continues until litigation starts,215 that avoidance is 
only appropriate in a post-contractual context in situations analogous to “situations where the 
insurer has a right to terminate for breach”. 216  These issues have sparked considerable 
controversy.217 The trend to expend the pre-contract duty of utmost good faith into the post-
contract stage has been cautioned against.218 It has been noted that the law would have been neater 
if it could “either unambiguously exclude the post-contractual doctrine from the ambit of section 
17 or attribute to it a different juridical basis in order to avoid the glosses and contrivances in the 
judicial interpretation of this particular provision”.219 It is also criticized that it is unnecessary to 
resort to the principle of good faith in deciding cases of fraudulent claim.220 
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In China, there are also many arguments that the principle of utmost good faith survives after the 
conclusion of the contract.221 Under the Chinese law, the parties to an insurance contract must also 
observe good faith in the performance of the contract, but this is requirement of the principle of 
good faith which is set up in the Contract Law 1999. Different from the law of U.K., the duty of 
good faith is a collateral duty imposed by law.222 Its contents and remedy have been discussed at 
page 38ff., above. Since the continuing duty of good faith applies to all kinds of contracts, it is 
more appropriate to discuss this problem in the context of general contract law instead of the 
insurance contract law since this problem arises in all kinds of contracts.223  Therefore, as a 
comparative study, this thesis is not going to discuss any further on the post contract duty of 
utmost good faith. 
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2. The Duration of the Duty of Disclosure in the Common Law 
 
i. General Principle on New Contract 
 
As the purpose of the duty of disclosure is to help the insurer to assess the risk, the duty of 
disclosure continues throughout the negotiation of the contract and ceases at the time when the 
contract is completed.224 Therefore, any material fact which the proposed insured becomes aware 
of during the negotiations, or any fact which was immaterial but which later turns out to be 
material, must be disclosed to the insurer.225 In addition, any statement made at any stage of the 
negotiation which becomes inaccurate as a result of a change of circumstances must be amended 
or withdrawn by the insured prior to the conclusion of contract.226 After the contract is completed, 
there is no duty to disclose supervening material facts which come to the knowledge of the insured, 
or any facts which becomes material. Channell J. said in Re Yager and Guardian Assurance Co. 
that “… the time up to which it must be disclosed is the time when the contract is concluded.”227 
 
ii. The Time of the Conclusion 
 
It is obvious that the question as to which moment should be regarded as the time of the 
conclusion of a contract is extremely important. Section 21 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
(U.K.) stipulates that: 
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“A contract of marine insurance is deemed to be concluded when the proposal of the 
assured is accepted by the insurer, whether the policy be then issued or mot; and, for the 
purpose of shoeing when the proposal was accepted, reference may be made to the slip or 
covering not or other customary memorandum of the contract…” 
 
The proposal is the offer by the insured and the acceptance of the proposal marks the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. 
 
iii. Exceptions to the General Rule as to When a Contract Is Concluded 
 
The date at which the duty of disclosure comes to an end can be changed by express provisions in 
the policy.228 In particular, in life insurance, it is a common practice that the contract includes a 
special clause that the commencement of the insurer’s liability is to be postponed until receipt of 
the first premium.229 Locker v. Law Union & Rock Insurance Co. Ltd230 shows a clear example of 
this. The insured’s duty of disclosure may also be extended by an express clause in a policy that 
the insurer’s liability does not commence until the policy is actually delivered to the insured.231 As 
a result, the duty exists longer.232 Additionally, it has been decided that the contract may modify 
the duty of disclosure stipulated by law with unambiguous words.233 
 
iv. Renewal of a Contract 
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A renewal of a contract is equal to a creation of a new contract.234 Consequently, the insured is 
under a duty to disclose to the insurer any material facts which have come to his knowledge before 
the contract is renewed. The life insurance, however, is not a renewable agreement but a long-term 
agreement which is usually continued by the payment of a periodical premium. In other words, the 
renewal of a life insurance is a sort of extension.235 
 
It often happens that the insured fails to realize his duty of disclosure on each renewal and seldom 
does the insurer remind the insured of the existence of such a duty. This difficulty has been 
eliminated by the Statements of Insurance Practice. The Statement of General Insurance Practice 
1986,236 clause 3(a) stipulates: 
 
“Renewal notices shall contain a warning about the duty of disclosure including the 
necessity to advise changes affecting the policy which have occurred since the policy 
inception or last renewal date, whichever was the later.” 
 
v. Alteration of a Contract 
 
The insured’s duty of disclosure may be revived after completion of the contract when the contract 
is altered. If the alteration does not “substantially alter the nature of the bargain”,237 it is not a 
creation of a new contract. In such cases, the duty is limited to disclose any material fact relevant 
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to the change in the risk that comes to his knowledge before the alteration of the contract.238 
Blackburn J. has observed in Lishman v. Northern Maritime Insurance Co.239 that: 
 
“If the alteration were such as to make the contract more burdensome to the underwriters, 
and a fact known at that time to the assured were concealed which was material to the 
alteration, I should say the policy would be vitiated. But if the fact were quite immaterial 
to the alteration, and only material to the underwriter as being a fact which shewed that he 
had made a bad bargain originally, and such as might tempt him, if it were possible, to get 
out of it, I should say there would be no obligation to disclose it.”240 
 
3. The Duration of the Duty of Disclosure in China 
 
i. General Principle as to the Duration of the Duty 
 
There is no divergence between marine and non-marine insurance as to the question when the duty 
of disclosure comes to an end. The position is also basically the same as in the common law, but 
there are some ambiguities in the Chinese law. They are whether the insured will be warned of the 
duty of disclosure when renewing the policy,241 whether the insured should make disclosure when 
altering the contract,242 etc. 
 
ii. The Time of Conclusion 
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Article 13 of the Insurance Law stipulates: 
 
“When an insurance applicant proposes an insurance request, and an insurer agrees to 
accept the proposal, and after an agreement on contract clauses is reached, the insurance 
contract shall be deemed as concluded. The insurer shall promptly issue an insurance 
policy or other certificates of insurance to the applicant, and the insurance policy or other 
certificates of insurance shall contain and specify the contents of the contract agreed upon 
by both parties. Upon consent through negotiation, an applicant and an insurer may also 
conclude an insurance contract in writing in other forms other than those provided in the 
preceding paragraph.” 
 
Article 221 of the Maritime Code stipulates: 
 
“A contract of marine insurance comes into being after the insured puts forth a proposal 
for insurance and the insurer agrees to accept the proposal and the insurer and the insurer 
and the insured agree on the terms and conditions of the insurance. The insurer shall issue 
to the insured an insurance policy or other certificate of insurance in time, and the contents 
of the contract shall be contained therein.” 
 
Therefore, the time of the conclusion of the contract is the same as under the common law. The 
proposal is an offer and the contract is reached when the insurer accepts the proposal. The wording 
of the Insurance Law that “an agreement on contract clauses is reached” and of the Maritime Code, 
that “agree on the terms and conditions of the insurance”, seems to show that the mutual 
agreement on the terms of the insurance contract is an additional requirement for the contract to be 
reached, but such a requirement, if it exists, is pleonastic because once the insurer has accepted the 
proposal, he is not allowed to say that he actually disagrees on the terms and conditions of the 
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contract. The time the insurer issues the policy or other certificates of insurance is not the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, as both the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code consider the 
issuance of the policy or other certificates as a duty that insurer should perform after the 
conclusion of the contract.243 
 
In case the insurer sends his acceptance of the proposal by post, however, unlike the common law, 
the acceptance does not become valid until it reaches the insured. 244  Post is not often used 
nonetheless as a mean to send the acceptance in the modern society. 
 
iii. Renewal of a Contract 
 
It is the same in China that a renewal of a contract is equal to a creation of a new contract, so the 
insured must disclose to the insurer any material facts that the insured knows before the renewal. 
Life insurance is also a long-term contract and it is always extended instead of renewed. 
 
The problem is that the insured will not be warned of the duty of disclosure in renewing the 
contract. In practice, the insurer’s agent has a tendency to induce the insured not to disclose.245 The 
solutions is to impose on the insurer a duty to warn the insured of the duty of disclosure upon 
renewal of the contract, failing which deprives the insurer of the right to rely on the defence of 
non-disclosure, as what The Statement of General Insurance Practice 1986 and the Statement of 
Long-Term Insurance Practice 1986 have done. In non-marine insurance, there is no need to apply 
this suggestion because the doctrine of “inquiry-disclosure” releases the non-marine insured from 
disclosing anything the insurer does not inquire.246 
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iv. Alteration of a Contract 
 
In cases where the contract is altered,247 the law of China does not stipulate whether the insured 
should make disclosure to the insurer.248 However, in order to achieve the fairness in the dealing 
and secure the accuracy of the insurer’s estimate on the risks, the law should impose a duty of 
disclosure on the insured in marine insurance when the contract is altered for the insured’s benefit 
or under his request. The Chinese law has not adopted the English position that whether an 
alteration of the contract is tantamount to a new contract depends on whether the alteration has 
changed the nature of the risks. Since it is not clear whether or what kind of alteration of the 
contract is tantamount to a new contract under the Chinese law, there is an easier way to amend it 
which does not need to distinguish between an amendment of an existing contract and a creation 
of a new contract. As the rules of disclosure in making a new contract are different in marine and 
non-marine insurance, the suggestions are introduced separately below. 
 
In the marine insurance, when making a new contract, there is a duty of “voluntary disclosure” 
which means that, notwithstanding the insurer does not enquiry, the insured should voluntarily 
disclose everything material that the insured’s knows or ought to know in his ordinary course of 
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business.249 Then in cases of alteration of the contract, the scope of the disclosure is limited: the 
insured should disclose only those material circumstances relevant to the alteration of the contract. 
If the material fact is only relevant to the unchanged terms of the contract, the insured bears no 
duty to disclose it.250 That is to say, the more significant the alteration is, the wider range of 
disclosure must be made. This amendment of law will avoid the trouble to judge whether the 
alteration is significant enough to have changed the nature of the risks. 
 
In non-marine insurance, as the Insurance Law adopts the “inquiry-disclosure” doctrine,251 which 
means that the law requires that insured only disclose those circumstances asked by the insurer,252 
the insured should bear no duty to disclose anything unless the insurer inquires. In alteration of a 
contract, the position should be the same. 
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Chapter 3.  The Insured’s Duty of Disclosure: Knowledge and Constructive Knowledge 
 
I. The Position of the Common Law 
 
1. Test of the Constructive Knowledge 
 
 
The law never requires the insured to disclose what he is not able to know, but it is complicated as 
to whether the insured should disclose what he “ought to” know. In marine insurance, section 18(1) 
of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) provides that an insured is “deemed to know every 
circumstances which in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him”. Although it is 
said that the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) has stated the rule applicable to both marine and 
non-marine insurance, the court of appeal has decided that the constructive knowledge, or the 
deemed knowledge, does not apply to private insurance.253 The interpretation of section 18(1) as to 
what is “in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known” is a disputed issue.254  The 
knowledge of the agent is also a complicated legal issue, but this will only be briefly mentioned 
below255 because a comparative study on the agent’s knowledge may not give too much help to the 
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The private insured 257  is required to disclose what he actually knows. In Economides v. 
Commercial Union Assurance Co. plc,258 all three members of the Court of Appeal stated that the 
private individuals who are not obtaining insurance in the course of a business does not bear the 
duty to disclose any form of deemed or constructive knowledge,259 and honesty is the only thing 
required of private insured.260 Therefore, the rule applied in private insurance is that 
 
“The duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose what you do not know. The 
obligation to disclose, therefore, necessarily depends upon the knowledge you possess.”261 
 
Although the constructive knowledge is not ascribed to the private insured, he, nonetheless, cannot 
wilfully shut his eyes to material circumstances which he has good reason to suspect exist,.262 “If a 
man, suspicious of the truth, turns a blind eye to it, and refrains from inquiry - so that he should 
not know it for certain - then he is to be regarded as knowing the truth.”263 
 
 
Constructive knowledge is what the insured ought to know. Section 18(1) of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 (U.K.) requires the marine insured to disclose not only what he actually knows but also 
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what he “in the ordinary course of business” ought to know. This, however, does not means that 
the insured must conduct an investigation into his business,264 otherwise it will go against the merit 
of the principle of utmost good faith that it is less costly and more efficient for the insured to tell 
the insurer about the material circumstances.265 If the insured does conduct such an investigation, 
he must disclose any material circumstances that he has found.266 
 
Although this point has been disputed,267 in principle the rule of constructive knowledge expressed 
in section 18(1) applies to non-marine insurance,268 but the case of Economides v. Commercial 
Union Assurance plc269 seems to suggest that the constructive knowledge will not be applied at 
lease to the private insurance, which is effected by an individual not in the course of business.270 
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Is the insured deemed to know what ought to be known in the ordinary course of the business of a 
prudent insured or what ought to be known in the ordinary course of his business? There are 
disputes as to whether the test of the constructive knowledge is the objective one or the subjective 
one. 
 
Clarke takes the objective view that the insured ought to know what, in the ordinary course of 
business, a prudent insured ought to know.271 In London General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. General 
Marine Underwriters Association,272 the plaintiff insured was himself an insurer who had insured 
the cargo of a vessel that was on fire on the evening of 24 September. The fire was posted on the 
casualty board at Lloyd’s and the “casualty slop” was send to the insured the next morning. Owing, 
however, to pressure of business in the plaintiffs’ office, nobody there took any notice of it when 
received. Thus, no one in fact knew of its contents when the plaintiffs’ department for reinsurance 
reached the reinsurance with the defendant reinsurer. The Court of Appeal held that the 
information contained in the slip was a material circumstance which, in the ordinary course of 
business, ought to have been known by the plaintiffs because the pressure of the particular 
insurer’s business was not an excuse though the pressure of the whole market might be.273 
 
Clarke explains why the law should by such: 
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“It would be odd, if the law applied an objective standard to inferences that the proposer 
draws from what he knows, as well as an objective standard of materiality by reference to 
the prudent insurer or, sometimes, the reasonable insured, yet allowed the proposer to 
conduct his business in such a negligent way that facts never come to his attention in the 
first place, so that the objective rules are never allowed to bite.”274 
 
The objective view that the insured should act like a prudent insured in obtaining relevant 
knowledge for the purpose of proposing insurance is not widely accepted in U.K., although the 
CMI report regards Clarke’s view as the existing English law.275 Recent cases276 have suggested 
that the courts have interpreted the words “in ordinary course of business” more restrictively than 
it was in London General Insurance Co. v. General Marine Underwriters’ Association Ltd.277 In 
Australia & New Zealand Bank Ltd. v. Colonial & Eagle Wharves Ltd.; Boag (third party),278 
McNair J. decided that the insured was not required to do what a reasonable insured would have 
done. “The assured is deemed to know only what he would be expected to know in the ordinary 
course of his own business, making allowance for its imperfect organisation, prior to the 
conclusion of the insured. Therefore, he is not deemed to be aware of matters which should be 
known to him in the course of a well run business which he would have found out if he had re-
organised his schedule or business system at the time in question.”279 This subject view seems to 
be favoured by the CMI report.280 
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The reasons why the subjective view is preferred are expressed by Arnould:281 
 
“The test of what ‘ought to be know’ by the insured is… a test of what ought to be known 
by the insured in carrying out his business in the manner in which he carries on that 
business; the underwriter takes the risk that the business may be run inefficiently unless 
the circumstances are such that the insured knows or suspects facts material to be 
disclosed. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to saying that underwriters only insure 
those who conduct their business prudently, whereas it is a commonplace that one of the 
purposes of insurance is to obtain cover against the consequences of negligence in the 
management of the assured’s affairs.” 
 
2. The Knowledge of the Employee and the Agent 
 
The agent of the insured should not only disclose to the insurer the material circumstances that he 
knows, or ought to know, but also what the insured is bound to know unless it comes to the 
insured’s knowledge too late to communicate to the agent.282 It was held that material facts ought 
to be forwarded to the agent with all reasonable diligence so as to reach the underwriter before the 
insurance is actually effected.283 
 
Whether the knowledge of an agent or an employee is imputed to the principal insured depends on 
the nature of the position of the agent or the employee and the authority given to him by the 
principal, and this kind of agent or servant is called the “agent to know”. “Some agents, so far 
represent the principal that in all respects their acts and intentions and their knowledge may truly 
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be said to be the acts and intentions and knowledge of the principal. Other agents may have so 
limited and narrow an authority, both in fact and in the common understanding of their form of 
employment, that it would be quite inaccurate to say that such an agent’s knowledge or intentions 
are the knowledge or intentions of his principal.”284 In other cases, the master of a ship and the 
general agent of a ship-owner for the transaction of his shipping business,285 the consigner and 
shipper of a cargo286 and the general representative of the assured at a foreign port287 have been 
held to be agents with whose knowledge the insured is affected. In circumstances where the 
insurance is effected through more than one brokers, it was held that the concealment of a material 
fact within the knowledge of any agent through whose agency, whether directly or indirectly, the 
insurance has been effected vitiates the policy.288 On the other hand, where the insurance is not 
effected through the broker, the concealment of any material circumstance by the broker will not 
vitiate the contract.289 
 
II. The Position in Chinese Marine Insurance Law 
 
1. Test of the Constructive Knowledge 
 
In China, article 222 of the Maritime Code also requires that the insured should disclose every 
material circumstance which he ought to know in the ordinary business practice, in addition to 
what he actually knows. Such a rule may help the insurer avoid the heavy burden of proving the 
actual knowledge of the insured, but whether a particular circumstance is within the presumed 
knowledge of the insured is still largely dependant on the discretion of the judge. The CMI report 
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stated that the Chinese law is taking an objective view, but this is probably caused by a mistake in 
the translation of the Maritime Code.290 Actually, the law does not specify whether the test of the 
constructive knowledge is the objective one or the subjective one. It is largely accepted among the 
scholars that the insured is not obliged to make special investigations so as to exhaust every 
material circumstance before the conclusion of the contract, but he must observe “reasonable 
inquiry” so as to find any available material circumstance,291 and it is further contended that the 
insured should exercise reasonable diligence in his management of the business so as to find the 
material circumstances.292 These arguments are in substance advocating the objective criterion. 
 
So which test shall Chinese law adopt? It seems to me that the view of the objective test which is 
the position of London General Insurance Co. v. General Marine Underwriters’ Association 
Ltd.293 in the common law is the better choice for the marine insurance of China. First, if the test 
were the particular insured test, namely, the subjective one, how could the insurer prove that the 
particular insured, in the manner in which he carries on his business, ought to know the non-
disclosed fact, since it is hardly possible for the insurer to find out how the particular insured 
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China Laws for Foreign Business, vol. 3, looseleaf (North Ryde, N.S.W.: CCH Australia Ltd, 1985-1987) 
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carries on his business? Second, if the subjective test were adopted, the law would seem to be 
protecting those who carry on their business recklessly. Moreover, it would be ridiculous that an 
insured would be released from the liability for non-disclosure because his business was so 
improperly operated that material information never reached the relevant department in time. 
 
In addition, the prudent insured test would drive the insured to manage his business with higher 
attention to the material circumstance related to the risk and consequently the risk will be reduced. 
On the other hand, if the particular insured test were applied, the insurer would be compelled to 
inquire in the proposal form and investigate how the insured conducts his business and this will 
increase the premiums accordingly. Moreover, the insurance brokage in China is very immature 
with only 1% of the premium income coming from those contracts reached through the broker.294 
The tendency of the particular insured test to protect the careless people would hinder the insured 
to hire an experienced and prudent broker, and consequently hinder the development of the 
insurance brokage, the development of which is critical to a healthy insurance market. 
 
2. The Knowledge of the Employee and the Agent 
 
The Maritime Code does not mention the duty of agent. The relationship between the principal and 
the agent and the relationship toward a third part are set out in the General Principles of the Civil 
Law 1986. The general principle is that the principal should bear any consequence of the acts by 
the agent within his authority.295 It may follow that, when the insured makes an insurance contract 
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 Article 63 of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986: “Citizens and legal persons may perform civil 
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through an agent, whatever the agent knows or ought to know, is presumed to be the knowledge of 
the insured. However, this is not expressed by law in unambiguous words. Whether the word 
“acts”296 is inclusive of the meaning of knowledge will be disputed, so it is preferred that the 
Maritime Code could add a article imitating section 19 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) 
so that any non-disclosure made by the agent through whom the insurance contract is made, for 
whatever reasons (except that the agent was defrauding the principal insured)297 and whether the 
principle knows, should result in the same consequence as if the non-disclosure were done by the 
insured himself. 
 
Not all the employees have the same position as the agents under Chinese law. The law does not 
specify in which conditions the employees’ knowledge is imputed on the insured. Article 43 of the 
General Principle of Civil Law 1986 stipulates that “an enterprise as legal person shall bear civil 
liability for the operational activities of its legal representatives and other personnel”. Article 58 of 
the Judicial Interpretation of the General Principle of Civil Law further stipulates that “if the legal 
representatives and other personnel of an enterprise as legal person are engaged in any business 
activities in the name of the legal person and cause economic loss to others thereupon, the 
enterprise as legal person shall bear the civil liability.” These regulations are concerning the 
employees’ conduct, not their knowledge. The law would go too far if the employee’s knowledge 
were all imputed on the employer. China’s insurance law should use the English concept of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Article 83 of the Judicial Interpretation of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986: “the agent and the 
principal bear joint and several liability to the civil juristic acts that have been done. They can be the joint 
defendants in civil proceedings.” [translated by the author] 
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the Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Governing Foreign-Related Matters, trans., 
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“agent to know” for reference on this point and only the knowledge of the agent to know should be 
imputed to the insurer.298 
 
III. Constructive Knowledge in China’s Non-Marine Insurance Law 
 
The Insurance Law does not stipulate that the insured should disclose what he ought to know, but 
the proposed judicial interpretation suggests that the constructive knowledge should also apply to 
the non-marine insurance as well as the marine insurance.299 
 
IV. What Need Not Be Disclosed? 
 




In the landmark precedent Carter v. Boehm,300 Lord Mansfield said, 
 
“The assured, need not mention what the underwriter knows, what way soever he came by 
the knowledge; or what he ought to know; or takes upon himself the knowledge of; or 
waives being informed of; or what lessens the risk agreed and understood to be run; or 
general topics of speculation; or every cause which may occasion natural perils, as the 
difficulty of the voyage, kind of seasons, probability of hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.; or 
every cause which may occasion political perils, from the rupture of States, from war, and 
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the various operations of it, upon the probability of safety from the continuance and return 
of peace, or from the imbecility of the enemy.” 
 
As far as marine insurance is concerned, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), section 18(3), 
provides 
 
“In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, namely: 
(a) Any circumstance which diminishes the risk; 
(b) Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The 
insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and matters 
which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, ought to know; 
(c) Any circumstances as to which information is waived by the insurer; 
(d) Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or 
implied warranty.” 
 
ii. Facts within the Actual or Presumed Knowledge of the Insurer 
 
The insured need not disclose what the insurer knows in whatever way.301 In addition, at least in 
marine insurance, the insured is not bound to disclose facts within the ordinary professional 
knowledge of an underwriter302 and this “probably extends to other branches of insurance”.303 The 
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presumed knowledge has been held to include the usages of trade,304 usual clauses of merchant 
contracts,305 the standing law of a state,306 the common sense and the other knowledge in the 
common course of the business of the insurer underwriting the same class of risks. The contents of 
Lloyd’s List or any other newspaper do not necessarily become the common sense, or public 
knowledge, and therefore there is no presumption of knowledge of the insurer merely on ground 






In the present context, waiver means “the abandonment or relinquishment of a right or a defence 
which may occur as the result either of an election by the insurer or of the creation of an estoppel 
precluding him from relying upon his… rights against the assured”.308 If the insurer waives by 
express words,309 it is easy to judge; the problems often arise when the insured argues that the 
insurer has waived his right by his conduct, which is called implied waiver. Implied waiver is also 
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an apparent flaw in the Chinese insurance law.310 So the following discussion will focus on the 
circumstances where the insurer waives by his conduct. 
 
(b) Waiver of the Duty of Disclosure 
 
Before the contract has been concluded, the insurer may waive the insured’s duty of disclosure 
totally or partially impliedly by his conduct. 
 
For example, if the insurer does not seek for the information of a particular circumstance, the 
current proposition in U.K. is that the insurer has not necessarily waived the insured’s duty of 
disclosure by omitting to inquire,311 but this will be evidence that the insurer does not regard the 
matter as material.312 The position is that if the insurer has been given information that, although 
incomplete, constitutes a fair representation of the risk which would raise suspicions in the mind 
of a prudent insurer that there are other material circumstances, then the acceptance of the 
application without further inquiry constitutes a waiver by conduct.313 The self-regulation, the 
Statement of General Insurance Practice 1986,314 clause 1(d), takes the view that “those matters 
which insurers have found generally to be material will be the subject of clear questions in 
proposal forms”. In IOB report 1994,315 the Bureau was of the position that the scope of the 
insured’s duty of disclosure was determined by the questions put by the insurer as far as consumer 
insurance was concerned. 
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If the insurer asks a question of limited scope in the manner that he implies that he has no interest 
in the rest matters outside the scope, he is deemed to have waived the disclosure of the rest 
matters.316 However, the implication of the question must be clear. For example, questions seeking 
trade references do not waive information about convictions.317 In addition, the implication must 
be reasonable, in the sense that a reasonable man reading it would think that the insurer is not 
seeking for further information.318 
 
In cases where the insurer asks questions but the insured does not answer, or the answer is 
incomplete, but the insurer nonetheless issues a policy without inquiry, the insurer will normally 
be taken as waiver of the disclosure in respect of the matters,319 unless the blank obviously implies 
a negative answer.320 In the latter circumstances, if the negative answer is wrong, the insurer can 
avoid the contract.321 
 
(c) Waiver of Further Information 
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Lord Esher MR has said that it “is not necessary to disclose minutely every material fact; 
assuming that there is a material fact which he is bound to disclose, the rule is satisfied if he 
discloses sufficient to call the attention of the underwriter, in such a manner that they can see that 
if they require further information they ought to ask for it.”322 But if a presentation makes no 




The Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), section 18(3) (d) stipulates that the insured, in the absence 
of inquiry, need not disclose “any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of 
any express or implied warranty”.324 
 
v. The “Spent” Convictions 
 
According to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (U.K.), previous convictions are regarded 
as “spent” after a certain “rehabilitation periods”, varying from five to ten years depending on the 
type of sentence, and the insured is not liable for not disclosing such “spent” conviction even when 
the insurer inquires about his previous convictions. But if the conviction is a sentence of 
imprisonment for more than 30 months, such conviction is not caught by the Act. 
 
2. The Position of China in Marine and Non-Marine Insurance 
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The Maritime Code has given the general rule of what need not be disclosed, saying that “the 
insured need not inform the insurer of the facts which the insurer has known of or the insurer 
ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary business practice if the insurer made no inquiry.”325 
According to the unius exclusio interpretation326 of this article, it seems that since the law only 
exempts the disclosure of the facts within the actual or presumed knowledge of insurer, any other 
facts which diminish risks, which have been waived by the insurer, which are the subject of a 
warranty or which are concerned with the previous convictions, must all be disclosed voluntarily. 
 
In practice the insured can raise some of these defences. A clever judge may resort to some basic 
principles or abstract concepts in the civil law to support the insured in such cases. For example, 
where the insured fails to disclose a circumstance which diminish the risk, if the insurer claims 
that he has been induced by the non-disclosure, the inducement must result in a favourable 
contract to the insurer than it should have been had the disclosure been made.327 Thus, the judge 
may conclude that the insurer purely benefits from the non-disclosure and nothing adverse has 
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been made to the insurer. Since one of the basic principles in the civil law is “no damage, no 
remedy”,328 the insurer is not allowed to get remedy from what has benefited him. 
 
As for the information which the insurer has expressly waived, it could be held that the waiver is 
evidence that the insurer regards it as unimportant or the insurer has not been induced by the non-
disclosure. It is also possible to resort to the principle of good faith in the civil law which requires 
the party to a contract to exercise his right in a reasonable way, 329  because an insurer who 
expressed that he did not want to know certain information and later accused the insured for not 
disclosing that information is not exercising his right in a reasonable way. 
 
However, it is still suggested that the law clearly stipulate that those circumstances need not be 
disclosed in absence of the inquiry so that the law would not be so discretionary because not every 
judge will take these approaches illustrated above.330 In addition, however the judge interprets the 
law, there is no way that he could fairly decide that the insured need not disclose the spent 
convictions,331 so the law must be amended in this regard. 
 
In non-marine insurance, as the result of adopting the principle of “inquiry-disclosure”, whatever 
is not asked by the insurer, not matter how material it is, need not be disclosed by the insured. On 
the other hand, not all questions asked by the insurer should be disclosed. The Insurance Law 
provides that the insurer can only make inquiry on conditions relating to the subject matter to be 
insured or the person to be insured. In addition, although without the law does not stipulate so in 
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clear words, it is believed that the information expressed waived by the insurer need not be 
disclosed.332 
 
ii. The Actual and Presumed Knowledge of the Insurer 
 
The insured of marine insurance need not inform the insurer of the facts which the insurer has 
known of or the insurer ought to have knowledge of in his ordinary business practice if the insurer 
made no inquiry.333 There is no ambiguity in the meaning of the insurer’s actual knowledge, but, 
as the article leaves the word of “insurer” unadorned, the question rises: is the insurer deemed to 
know what a prudent insurer should know? 
 
The test of judging the scope of the presumed knowledge of the insurer should be the objective 
one, namely, the test of a prudent insurer. This is because from the wording of article 222(2), it can 
be inferred that the legislative intent was to define the presumed knowledge of the insurer in the 
same manner as the presumed knowledge of the insured. If the word of “insured” in article 222 
should be understood as a reasonable insured, there is no reason why the “insurer” should not be 
regarded as a reasonable, or prudent, insurer. Furthermore, to hold otherwise is equal to saying that 
the less the insurer takes care of his business, the heavier duty the insured would have. 
 
In Xi Gu Commercial Ins. v. People’s Insurance Company of China, Qingdao Branch,334 a case 
decided by the Maritime Court of Qingdao, one of the essential matters was decided on what 
should be presumed to be known by the insurer. In this case, the insurer declined the claim on 
ground of non-disclosure of the material fact that the cargo was shipped on a barge tugged by 
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another ship, but the insured argued that the insurer should have known this because: (1) the 
circumstances of the shipment had been reported by a famous local newspaper and the local TV 
channel, so those circumstances were common public knowledge; (2) the documents that the 
insured had submitted to the insurer had included the information such as the weight, the size, and 
the name of the ship,335 and the undisclosed fact could be inferred from such information. Both the 
Maritime Court and the High People’s Court 336  decided against the insured. Concerning the 
insured’s first argument, the judges held that the mere fact of the information having been reported 
by local media could not necessarily made that information a public knowledge, and the insured 
still had the duty to disclose it to the insurer. Concerning the second argument, the judges said, 
although there were some indications of the ship being a towage, such indications could not come 
to the mind of an ordinary people until he had understood the whole truth. Moreover, the law does 
not impose such a duty on the insurer to discover the truth by making enquiry on any information 
which would indicate the existence of further material circumstances as the insured’s duty should 
be performed voluntarily. 
 
It could not be clearly discerned from this case whether the test of a prudent insurer or the 
particular insurer was adopted, but the judges did not inquire into how the insurer in this case 
carried on his business; instead, the judges based his conclusion on what an ordinary man, 
something like a reasonable man, would have thought. So the decision is close to the test of a 
prudent insurer. However, in a strict sense, there is still a small flaw in the judgement. The obiter 
dictum that the insurer has no duty to probe the details of the facts if the general information of the 
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facts has been disclosed cannot be fully accepted. The right point of view should be that if the 
insured has disclosed sufficiently enough information to draw the attention of a prudent insurer 
concerning the materiality of the details, but the particular insurer still chooses not to inquire about 
the details, or, due to his stupidity or carelessness, fails to appreciate the materiality of the details, 
the insured should be deemed as having fully performed his duty unless there is intentional 




In both marine and non-marine insurance, there is no such a doctrine as waiver and there is even 
no parallel concept of waiver in the whole Chinese law.337 Where the insurer has expressed that he 
will waive his right if the insured breaches the duty of disclosure, or has expressly waived, either 
fully or partly, the performance of the duty of disclosure, the People’s Court should decide for the 
                                                        
337
 There is no doctrine of waiver or estopple in the Chinese law. However, in the civil law, there are many 
rules that may have similar functions as waiver. Generally speaking, the solution to waiver under the 
Chinese law is a piecemeal one. For example, the extinction period, which means the period after which a 
certain right will be extinguished, serves part of function of waiver in the Chinese law. According to Article 
55(1) of the Contract Law, where a party does not avoid the contract after one year of knowing his right to 
do so, the party will be barred from avoiding the contract. Article 55(2) of the same statute stipulates that the 
right to avoid a contract will be extinguished if the party with the right expressly gives up the right or gives 
up the right by his conduct. This provision is very similar to waiver, but it only applies to the right to avoid a 
contract. For another example, if someone promises to give up a right or some interest, then the promise 
must be obeyed because consideration is not needed to enable a promise actionable (in China, there is even 
no concept of consideration). Sometimes, the court will forbid a person to exercise his right which he has 
waived as the court considers the exercise of such a right would seriously conflict with the principle of good 
faith in the civil law, although the person’s right may be justified by a contract. See Li Yuquan, Bao Xian Fa 
(Insurance Law), 2nd ed. (Beijing: The Law Press, 2003) at 70; Mu Shengting & Xu Liang, “Guan Yu Bao 
Xian He Tong Fa Zhong De Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze Ren Ti (On the Problem of the Principle of Utmost 
Good Faith in the Insurance Contract Law)” (2003) 56:3 Wuhan University Journal (Social Science Edition) 
287 at 290.. It has also been argued that the doctrine of waiver is especially important to the insurance law. 
See Xu Shenliang & Li Xiao, “Bao Xian Fa Ye Yao Zao Ru Shi (The Insurance Law should also ‘Join the 
WTO’ as early as Possible)”, International Finance Newspaper, November 15, 2001, section 6, online: the 
National People’s Congress News 
<http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper12/1/class001200078/hwz211693.htm>. 
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insured on the ground that such a promise must be kept otherwise it would be a breach of the 
principle of good faith, one of the general principles in the contract law and civil law.338 
 
But in circumstances where the insurer, in the eyes of a lawyer of the common law, would be held 
to have impliedly waived the insured’s performance of the duty of disclosure by his conduct, the 
attitude of the courts in China is not very clear. In such cases, the court often resorts to giving a 
broad interpretation to certain general principles in the contract law or certain well-recognized 
theories of the civil law, such as the principle of good faith.339 Because these approaches are not 
very consistent and one person’s interpretation may differ from another’s, the decisions will be 
inconsistent accordingly. It is suggested that the best approach for China would be to borrow the 
concept of waiver from the common law for ensuring consistency in decisions. 
 
Because of the lack of a clear doctrine of waiver in the Chinese law, practical difficulties often 
occurs when the insurer accepts the uncompleted proposal without any objection or further inquiry. 
In such circumstances, there are two opposite views.340 One assumes that it is the insurer’s duty to 
                                                        
338
 For principle of good faith in the contract law and civil law, see page 36ff., above. For other approaches 
dealing with the expressed waiver, see text accompanying supra note 329. For further discuss on the 
alternative approaches dealing with waiver under the Chinese law, see supra note 337. Compare with the 
U.K. case, Drake Insurance plc v. Provident Insurance plc [2003] EWCA Civ 1834. In this case, the judges 
clearly expressed their attitude against the insurer’s utilizing the principle of utmost good faith to avoid a 
contract in bad faith. “…the doctrine of good faith should be capable of limiting the insurer’s right to avoid 
in circumstances where that remedy…would operate unfairly.” (Per Rix L.J. at para. 87.) “If more than lip 
service is to be paid to the principle that an insurer shall show the utmost good faith, the principle in my 
judgment required that [simple] enquiry to be made before the ‘wholly one-sided’ remedy of avoidance was 
exercised.” (per Pill L.J., dissenting, at para. 177.) See also, Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1918, 
for Lord Mansfield’s dictum that an insurer, by asserting a right to avoid for non-disclosure, would himself 
be guilty of want of good faith; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v. Pine Top Insurance Co [1995] 1 A.C. 501 at 
505.  
339
 See text accompanying supra note 329. 
340
 In Wang B v. PICC, reported in Liu Zhixin, ed., Zhong Guo Dian Xing Shang Shi An Li Ping Xi (China 
Typical Commercial Cases and Comments) (Beijing: The Law Press, 1997) at 351-352. The tribunal of the 
People’s Court had divided into two opinions. These two opinions are mentioned below. But the name of the 
judge who supports each opinion is unreported. The decision of this case at last was a concoction of the two 
opinions. In this case, the insured died from cancer. The beneficiary under the policy claimed. The insurance 
company denied liability on ground of non-disclosure. The People’s Court found that the insured did not 
disclose the fact that he already had cancer before the insurance contract was concluded, but the Court also 
found that the insured did not know that he had had cancer because his family had concealed this from him. 
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check the proposal; if he fails to do so, it is his negligence and the insurer should not be allowed to 
avoid the contract on ground of his own negligence.341 The other view considers the insured’s duty 
of disclosure to be a duty prior to the insurer’s duty to check the proposal. Since the insured has 
broken the duty first, why should the insurer be expected to amend the fault of the insured?342 The 
People’s Court sometimes goes the middle way between the two opposite view, and decides that 
the insurer should compensate part of the loss of the insured,343 but the decisions are not consistent 
and the Court ends the case in conciliation most of the time.344 Considering the current situation of 
China’s insurance industry, where the insurer often misleads the insured not to perform the duty of 
disclosure,345 it might be a better solution to adopt the view taken in Roberts v. Avon Insurance 
Co.346 that 
 
“Where a question in the proposal is left entirely unanswered, the issue of the policy, 
without further inquiry, has been held to be a waiver of information, and it would seem 
that the omission to answer a question cannot be regarded as a misstatement of fact, unless 
the obvious inference is that the applicant intended the blank to represent a negative 
answer.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
It was held that the insured had breached the duty of disclosure negligently (because he should have known 
that he had had serious illness as a reasonable man in his situations); as a result the contract was avoidable 
and the insurance company was liable to return the premium. The Court also held that the insurance 
company’s negligence in checking the application was a contributory negligence which together with the 






 See “contributory negligence” at page 142-171, below. 
344
 See supra note 712. 
345
 See suggestion 3 of The Report of the Legal Committee of the National People’s Congress on the 
Amendment of “Bill of Amendment of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)”, in Hu 
Jihua, gen. ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Bao Xian Fa Shi Yi Ji Shi Yong Zhi Nan (The 
Paraphrase and Practical Guide of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: China 
Democracy and Legal System Press, 2002) 48 at 49-50. 
346
 [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 240 at 249, citing E.J. Macgillivray & Dnis Browne, Macgillivray on Insurance 
Law, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1947) at 503. See also the U.S.A. position that “by issuing the 
policy without requiring an answer to the question the company waived answer to the inquiry and elected to 
treat it as immaterial.” Bowles v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident, 99 F. 2d. 44 (4 Cir, 1938). 
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But this rule should be excluded when the insured conceals the truth intentionally. 
 
Another example showing the difficulty arising from the want of the rule of waiver is the group 
insurance category: the insurer makes contract with the insured through an intermediary institution, 
such as a school or a ferry company. In such insurance, the insurer usually does not ask the 
circumstances of the particular insured and it is also difficult for the insured to communicate any 
material circumstance to the insurer. In non-marine group insurance, the insured can defend for his 
non-disclosure on ground of the doctrine of inquiry-disclosure. 347  Nevertheless, in marine 
insurance, such as marine passenger life insurance, the insured will find himself in trouble because 
the Maritime Code provides that he should voluntarily disclose.348 In the author’s opinion, group 
insurance is a kind of consumer insurance in which the insurer has sacrificed the accuracy of the 
character of each individual insured in consideration of more efficient making of the contract and 
larger amount of market share. In this sense, the insurer could be regarded to have waived his right 
in regard to disclosure. 
 
The proposed judicial interpretation has partly covered the issue of waiver. It stipulates that “after 
the contract has been concluded, if the applicant or the insured performs the duty of disclosure, 
and if the insurer has no objection, the insurer is not entitled to terminate the contract 
therewith.”349 The wording of this stipulation is a bit unclear, it seems that the true meaning is that 
after the contract has been concluded, if the insured makes complementary disclosure and if the 
                                                        
347
 For the meaning of “inquiry-disclosure”, see 68, above. 
348
 It probably could be argued that, in group insurance, the insurer classifies the kind of the insured by 
identifying the intermediary organizations (the ferry operators, for example) and the marine peril are 
generally more associated with the intermediary organization than the individual insured. For example, in 
the passenger group insurance, whether the ferry operator is reliable is more important than the personality 
of the individual passenger. Therefore, the disclosure made by the individual insured are much less 
important and it generally cannot be said to have induced the insurer’s decision.  
349
 Article 9(3) of The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the 
Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
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insurer has no objection at the time of complementary disclosure, the insurer cannot terminate the 
contract for this non-disclosure. 
 
In addition, article 46 of this interpretation provides that where the insured has performed physical 
examination at the pointed hospital as requested by the insurer, if the insurer knows that the result 
of the physical examination of the insured is not consistent with the disclosure, or if the hospital 
fails to communicate the result of the physical examination to the insurer, the insurer cannot 
terminate the contract on ground of non-disclosure unless the matter undisclosed is not the subject 




The Maritime Code does not provide that it is unnecessary for the insured to disclose the matters 
of a warranty, but it actually does not matter too much because the insurer will either decline the 
claim for the breach of the warranty, which is much easier to be proved than the breach of the duty 
of disclosure, or the court will find the matter unimportant due to the existence of the warranty. 
 
v. Previous Conviction 
 
No law in China provides that any precious conviction can be concealed by the insured from the 
insurer. In fact, few have noticed the need to establish such a rule to protect those with a previous 
conviction so that it would be easier for them to be re-accepted by the society. However, it is not 
the task of the insurance law so I will not discuss the issue in detail. 
                                                        
350
 See article 46 (physical examination and disclosure) of The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme 
Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), ibid. 
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Chapter 4. The Insured’s Duty of Disclosure: Materiality 
 
I. Common Law Materiality 
 
1. Introduction to the Common Law Position 
 
It is not all the facts the insured knows or ought to know that should be disclosed. The duty of 
disclosure only extends to those “material” circumstances. The requirement for materiality is set 
up in section 18(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) as 
 
“Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer 
in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take the risk.” 
 
Two issues are involved in the criterion of materiality, namely, to whom the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation is material and what the “influence” means. The rule adopted in U.K. is called 
“a prudent insurer test”.351 This test, together with the interpretation of “influence”, which is called 
“the want to know test”,352 has been strongly criticized.353 The Australian law has adopted other 
tests of materiality, “a prudent insured test”.354 In China, it is unanimous agreed that the words 
stipulated in the Maritime Code mean “decisive influence”,355 but it is not clear whether the 
“insurer” means a prudent insurer or the particular insurer.356 
 
2. The Test of Materiality 
                                                        
351
 “A prudent insurer test” means that a fact is material if it would influence the mind of a prudent insurer. 
Discussed in more detail at page 85ff., below. 
352
 Under the law of U.K., the non-disclosure has influenced a prudent insurer if the prudent insurer would 
want to know the relevant information. Discussed in more detail at page 89ff., below. 
353
 See supra note 24. 
354
 Discussed in more detail at page 99ff., below. 
355
 Discussed in more detail at page 94, below. 
356
 Discussed in more detail at page 94ff., below. 
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i. Four Choices for the Test of Materiality 
 
No doubt, only the material circumstance should be disclosed, but in whose eye should the 
circumstance be material? There could be four possible choices for the test of materiality,357 that is, 
the particular insured test, the particular insurer test, a prudent (or reasonable) insured test and a 
prudent insurer test. The first test, the particular insured test, which considers the actual opinion of 
the particular insured as the decisive yardstick for determining materiality, can be set aside for its 
obvious unfairness and bias to the insured.358 The second test, the particular insurer test, which 
means that a circumstance is material if the particular insurer regards it material, is also a 
subjective test. The particular insurer test would coincide with the requirement of actual 
inducement if the test for influence would be the decisive one.359 It should be applied combined 
with a prudent insurer test.360 
 
The third test, “a prudent insurer”, is the current law of the U.K.,361 and the fourth, “a prudent 
insured test”, is the most favourite test advocated in Australia by the legal reformers as a substitute 
for the current marine insurance law and it has been adopted in Australian general insurance 
law.362 
 
                                                        
357
 See Lambert v. Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 485 at 487. 
358
 Lindenau v. Desborough (1828) 8 B. & C. 586 at 592, where Bayley J. said that “The proper question is 
‘whether any particular circumstance was in fact material?’ and not whether the party believed it to be so. 
The contrary doctrine would lead to frequent suppression of information, and it would often be extremely 
difficult to show that the party neglecting to give the information thought it material.” Bates v. Hewitt (1867) 
L.R. 2 Q.B. 595 at 608, where Mellor J. said that “… to enable a person proposing an insurance to speculate 
upon the maximum or minimum of information he is bound to communicate, would be introducing a most 
dangerous principle into the law of insurance.” Semin Park, the Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract 
Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 73-74. In the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (Australia), 
the particular insured test is adopted combined with a reasonable insured test; see page 87, below. 
359
 See page 105ff., below. 
360
 See page 105, below. 
361
 See infra note 363. 
362
 Discussed in more detail at page 87, below. 
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ii. A Prudent Insurer Test 
 
The current law of the U.K. takes the view that it is in the eyes of a prudent insurer, not the 
particular insurer, that the fact in question should be material.363 According to Lord Radcliffe,364 
the prudent insurer is no more than the anthropomorphic conception of the standard of 
professional underwriting which the court found appropriate to uphold. The materiality is also 
connected to the class and character of the transaction contemplated, as the insurer of one kind of 
risk may be influenced by a particular circumstance that would not influence those underwriting 
other kinds of risk. 365  It seems to be appropriate that some words such as “in that type of 
insurance” should be added after the term of “a prudent insurer” in s. 18(2) of the M.I.A. 1906.366 
It is the duty of the insurer to prove the materiality of a particular fact.367 The evidence from other 
independent experts who represent the prudent insurer as to the opinion on the question is 
admissible to prove materiality of a non-disclosure and is needed to help the judge discover the 
standards and practice of the notional prudent insurer.368 The expert evidence is not binding on the 
                                                        
363
 Ionides v. Pender (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 531; Mutual Life Insurance Co. New York v. Ontario Metal 
Products Co. [1925] A.C. 344; Lambert v. Co-Operative Insurance Society [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 485 at 
491, 493; Container Transport International Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476 at 492, 510, 511, 529; Highlands Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. 
[1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 109 at 113-114; Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v. Pine Top Insurance Co [1994] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 427; St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (UK) Ltd. v. McConnell Dowell Constructors Ltd. 
[1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 116. 
364
 Davis Contractors v. Fareham Urban DC [1956] A.C. 696 at 728. 
365
 Scrutton L.J. showed an example, in Glicksman v. Lancashire and General Assurance Co. [1925] 2 K.B. 
593 at 608, that in marine insurance the fact that another underwriter had rejected the risk was immaterial, 
whereas this was certainly material in non-marine insurance. 
366
 Becker v. Marshall (1922) 12 Ll. L. R. 413 at 414, per Scrutton L.J.; Nicholas Legh-Jones, gen. ed., 
MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 10th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at para. 17-35. 
367
 Semin Park, the Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 
1996) at 80. 
368
 At the beginning, Lord Mansfield was inclined to treat the experts’ opinions as “evidence”. Carter v. 
Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1918. But later the expert evidence was admitted and has been widely 
accepted. Campbell v. Richards (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 840; Ionides v. Pender (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 531; Thames 
and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. v. Gunford Ship Co. [1911] A.C. 529; Glasgow Assurance v. Symondson 
(1911) 16 Com. Cas. 109; Yorke v. Yorkshire Insurance Co. [1918] 1 K.B. 662. See the history of expert 
evidence in Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth 
Pub. Co., 1996) at 81-82. 
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court. 369  Consequently, the court will decide the question of materiality, considering all the 
relevant factors such as judges’ experience, common sense, whether the insurer asked the insured 
some relevant questions and the expert evidence.370 
 
iii. A Reasonable Insured Test 
 
(a) The Reform in U.K. 
 
A prudent insurer test has been criticized for a long time throughout common law countries.371 The 
most favoured substitutive test is “a reasonable insured test”, the basic idea of which is that the 
materiality of a fact is what a reasonable insured, that is, what a reasonable man in the position of 
an insured, would consider it material to the risk proposed to be covered. This test was discussed 
in full-scale by Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Company372 and 
it was recommended by the Law Reform Committee (U.K.) in its Fifth Report.373 The committee 
concluded that “for the purpose of any contract of insurance no fact should be deemed as material 
unless it would have been considered material by a reasonable insured”.374 In 1980, the Law 
Commission considered that the present law of non-disclosure was unjust so that reform was 
needed. The Law Commission proposed a reasonable insured test in addition to a prudent insurer 
                                                        
369
 Reynolds and Anderson v. Phoenix Assurance Co. [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 440 at 457-458. 
370
 Roselodge v. Castle [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 113; Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance 
Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 83; Nicholas Legh-Jones, gen. ed., 
MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 10th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 17-49. 
371
 See e.g. U.K., the Law Commission, Insurance Law - Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, Law 
Com. No. 104, Cmnd 8064 (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) at paras. 3.17-3.22; U.K., the Law Reform 
Committee, Conditions and Exceptions in Insurance Policies, Law Reform Committee No. 5, Cmnd. 62 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1957) para. 4; Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 (Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at 10.23-10.29; Yeo Hwee Ying, 
“Common Law Materiality – An Australian Alternative”, [1990] J.B.L. 97. 
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 [1908] 2 K.B.863 at 884. 
373
 U.K., the Law Reform Committee, Conditions and Exceptions in Insurance Policies, Law Reform 
Committee No. 5, Cmnd. 62 (London: H.M.S.O., 1957). 
374
 Ibid at para. 14(1). 
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test.375 It was suggested that a prudent insurer test should still be the law, but its application should 
be limited according to a reasonable insured test. Under this suggestion, an insured is still obliged 
to disclose any circumstance that is material to a prudent insurer, but he is not obliged to do so if 
that circumstance will not be disclosed by a reasonable man in his position.376 
 
Under the influence of these reports, reform took place in the Statement of General Insurance 
Practice 1986 and the Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice 1986.377 These self-regulations 
provided that an insurer is not allowed to repudiate his liability on grounds of non-disclosure of 
material fact, which the insured could not reasonably be expected to disclose.378 However, these 
self-regulations are not law; they are only of value when those reputable underwriters choose to 
follow them. 
 
(b) The Australian Reform 
 
In Australia, a prudent insurer test, which had been the majority of the authorities, was abolished 
as a result of the new Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Commonwealth). Section 21(1) of this act 
adopts a reasonable insured test in combination with a particular insured test, stating that: 
 
“Subject to this Act, an insured has a duty to disclose to the insurer before the relevant 
contract of insurance is entered into, every matter that is known to the insured, being a 
matter that – (a) the insured knows to be a matter relevant to the decision of the insurer 
                                                        
375
 U.K., the Law Commission, Insurance Law – Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, Law Com. No. 
104, Cmnd 8064 (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) at para. 4.47-4.48, 4.51. (Law Commission’s proposals do not 




 See supra note 236. 
378
 Clause 2(b) of the Statement of General Insurance Practice 1986 and clause 3 (a) of the Statement of 
Long-Term Insurance Practice 1986. 
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whether to accept the risk and, if so, on what terms; or (b) a reasonable person in the 
circumstances could be expected to know to be a matter so relevant…” 
 
The Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth) is now under review, and the Australian Law 
Reform Commission also suggested that section 24(1) and 26(1) should be amended to provide 
that “an insured must disclose accurately all circumstances that it know, or a reasonable person in 
its position would know, to be material.”379 
 
iv. Reasons for Adopting a Reasonable Insured Test 
 
The adoption of a reasonable insured test is spurred by the defaults of a prudent insurer test, which 
has been criticised mainly from the following aspects. First, the insured, even acting as a 
reasonable man with reasonable care, may fail in his duty of disclosure, because it is unrealistic 
and unfair to expect an insured to figure out what a prudent insurer would regard material.380 
Second, the particular insurer may not always act as carefully as the notional prudent insurer, and 
he may not care what a prudent insurer would care.381 Then why is the insured obliged to disclose 
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 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 
(Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at 231. 
380
 Yeo Hwee Ying, “Recent Developments in Materiality Test of Insurance Contracts”, [1995] Sing JLS, 56 
at 70; Semin Park, the Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 
1996) at 83; Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report 
No. 91 (Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at 10.23. 
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 Anthony Diamond QC has observed: “Suppose that you or I, as reasonable prospective assureds, were to 
go in search of the prudent insurer. He is to be found, if anywhere at all, in the room at Lloyd’s. so let us 
suppose that you or I were to go to lime street… to interrogate the working underwriters, or least those of 
them that write marine business and are thus subject to the act of 1906. What would we find if we bean to 
ask a few questions? Surely we would find a few prudent underwriters. But also, in all probability, even in 
that ancient institution, we would find some who are not prudent at all. And even the great majority who are 
without question prudent underwriters, would tell us, if we persisted in our questioning, that there are 
occasions when they simply cannot afford to be prudent. For example, one might say that he cannot afford 
not to write a fixed lime on every risk presented by a certain broker; otherwise he would never see that 
broker again. Or another might tell us that he has on occasion to write ‘loss’ leaders’ knowing that the 
business will be unprofitable and in the hope of getting an entree into a particular line of business in the 
future.” A Diamond, “The Law of Marine Insurance: Has It a Future?” (1986) L.M.C.L.Q. 25 at 30-1. See 
also Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 
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what the particular insurer does not need? Third, the insurer has “an unfair advantage in relation to 
the practice of expert evidence”,382 which is more easily tailored to the needs of the insurer’s 
defence.383 In comparison, a reasonable insured test is more reasonable in the regard and does not 
have these problems. 
 
As suggested by the Law Reform Committee, the test of a reasonable insured will not bring any 
practical difficulty. 384  The test is substantially a reasonable man test that has already been 
acquainted by the judges. In addition, if the test of a reasonable insured were accepted, the costly 
procedure of the expert evidence would be unnecessary and the unbalance in the capability of 
accessing to evidence would no longer exist. 
 
Although there may be more than enough reasons for the U.K. to change her rigid position of the 
test of a prudent insurer, whether such a change is suitable to China will be discussed later.385 
 
3. Degree of Influence 
 
i. Decisive Test v. “Want to Know Test” 
 
According to the test of a prudent insurer, a fact is material if it would influence a prudent 
insurer’s decision on whether to take on the risk or what amount of premium he would 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at 10.24; Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law 
(Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 83-84. 
382
 Semin Park, the Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 
1996) at 84;  
383
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 
(Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at 10.91. 
384
 U.K., the Law Reform Committee, Conditions and Exceptions in Insurance Policies, Law Reform 
Committee No. 5, Cmnd. 62 (London: H.M.S.O., 1957) at para. 14(1). 
385
 See page 95ff., below. 
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charge.386There could be two explanations for the degree of influence in the test of materiality.387 
One is called “the decisive influence”. The law of U.S.A. and Australia upholds this interpretation. 
It is held in most jurisdictions of U.S.A. that the word of “influence” means that had the prudent 
insurer possessed the undisclosed fact he would have accepted the risk with different terms, in 
particular with a different premium, from those that he had originally accepted.388 The Insurance 
Contract Act 1984 (Australia) also provides that the remedies do not apply “where the insurer 
would have entered into the contract, for the same premium and on the same terms and conditions, 
even if the insured had not failed to comply with the duty of disclosure or had not made the 
misrepresentation before the contract was entered into”.389 Similar sections have been suggested to 
substitute the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth).390 
 
The current law of the U.K. upholds another explanation that a fact is material as far as a prudent 
insurer would want to know it as a factor in assessing the risks; he is not necessary bound to have 
declined to assume the risk or increased the premium had he known the facts undisclosed or 
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 Poh Chu Chai, Principles of Insurance Law, 5th ed. (Singapore: Butterworths, 2000) at 123. 
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 Clarke alleges that there could be four types of “influence”. Type A is information such that, if the 
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located between type B and C. see Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. (London: 
LLP, 2002) at para. 23-7A. Type A and B can both be called the decisive influence test, and type C and D 
can be regarded as indecisive (the want to know test). 
388
 Penn Mutual Life v. Mechanics’ Saving Bank 72 F. 413 at 429 (6 Cir., 1896); Hare & Chase v. National 
Surety 49 F. 2d. 447 at 457 (S.D.N.Y., 1931); Clemmer’s Administrator v. Jefferson Standard Life 
Insurance Co. 9 F. Su 115 (W.D. Va., 1941); New York Life v. Kuhlenstadt 33 N.E. 2d. 340 at 347-348 (S.C. 
Indiana, 1941); American Eagle Fire Insurance Co. v. Peoples Compress Co. 156 F. 2d 663 (10 Cir., 1946); 
Garvey v. Old Colonial Insurance Co. 153 F. Su 755 (E.D.N.C., 1957); Welded Tube Co. v. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. 1973 A.M.C. 555 at 563 (E.D.Pa., 1973); Parker v. Prudential Insurance Co. 900 F. 2d. 772 
(4Cir., 1990); Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 803 P. 2d. 406 at 409 (Alaska, 1990). In certain jurisdiction 
of U.S.A., “influence” means that had the insurer known the undisclosed fact, the insurer would have 
rejected the risk at all. Klingman v. National Indemnity Co. 317 F.2d 850 (7 Cir., 1963); Fernandez v. 
Windsor Life Insurance Company of America 372 N.Y.S. 2d. 357 (1975); Knight v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co. 
651 F. Su 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Viriato Evora v. Guy Henry 559 A. 2d. 1038 (1989); American Home 
Assurance Co. v. Fremont Indemnity Co. 457 F. Su 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
389
 Section 28(1) of the Insurance Contracts Act (Australian). 
390
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 
(Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at 327. 
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misrepresented.391 For the convenience of writing, Lord Mustill’s words are used to call the test 
“the want to know test”.392 
 
ii. From the C.T.I. Case to the Pan Atlantic Case 
 
The two interpretations of “influence” were discussed in full scale in a series of recent cases. The 
first case is the C.T.I. case,393 where Kerr L.J., who delivered the main judgement, expressed his 
view of supporting the want to know test.394 Ten years later, in the Pan Atlantic case,395 the House 
of Lords got the chance to review the decision of the C.T.I. case. Lord Mustill, whose decision 
was the bare majority of three to two, said: 
 
“…the duty of disclosure extended to all matters which would have been taken into 
account by the underwriter when assessing the risk (i.e. the speculation) which he was 
consenting to assume. This is in my opinion what the Act was intending to convey and 
what it actually says.”396 
                                                        
391
 See the decisions of the C.T.I. case and the Pan Atlantic case below. 
392
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 at 437 (H.L.). 
393
 Container Transport International Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) [1984] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 476. 
394
 Kerr L.J. made a semantic analysis on two words of section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.). 
He observed, in the C.T.I. case, at 492, “The word ‘judgement’ – to quote the Oxford English Dictionary to 
which we were referred - is used in the sense of ‘the formation of an opinion’. To prove the materiality of an 
undisclosed circumstance, the insurer must satisfy the Court on a balance of probability - by evidence or 
from the nature of the undisclosed circumstance itself - that the judgment, in this sense, of a prudent insurer 
would have been influenced if the circumstance in question had been disclosed. The word ‘influenced’ 
means that the disclosure is one which would have had an impact on the formation of his opinion and on his 
decision-making process in relation to the matters covered by s. 18 (2).” 
395
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.); affirming [1993] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 (C.A.); affirming [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 (Comm. Ct.). Hereafter the Pan Atlantic 
case. 
396
 Ibid at 445. Lord Goff of Chieveley concurred with Lord Mustill, saying that “it seems to me, as it does 
to Lord Mustill, that the words in s. 18(2) … denote no more than an effect on the mind of the insurer in 
weighing up the risk. The sub-section does not require that the circumstance in question should have a 
decisive influence on the judgment of the insurer; and I, for my part, can see no basis for reading this 
requirement into the sub-section.” Lord Slynn of Hadley agreed with Lord Mustill on that “the ‘decisive 
influence’ test is to be rejected and that a circumstance may be material for the purposes of an insurance 
contract (whether marine or non-marine) even though had it been fully and accurately disclosed it would not 
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In reaching his conclusion, besides an analysis on the meaning of section 18 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.),397 Lord Mustill also observed that the decisive influence test might 
cause practical difficulties. 
 
“I am bound to say that in all but the most obvious cases the ‘decisive influence’ test faces 
them with an almost impossible task. How can they tell whether the proper disclosure 
would turn the scale? By contrast, if all that they have to consider is whether the materials 
are such that a prudent underwriter would take them into account, the test is perfectly 
workable.”398 
 
Moreover, according to Lord Mustill, considering together with the additional requirement of 
actual inducement which he regarded as the second question in his judgement, the want to know 
test may not cause the unfair situation where the insurer is able to get rid of a bad bargain on the 
technical defence of non-disclosure although he in fact had not care about the undisclosed 
circumstance at all.399 The effect of the additional requirement of inducement, however, largely 
depends on the application of the presumption of inducement.400 
                                                                                                                                                                      
have had a decisive effect on the prudent underwriter’s decision whether to accept the risk and if so at what 
premium”. As for the opinions of Lord Templeman and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who gave the dissenting 
decisions, see page 93ff., below. 
397
 “The legislature might here have said ‘decisively influence’…or all sorts of similar expressions, in which 
case Pan Atlantic’s argument would be right. But the legislature has not done this, and has instead left the 
word ‘influence’ unadorned…Furthermore… it should be observed that the expression used is ‘influence the 
judgement of the underwriter in… determining whether he will take the risk.’ to my mind, this expression 
clearly denotes an effect on the thought processed of the insurer in weighting up the risk, quite different 
from the words…such as ‘influence the insurer to take the risk’.” Pan Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Pine Top Ins. Co. 
[1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 at 440, per Lord Mustill. 
398




 Because the House of Lords had set so low a standard of the test of materiality, it was easy for the insurer 
to prove the materiality. If the presumption of inducement from the proved materiality is easily applied, the 
burden would be shifted to the insured to prove that the particular insurer had not been induced, even though 
the insurer may have nothing to prove the inducement. See Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance 
Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 156. 
As for presumption of actual inducement, see page 102ff., below. 
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iii. The Minority View in the Pan Atlantic Case 
 
Both Lord Templeman and Lord Lloyd of Berwick supported the decisive test. In Lord 
Templeman’s opinion, “‘the judgment of a prudent insurer’ cannot be said to be ‘influenced’ by a 
circumstance which, if disclosed, would not have affected acceptance of the risk or the amount of 
the premium.”401 Lord Lloyd of Berwick particularly reasoned why the decisive influence should 
be adopted. 
 
According to Lord Lloyd of Berwick, the reason why the insurer may avoid the contract even 
where the insured innocently breaches the duty is said by Lord Mansfield that “the risqué run is 
really different from the risqué understood and intended to be run at the time of the agreement.”402 
“But if the prudent insurer would have accepted the risk at the same premium and on the same 
terms, it must be because, so far as he is concerned, the risk is the same risk.”403 Then how could 
the rejection of the decisive test be justified? “How in those circumstances could it be said that the 
actual insurer’s consent had been vitiated? And if not, on what other juristic basis could he claim 
the right to avoid the contract?”404 
 
Therefore, Lord Lloyd of Berwick described what the test should be as following: 
 
                                                        
401
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 at 430. 
402
 Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1905. Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. 
[1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 at 457. 
403
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 at 457, per Lord Lloyd 
of Berwick. 
404
 Ibid. Lord Lloyd of Berwick also relied on semantic analysis of the word “would”. He observed, “L.J. 
Kerr in a passage already quoted refers to things which the insurer might have done if he had been told of 
the undisclosed fact. In my judgment it is never enough to show that a prudent insurer might have declined 
the risk or charged an increased premium. It is necessary to show that he would have done.” See Ibid, 459. 
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 “What… is meant by the words ‘would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer’? ... I 
would answer that it points to something more than what the prudent insurer would want 
to know, or take into account. At the very least it points to what the prudent insurer would 
perceive as increasing, or tending to increase the risk…The ordinary meaning of 
‘influence’ is to affect or alter.”405 
 
The minority view of Lord Templeman and Lord Lloyd of Berwick supports that the Chinese law 
should adopt the decisive influence test in interpreting the relevant articles of law.406 
 
II. Materiality in China’s Marine Insurance 
 
1. Test of Materiality 
 
i. A Prudent Insurer v. the Individual Insurer 
 
The Maritime Code also requires that the non-disclosure must be material before the insurer can 
cancel the policy. It may sound strange, but one has to regret that the verbal meaning of article 222 
of the Maritime Code seems to have adopted the particular insurer test407 since article 222 leave 
the word “insurer” unadorned, saying that the insured shall disclose “the material circumstances… 
which have a bearing on the insurer in deciding the premium or whether be agrees to insure or 
not.”408 It is possible for the judges to read in the word “prudent” before the word “insurer” in 
                                                        
405
 Ibid, at 458. 
406
 Discussed in more detail at page 99ff., below. 
407
 See also Gao Wei, “Lun Hai Shang Bao Xian Fa De Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze (On the Principle of 
Utmost Good Faith in Marine Insurance Law)”, [1997] 8 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of 
China Maritime Law) 163 at 179. 
408
 The same problem exists in non-marine insurance in China, as article 17 of the Insurance Law also uses 
“the insurer” and no word of “prudent” or “reasonable” is added. See page 99ff., below. 
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article 222. Many scholars have supported this view.409 It goes without saying that, between the 
particular insurer test and a prudent insurer test, the Maritime Code should choose the latter, which 
is the standing law of U.K.,410 but as to how the law should be changed on this point, one must 
also consider the requirement of actual inducement.411 
 
ii. Whether to Adopt a Reasonable Insured Test in the Maritime Code? 
 
Until now the voice of adopting the Australian model412 of test of a reasonable insured has not 
come up in China either in judicial or academic groups but it is still necessary to ask whether the 
Maritime Code should transfer to a reasonable insured test. Though it may be urgent for the U.K. 
to abolish the test of a prudent insurer for the reasons listed above, those reasons cannot justify the 
necessity of China in changing the test. 
 
The test of a prudent insurer is mainly criticized for its extreme harshness towards the insured in 
the U.K., while in China, if a prudent insurer test were to be adopted as suggested above, its 
application would not be too unfavourable to the insured as a result of other rules in the Maritime 
Code which have moderated the strictness of the duty of disclosure. For example, the suggestion to 
adopt the decisive influence test will narrow the scope of the insured’s duty of disclosure,413 and 
                                                        
409
 See Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 
2nd ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 80; Wang Pengnan, “Gao Zhi Yi Wu Ji Wei Fan 
Gai Yi Wu De Fa Lv Hou Guo (The Duty of Disclosure and the Legal Result of the Breach of This Duty)”, 
[1993] 4 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of China Maritime Law) 158 at 161; Yuan Shaochun, 
“Tan Hai Shang Bao Xian Zhong Bei Bao Xian Ren Gao Zhi Yi Wu De Fan Wei (Discuss on the Scope of 
the Duty of Disclosure of the Insured in Marine Insurance)”, (1998) Issue 3, Maritime Trial 13 at 15. 
410
 As for the law of U.K. on this issue, see page 85, above. 
411
 The author suggest to combining the concept of materiality and the inducement under Chinese law. See 
the author’s opinion on how to change the law on this point at page 105ff., below. 
412
 See page 87, above. 
413
 Discussed in more detail at page 99ff., below. 
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the causation requirement has further increased the difficulty for the insurer to completely get rid 
of his liability of indemnity.414 
 
The necessity for the U.K. to change the test of the prudent insurer is also partly influenced by the 
universal application of the test in non-marine insurance. It appears that the consumer insured need 
the protection from a reasonable insured test. On the contrary, the non-marine insured, including 
those consumers, are already protected by the inquiry-disclosure doctrine. The maritime merchant 
should be more aware of what is material to the insurer than those consumer insured during long 
time of exposure to the business and with the help of legal professionals.415 
 
In addition, the rule of expert evidence is also very different from that in the U.K. 416  The 
unbalance in access to expert evidence between the insurer and the insured may not exist in China 
since “expert evidence” is not evidence at all.417 Moreover, the marine insured and the insurer may 
have a nip and tuck power in engaging experts. 
 
iii. Expert Evidence 
 
                                                        
414
 Discussed in more detail at page 129ff., below. 
415
 It gradually becomes a common practice, in most places of China, for the businessmen to consult the 
legal professionals, or hiring staff with legal training, in dealing with his business related to insurance, while 
it has not become a practice for ordinary people to do so. 
416
 Article 61 of the Evidence Rules of Civil Action by the Supreme People’s Court, Fa Shi [2001] No. 33, 
stipulates that: “The party may apply to the People’s Court for the explanations of certain special problem 
by one or two persons with special knowledge appearing in court. If the People’s Court permits the 
application, the relevant costs shall be borne by the applicant party. The judicial personnel and the parties 
may inquire of the persons with special knowledge who appear in court. With the permission of the People’s 
Court, the persons with special knowledge respectively applied by each party may do counterview on the 
relevant problems in the case. The person with special knowledge may inquire of the authenticator.” 
Discussed in more detail below. 
417
 In the Evidence Rules of Civil Action by the Supreme People’s Court, Fa Shi [2001] No. 33, the so called 
expert evidence is not regarded as evidence. In article 61 of the Evidence Rules, ibid, such experts are called 
“persons with specialised knowledge” and their task is to “make explanations for specialised problems”. 
Since they are not evidence, the decision cannot rely on it; however, a well guided expert “explanation” will 
surely have an impact on the judge’s reasoning process. 
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The expert evidence, which was unknown a decade ago, has now become more and more popular 
in China in the judicial practice, although it is not admitted as evidence.418 The insurer more and 
more often resorts to the expert evidence to support the materiality of the facts in his defence of 
the non-disclosure. However, due to different litigation rules, most of the time, the expert is not 
summoned to the court for cross-examination and the evidence is only a written record of the 
opinion of the expert.419 Moreover, as the expert who gives evidence in support of the insurer is 
engaged by one of the parties, more often the insurer, the impartiality of the expert evidence is 
always in question. Therefore, the judges are in fact quite reluctant to accept the expert evidence as 
conclusive and prefer to rely on their own experience. 
 
In a case appealed from the Maritime Court to the High People’s Court of Shandong Province,420 
the appellant insured submitted the written opinion of the China Maritime Law Association421 on 
three questions. None of the opinions was considered by the High People’s Court and the decision 
was totally opposed to the opinions. Although this is a case in which the expert evidence is filed 
by the insured, it to some extent shows how the court in China treats the expert evidence. 
 
2. Examples of Material Circumstances 
 
It has been held that a ship for the purpose of disassembly,422 the cargo on deck,423 or the cargo 
that is on a barge tugged by another ship424 are circumstances material to the decision of the 




 The evidence law is still being drafted. It is expected that the evidence law will change the situations and 
compulsorily requires cross-reference. 
420
 Xi Gu Commercial Ins. v. People’s Insurance Company of China, Qingdao Branch [2002] Lu Min Si 
Zong Zi, No. 45, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=752>. 
421
 China Maritime Law Association, China’s official academic research association of maritime law. 
422
 Chenco International Inc. v. China Pacific Insurance, Shanghai Branch [1997] Hu Hai Fa Shang Zi, No. 
486, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=433>. 
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insurer on the premium or whether to accept the risk. In another case, it was held that the mere 
misrepresentation of the series numbers of two contracts among a series of contracts was not 
material to evaluation of the risk.425 In Chenco International Inc. v. China Pacific Insurance, 
Shanghai Branch,426 the judge even gave a test for his judging of the materiality, saying that “it 
should be held that, although the Maritime Code does not provide a clear definition for materiality, 
any circumstance showing the increase of the risk must be regarded as a material circumstance”.427 
However, one need always remember that China is not a case law country and future decisions are 
never bound by these given cases. These judgments at most provide some guidance for future 
reference. 
 
It is suggested that the insurance application form should be more carefully designed. In China, the 
insurance companies’ usually use very simple application forms on which there is no guidance on 
what kind of circumstances will be regarded as material. It would greatly help the insured to 
accurately perform his duty of disclosure if the insurer could print the examples of the material 
circumstances on the blank back of application forms.428 This will alternatively benefit the insurer 
by allowing him to make more accurate estimation. 
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 The “Min Lian Yun” 9503 [1994] Guangzhou Maritime Court, online: China Foreign-Related 
Commercial and Maritime Trial <http://www.ccmt.org.cn//hs/news/show.php?cId=1852>. 
424
 Xi Gu Commercial Ins. v. People’s Insurance Company of China, Qingdao Branch [2002] Lu Min Si 
Zhong Zi, No. 45, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=752>. 
425
 Trading Company Korat (Moscow) v. Pin An Insurance Company, Shaoxing Branch & Pin An Insurance 
Company [1999] Yong Hai Shang Chu Zi, No. 209 online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and 
Maritime Trial <http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=471>. 
426
 [1997] Hu Hai Fa Shang Zi, No. 486, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=433>. 
427
 This is a similar approach to the Court of Appeal in Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another v. Pine 
Top Insurance Co. [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 at 506, where Steyn, L.J. held that “the question is whether 
the prudent insurer would view the undisclosed material as probably tending to increase the risk.” 
428
 In making a list of the categories of the material circumstances, the English scholar’s summary may be a 
good reference. For example, Ivamy said, “in general, it can be said that the following classes of facts will 
usually be held to be material: (a) All facts suggesting that the subject matter of insurance, by reasons of its 
nature, condition, user, surroundings, or other circumstances, is exposed to mare than ordinary danger from 
the peril insured against. (b) All facts suggesting that the proposed assured, in effecting the insurance, is 
actuated by some special motive, and not merely by ordinary prudence. (For example in marine insurance, a 
ship for disassembly use is of higher risk than normal.). (c) All facts suggesting showing that the liability of 
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3. Degree of Influence 
 
Article 222 of the Maritime Code stipulates that the material circumstances mean the 
circumstances “which have a bearing on the insurer in deciding the premium or whether be agrees 
to sure or not”. “Have a bearing”, according to the maritime law scholars, means decisive 
influence.429 The courts are also inclined to accept the decisive influence test.430 
 
There is another problem in the test of influence in the Maritime Code: the material circumstances 
only mean the circumstances “which have a bearing on the insurer in deciding the premium or 
whether be agrees to sure or not”.431 The insurer should be also able to decline the claim when the 
undisclosed facts are such that had the insurer known he would still underwrite the policy with the 
same premium but with different terms because sometimes the changing of some other terms may 
be even more fundamental to the risk covered than the premium. 
 
III. Materiality in China’s Non-Marine Insurance 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the insurers might be greater than would normally be. (d) All facts related to the “moral hazard”, such as the 
previous criminal record of the assured. (e) All facts that to the knowledge of the proposed assured are 
regarded by the insurers as material. In practice, the materiality of such facts is usually shown by the asking 
of a specific question. Hardy Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 
1993) at 131-136. The previous refusals of similar type of insurance are material information that must be 
disclosed in non-marine insurance, but it is not so in marine insurance. See Poh Chu Chai, Principles of 
Insurance Law, 5th ed. (Singapore: Butterworths, 2000) at 174-177. 
429
 Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd 
ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 80. 
430
 See Chenco International Inc. v. China Pacific Insurance, Shanghai Branch, [1997] Hu Hai Fa Shang Zi, 
No. 486, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.CCMT.org.cn/HS/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=433>. The Court decided that “any 
circumstance showing the increase of the risk must be regarded as a material circumstance”. This is akin to 
the decisive influence test because the circumstances showing the increase of the risk would certainly make 
a prudent insurer change the terms of the contract more burdensome to the insured. 
431
 The common law also has this problem. 
 100
Materiality is unimportant where the insured has breached the duty of disclosure fraudulently, 
because the insurer can nevertheless avoid the contract where the fact undisclosed is immaterial.432 
Materiality is only concerned with circumstances where the insured breaches the duty due to his 
negligence. Article 17(2) of the Insurance Law433 stipulates that if the insured has breached the 
duty of disclosure due to his negligence, the insurer is entitled to terminate the contract only when 
the non-disclosure “is sufficient to affect the insurer in deciding whether or not to agree to the 
insurance or to raise the insurance premium rate.” Like the words in article 222 of the Maritime 
Code, the word “insurer” here is again left unadorned so the verbal meaning of the test of 
materiality is the particular insurer test. It should be interpreted as a prudent insurer test. 
 
According to article 17(2),434 the test of influence must be the decisive influence test when the 
insured has breached the duty of disclosure due to his negligence because “sufficient to affect” 
apparently means that the non-disclosure must affect the insurer to make a different decision at 
least as to what premium he would have charged. 
 
Materiality in non-marine insurance is a less important question than in marine insurance due to 
the application of the inquiry-disclosure doctrine. Generally speaking, the questions asked by the 
insurer are usually relevant to material information and the insured should make truthful answers. 
Additionally, the questions listed in the non-marine insurance application forms are much more 
carefully designed than those in the marine ones. 
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 Article 17(2) of the Insurance Law: “The insurer shall have the right to terminate the insurance, if the 
applicant intentionally conceals the facts and does not perform his duty of truthful disclosure, or if the 
insured negligently fails to make disclosure thereby which is sufficient to affect the insurer’s decision on 
whether or not to provide the insurance or whether to increase the premium rate.” While in marine insurance, 
even the insured intentionally breaches the duty of disclosure, the circumstances he conceals or 






Chapter 5. Additional Requirement of Actual Inducement 
 
I. The Requirement of Actual Inducement in U.K. 
 
1. The Pan Atlantic Case435 
 
In the Pan Atlantic case, it was eagerly anticipated that the House of Lords would have overruled 
the decision of the C.T.I. case and abolished the want to know test, but the House of Lords did not 
uphold it. They, however, introduced a requirement additional to materiality before the insurer 
could rescind policy, namely, the requirement of actual inducement.436 Consequently, in order to 
succeed in the defence of non-disclosure, the insurer has to prove that he was actually induced by 
the misrepresentation or the non-disclosure “using ‘induced’ in the sense in which it is used in the 
general law of contract”.437 Lord Mustill concluded that: 
 
“If the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a material fact did not in fact induce the 
making of the contract (in the sense in which that expression is used in the general law of 
misrepresentation) the underwriter is not entitled to rely on it as a ground for avoiding the 
contract.”438 
 
Under the general law, “if the false statement of fact actually influenced the [representee], the 
[representor is] liable, even though the [representee] may have been also influenced by other 
                                                        
435
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.); affirming [1993] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 (C.A.); affirming [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 (Comm. Ct.). 
436
 Thus, the law significantly shifts in favour of the insureds. See Poh Chu Chai, Principles of Insurance 
Law, 5th ed. (Singapore: Butterworths, 2000) at 120. 
437
 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.) per Lord Mustill at 452. 
438
 Ibid, at 453. 
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motives.”439 In this sense, inducement must decisively influence the insurer’s mind although it not 
necessary to be the sole causation. According to Lord Mustill, this decisive meaning of 
inducement under the general law should be equally applied in the insurance law. This position 
has been supported by earlier cases.440 
 
2. The Effect of the Pan Atlantic Case 
 
The decision of the want to know test in the C.T.I. case has made it too easy for the insurer to 
prove the materiality of something undisclosed. The additional requirement of actual inducement 
made in the Pan Atlantic case has in certain degree restored the decisive influence rule although 
without altering the position of the C.T.I. case. Lord Mustill considered materiality and actual 
inducement as two different questions. As a result, there is a double check for the insurer to avoid 
the contract: in order to avoid the contract the insurer has to prove that the information undisclosed 
not only has influenced the prudent insurer, although not necessarily changed his mind, but also 
decisively influenced the actual insurer. 
 
The additional requirement of actual inducement has, to some extent, protected the insured from 
unduly taken advantage of by the insurer when the insurer misuses the right to avoid the contract 
with the technical defence of non-disclosure. The extent, to which the insured is to be protected, 
however, depends largely on the application of the presumption of inducement. 
 
3. Presumption of Actual Inducement 
                                                        
439Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1884) 29 Ch.D. 459 at 485, per Fry L.J. See also e.g. JEB Fasteners v. Marks, 
Bloom & Co. [1983] 1 All E.R. 583. 
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 Decorum Investments v. Atkin [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 378 at 382, where David Steel J., with reference to 
the Pan Atlantic case, said that: “if a fair presentation of the circumstances material to the risks has not been 
made and if the failure to do so has induced the actual insurer to enter into the particular contract when he 




Generally the onus is on the insurer to prove the actual inducement, but there is presumption that 
the withheld facts being material may be sufficient for the court to apply the presumption of the 
actual inducement, and thus, the onus swifts to the insured. This position was delivered by Lord 
Mustill441 in apparently general words.442 
 
One year after the Pan Atlantic case,443 St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. McConnell 
Dowell Constructors Ltd, 444  a case appealed to the Court of Appeal, demonstrated how the 
presumption of actual inducement was formulated and applied. In this case, three of the four 
defendant underwriters had given evidence which sufficiently proved the actual inducement. The 
forth, however, did not give evidence. He would not have been “entitled to avoid their contract 
unless there is a presumption upon which they can rely to discharge the burden of proving 
inducement which rests upon them”.445 By reference to Halsbury’s Laws of England,446 Evans L.J. 
pointed out that: 
 
“Inducement cannot be inferred in law from proved materiality, although there may be 
cases where the materiality is so obvious as to justify an inference of fact that the 
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 “As a matter of common sense however even where the underwriter is shown to have been careless in 
other respects the assured will have an uphill task in persuading the court that the withholding or 
misstatement of circumstances satisfying the test of materiality has made no difference… For present 
purposes it is sufficient to say… that on the facts of this particular case the position as regards causation is 
so clear that the appeal can be decided in favour of the indemnitors without the need for remittal to the trial 
judge.” Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 at 453. Lord 
Mustill alone said this. Lord Goff concurred with other parts of Lord Mustill’s judgements but not 
specifically with this. Lord Slynn did the same but in more general terms. See also Malcolm A. Clarke, The 
Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. (London: LLP, 2002) at para. 23-2A1, note 2. 
442
 L.J. Mance, et al, ed., Insurance Disputes, 2nd ed. (London: LLP, 2003) at para. 4.60. 
443
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.); affirming [1993] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 (C.A.); affirming [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 (Comm. Ct.). 
444
 [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 116. 
445
 Ibid at 127. 
446
 4th ed., vol. 31 para. 1067. 
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representee was actually induced, but, even in such exceptional cases, the inference is only 
a prima facie one and may be rebutted by counter evidence.” 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that, unless the materiality is so obvious that the actual insurer is 
very likely to be induced, the insurer cannot rely on the presumption of actual inducement.447 
Some more recent cases also confirmed this position.448 In Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. Arab 
Insurance Group (BSC),449 Clarke L.J. further stated that 
 
“In order to prove inducement the insurer or reinsurer must show that the non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation was an effective cause of his entering into the contract on the terms 
on which he did. He must therefore show at least that, but for the relevant non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation, he would not have entered into the contract on those terms. On the 
other hand, he does not have to show that it was the sole effective cause of his doing 
so.”450 
 
II. Requirement of Inducement in China Law 
 
1. Inducement in China’s Marine Insurance 
                                                        
447
 Indeed, it is noteworthy that the only situation to date in which the presumption of inducement has been 
successfully pleaded by an underwriter is that of a market subscription where the majority of the 
underwriters were able to give evidence of their state of mind but one was unable to do so. See “Warranties 
and the Full Reinsurance Clause”, Insurance Law Monthly, 16.1(1), January 2004. 
448
 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting v. Johnson & Higgins [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 565, where Cresswell, J. 
restated that: “There is no evidence to displace a presumption of inducement” at 597. The case was at last 
appealed to the House of Lords but on question of measurement of the loss. See also Decorum Investments v. 
Atkin [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 378; Sirius International Insurance Corp v. Oriental Assurance Corp [1999] 1 
All E.R. (Comm) 699; Akedian Co v. Royal Insurance Australia [1997] 148 A.L.R. 480 at 494 (an 
Australian case). 
449
 [2003] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 131. 
450
 Ibid, at 149. Sir Christopher Staughton agreed with Clarke L.J. on the point that “causation cannot in law 
exist when even the ‘but for’ test is not satisfied” See ibid, at 170. But Ward L.J. took the opposite view that 
“it is sufficient if the representation is a cause even if it is not the cause operating on the representee when 
he enters into the contract.” See ibid, at 175. 
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i. Actual Inducement Incorporated in the Materiality 
 
In article 222 of the Maritime Code,451 it is stipulated that the test of materiality is the individual 
insurer test452 plus the decisive influence,453 so the test of materiality requires that the particular 
insurer has to show that he himself was decisively influenced by the non-disclosure, in the sense 
that but for the non-disclosure he, at least, would not have enter into the contract with the same 
terms. This has the same effect as the requirement of actual inducement. Therefore, the individual 
insurer test plus the decisive influence constitutes the requirement of actual inducement, and actual 
inducement is indeed what the materiality means in China’s marine insurance law.454 
 
ii. The Double Check Interpretation 
 
As criticised above,455 the problem in article 222 regarding the test of materiality is that the test is 
the particular insurer test. Some scholars have suggested reading in a word of “prudent” before the 
unadorned word of “insurer” in article 222.456 The problem is that if “the insurer” should be 
interpreted to mean a prudent insurer, then the requirement of actual inducement would be 
                                                        
451
 Article 222 of the Maritime Code: Before the contract is concluded, the insured shall truthfully inform 
the insurer of the material circumstances which the insured has knowledge of or ought to have knowledge of 
in his ordinary business practice and which have a bearing on the insurer in deciding the premium or 
whether be agrees to insure or not… 
452
 See page 94ff., above. 
453
 Although the law does not use the word “decisively influence”, it is the prevailing view that it should be 
so interpreted. See page 99ff., above. 
454
 See Gao Wei, “Lun Hai Shang Bao Xian Fa De Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze (On the Principle of Utmost 
Good Faith in Marine Insurance Law)”, [1997] 8 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of China 
Maritime Law) 163 at 179. 
455
 See page 94, above. 
456
 Wang Pengnan, “Gao Zhi Yi Wu Ji Wei Fan Gai Yi Wu De Fa Lv Hou Guo (The Duty of Disclosure and 
the Legal Result of the Breach of This Duty)”, [1993] 4 Zhong Guo Hai Shang Fa Nian Kan (Annual of 
China Maritime Law) 158 at 161; Yuan Shaochun, “Tan Hai Shang Bao Xian Zhong Bei Bao Xian Ren Gao 
Zhi Yi Wu De Fan Wei (Discuss on the Scope of the Duty of Disclosure of the Insured in Marine 
Insurance)”, (1998) Issue 3, Hai Shi Shen Pan (Maritime Trial) 13 at 15. 
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eliminated. For this reason, if “the insurer” should be interpreted to mean a prudent insurer, a new 
subsection providing the requirement of inducement would simultaneously need to be added. 
 
Alternatively, the unadorned word of “insurer” could be interpreted as having “double meanings”, 
i.e., “the insurer” in article 222 means that a circumstance is material if the particular insurer was 
induced to enter into the contract by the non-disclosure and a prudent insurer in his position would 
also be so induced. The author calls it the “double check interpretation”. Although the law of U.K. 
considers the materiality and the actual inducement as two separate issues, 457  they can be 
combined into one rule, i.e., the double check interpretation. If the double check interpretation 
were adopted, the Maritime Code would not need a new subsection of actual inducement and the 
law would be neater. Moreover, there is procedure reason to adopt it. It is within the power of the 
People’s Supreme Court to interpret “the insurer” to have a “double check” meaning, while only 
the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee has the power to add a new subsection 
of actual inducement into the Maritime Code. As the National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee have very short meeting period,458 it might be quite a long time before amendment of 
the Maritime Code could be listed in their working schedules. It is relatively convenient for the 
People’s Supreme Court to make a double check interpretation. 
 
iii. Presumption of Inducement 
 
                                                        
457
 See e.g. Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.); 
affirming [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 (C.A.); affirming [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 (Comm. Ct.). The English 
law considers the test of materiality and the inducement as separate issues, probably because in U.K. the 
influence is the “want to know” influence. 
458
 The National People’s Congress holds meeting once a year. The time of the meeting varied from 5 to 26 
days and the average time is thirteen working days annually. Its Standing Committee has a bit more and 
longer meetings. It has meeting every two months and each meeting lasts for about 8 working days. The 
total working days of the Standing Committee are about 48 days. See Li Lin, “Li Fa Cheng Xu Fen Xi 
(Analysis on the Legislation Procedure)”, online: the Institute of China Law 
<http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showarticle.asp?id=527>. Because the National People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee are the national highest authority it has lots of bills to pass every year, the short 
working time does not allow it to consider a “small” amendment in the Maritime Code. 
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Assuming that the Maritime Code adopts the double check test as suggested, we have to next 
consider the question how the presumption of actual inducement is to be applied. To begin with, it 
is only in a small number of certain circumstances where the general civil law stipulates 
presumption and the court is eligible to apply the presumption as stipulated. Most of the 
presumptions appear in the law of special tort.459  In the marine insurance, no law stipulates 
whether and how the presumption of actual inducement should be applied. Then the general law 
must apply. The onus to prove is imputed on the insurer due to the stipulation of article 5 of the 
Evidence Rules on Civil Action by the Supreme People’s Court.460 
 
Therefore, there is no presumption of actual inducement from proved materiality in the Chinese 
law. of course, the proved materiality, if obvious enough, could help persuade the court that the 
insurer is likely to have been actually induced. In addition, even without the presumption of actual 
inducement, the judge may also, in limited situations, deduce actual inducement from the nature of 
the misrepresentation, the grade of the importance of the fact undisclosed, the intention of the 
insured, his own experience, and other relevant circumstances.461 
 
2. Non-Marine Insurance 
                                                        
459
 See e.g. articles 123 and 126 of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986. In most cases of tort, the 
plaintiff has to prove the fault (intention or negligence) of the defendant who has done the tort, but in these 
two articles, the burden to prove whether the defendant has fault is reversed to the defendant. This is because 
the existence of the fault of the tort-doer has been presumed. In theory, the tort in the case of which the 
burden of proof is reversed is called “special tort”. (Article 123: “If any person causes damage to other 
people by engaging in operations that are greatly hazardous to the surroundings, such as operations 
conducted high aboveground, or those involving high pressure, high voltage, combustibles, explosives, 
highly toxic or radioactive substances or high-speed means of transport, he shall bear civil liability; however, 
if it can be proven that the damage was deliberately caused by the victim, he shall not bear civil liability.” 
Article 126: “If a building or any other installation or an object placed or hung on a structure collapses, 
detaches or drops down and causes damage to others, its owner or manager shall bear civil liability, unless 
he can prove himself not at fault.”) 
460
 Article 5 of the Evidence Rules on Civil Action by the Supreme People’s Court (Fa Shi [2001] No. 33): 
“In cases of contractual dispute… the party who alleges the modification, dissolution, termination or 
rescission of contracts should provide evidence of the existence of the facts that have caused the alteration of 
the contracts.” 
461
 Article 9 of the Evidence Rules on Civil Action by the Supreme People’s Court, Fa Shi, [2001] No. 33 
stipulates that: “the party need no provide evidence for the following facts: …(3) facts that can be deduced 
from the law, known facts, or common sense… unless the party has sufficient counter evidence to overrule.” 
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Neither the materiality of the facts undisclosed nor actual inducement is required in establishing a 
successful defence of non-disclosure. This is the position stipulated by article 17 of the Insurance 
Law which does not mention any additional conditions other than the inquiry of the insurer. It is 
understandable that the Insurance Law does not require actual inducement since the inquiry of the 
insurer in most of the time is sufficient to speak for itself regarding the materiality and inducement 
of the non-disclosed facts. However, materiality is essential for the insurer to get remedy in 
negligent non-disclosure.462 As the word “insurer” in article 17(2) of the Insurance Law is also left 
unadorned like article 222 of the Maritime Code, the materiality in non-marine insurance should 
also be interpreted as “the double test” in the marine insurance to incorporate the requirement of 
actual inducement. 
 
III. Summary of the Essentials in the Duty of Non-Disclosure 
 
To summarise, in order to establish a defence that the insured has breach the duty of disclosure, 
the insurer has to satisfy the court of certain conditions. 
 
In U.K., the essential conditions that constitute a successful defence of non-disclosure include: (1) 
that the insured knew, or ought to know in ordinary course of business, certain fact, before the 
conclusion of the insurance contract; (2) that the insured failed to disclose it or misrepresented it to 
the insurer; (3) that the fact was not a fact that need not to be disclosed; (4) that this fact was 
material, in the sense that a prudent insurer wants to know it in his deciding process of evaluating 
the perils; and (5) that the particular insurer was induced by the non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation. 
 
                                                        
462
 See page 99, above. 
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Under China marine insurance law, the conditions are: (1) that the insured knew, or ought to know, 
certain fact, before the conclusion of the insurance contract; (2) that the insured failed to truthfully 
disclose it to the insurer; (3) that the fact was not a fact that need not to be disclosed; and (4) that 
the fact is material in the sense that it induced the particular insurer to enter into the contract. It is 
suggested that both the particular insurer and the notional prudent insurer must be induced before 
the particular insurer can rely on the non-disclosure. 
 
In non-marine insurance in China, a breach of the duty of disclosure consists of: (1) that the 
insurer, before the insurance contract was concluded, inquired the insured about certain facts; (2) 
that the insured did not provide the true information or provided the incorrect information on the 
facts; (3) the insured had done so either deliberately or negligently;463 and (4) that if the insured 
breached the duty negligently, non-disclosure must be decisively material in the same sense as it is 
in the marine insurance law. 
 
These conditions seem not quite different especially between the English law and China’s marine 
insurance law, but there is hidden difference behind these conditions. In U.K., as far as these 
conditions are satisfied, the insured will be convinced to have breached the duty of disclosure and 
consequently the insurer will not be responsible for any loss or damage under the policy, while in 
China, in both marine and non-marine insurance law, the mere fact that the insured has breached 
the duty of disclosure only enable the insurer to terminate the policy. When a contract is 
terminated, the insurer is not automatically entitled to reject the claim rising before the termination. 
Whether the insurer can decline such claim depends on (1) the psychological state of the insured in 
which he has breach the duty of disclosure, and (2) the causal connection between the fact 
undisclosed and the occurrence of the risks.464 The psychological state also determines whether the 
                                                        
463
 The definitions of deliberate and negligent will be discussed in next chapter. 
464
 Article 17 (3), 17(4) of the Insurance Law and article 223 of the Maritime Code. 
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premiums should be refund.465 The detailed discuss of the conditions on which the insurer may get 
different remedies is carried on in the next sub-chapter. 
                                                        
465
 Article 17 (3), 17(4) of the Insurance Law and article 223 of the Maritime Code. 
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Chapter 6. Remedy for the Breach of the Duty of Disclosure by the Insured 
 
I. Remedy under the Law of U.K. 
 
1. Rescission of the Contract 
 
Rescission of the contract is the main, if not the sole remedy, for the breach of the duty of 
disclosure,466 and in most cases where the insurer seeks for remedy, rescission is an adequate and 
proper remedy. Many cases have decided that a failure on the part of the insured to observe the 
duty of disclosure renders the insurance contract avoidable at the option of the insurer.467 “The 
policy is equally liable to be avoided whether his failure is attributable to fraud,468 carelessness,469 
inadvertence, 470  indifference, 471  mistake, 472  error of judgement, 473  or even to his failure to 
appreciate its materiality.” 474  In breach of the duty of disclosure, the policy is not avoided 
automatically. The insurer may either elect to rescind the policy or confirm it.475 The effect of 
rescission is “total retroactivity”,476 which means that rescission “terminates the contract, puts the 
parties in statu quo ante and restores things, as between them, to the position in which they stood 
                                                        
466
 “Insurance – Utmost Good Faith – Breach – Remedies – Statement of Truth Clause”, Comment [2003] 
9:3 J.I.M.L. 220 at 222. 
467
 Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 (marine insurance); Bank Leumi le Israel BM v. British National 
Insurance Co [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 71 (contingency insurance). 
468
 Rivaz v. Gerussi [1880] 6 QBD 222 (C.A.). 
469
 M’Millan v Accident Insurance Co 1907 S.C. 484 per Lord Stormonth-Darling at 493; Cantere 
Meccanico Brindisino v. Janson [1912] 3 K.B. 452, (C.A.) per Fletcher Moulton L.J. at 469. 
470
 Abbott v. Howard [1832] Hayes 381 (life insurance); cf Lee v. Jones (1864) 17 C.B.(N.S.) 482 (guarantee) 
per Shee J. at 495. 
471
 Bates v. Hewitt [1867] 2 Q.B. 595 (marine insurance) per Cockburn CJ at 60. 
472
 Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 (marine insurance) per Lord Mansfield CJ at 109. 
473
 Elton v. Larkins (1832) 5 C. & P. 385 (marine insurance); Morrison v. Universal Marine Insurance Co. 
(1872) L.R. 8 Ex. 197, (marine insurance), where the broker had made inquiries and satisfied himself that 
the information did not relate to the ship in question, though, as a matter of fact, it did. 
474
 Dalglish v. Jarvie [1850] 2 M. & G. 231 at 243 per Rolfe B.; Asfar & Co v. Blundell [1896] 1 Q.B. 123, 
(C.A.) (marine insurance) per Lord Esher MR at 129; Bates v. Hewitt (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 595; Joel v. Law 
Union & Crown Insurance Co [1908] 2 K.B.863, (C.A.) (life insurance) per Fletcher Moulton L.J. at 884. 
Hardy Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1993) at 174. 
475
 Mackender, Hill and White v. Feldia A.G., Ch. Brachfeld and Sons S.A. and Diamil S.R.L. [1966] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 449, per Lord Denning MR at 455. 
476
 Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. (London: LLP, 2002) at para. 23-17C. 
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before the contract was entered into”.477 It follows that the insurer must return the premiums478 and 
he is not liable for claims arising before the moment of rescission; even if the insurer has paid the 
claim only after which he finds the breach of the duty of disclosure on the part of the insured, the 
insurer has the right to recover the compensation from the insured. 
 
2. Limitation to the Rescission of the Contract 
 
There are certain limitations to the rescission of the contract under the law of U.K. One of these 
limitations is the discretion of the court or the arbitrator to award damages in lieu of rescission 
under the Misrepresentation Act 1967, but it is only applicable to misrepresentation and usually 
the court is reluctant to do so.479 The others, according to Clarke,480 are affirmation, sometimes 
                                                        
477
 Abram Steamship Co v. Westville Shipping Co [1923] A.C. 773, per Lord Atkinson at 781. In Johnson v. 
Agnew [1980] A.C. 367, House of Lords drew a clear distinction between rescission for breach of contract, 
which operates prospectively, and rescission for misrepresentation, which operates retrospectively. See 
Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. (London: LLP, 2002) at para. 23-17C. Later 
when discussing Chinese rules of rescission, the interesting problem of the meaning of the termination, the 
way the insurer gets remedy for non-disclosure, will also arise as to whether it operates prospectively or 
retrospectively. 
478
 The insurer may retain the premium yet cancel the policy if the misrepresentation is fraudulent. See Feise 
v. Parkinson (1812) 4 Taunt. 640 at 641; Anderson v. Fitzgerald (1853) 4 H.L.Cas. 484 at 508; Fowkes v. 
Manchester and London Life Assurance and Loan Association (1863) 3 B. & S. 917 at 927, 931; Prince of 
Wales Association v. Palmer (1858) 25 Beav. 605; Rivaz v. Gerussi [1880] 6 Q.B.D. 222 at 229-230; 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, s.84 (1), (2). Nicholas Legh-Jones, gen. ed., MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 
10th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at para. 16-5. 
479
 It was held in Highlands Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 109 at 118 
that the court would not consider applying damages in lieu of rescission under the Misrepresentation Act 
1967 in commercial insurance. The reasons why the court was reluctant in awarding damage in lieu of 
rescission were given by Steyn J.  
“The rules governing material misrepresentation fulfil an important ‘policing’ function in ensuring 
that the brokers make a fair representation to underwriters. If s. 2(2) were to be regarded as 
conferring a discretion to grant relief from avoidance on the grounds of material misrepresentation 
the efficacy of those rules will be eroded. This policy consideration must militate against granting 
relief under s. 2(2) from an avoidance on the grounds of material misrepresentation in the case of 
commercial contracts of insurance.” 
The possibility of applying section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 in non-commercial insurance 
contract was not excluded by Steyn J., but the reluctance of the court to do so was apparent. 
As there is no similar rule in China’s general contract law, the comparison work will not focus on this, and 
for the reasons given by Steyn J., the author does not suggest that the Chinese law should have such a rule 
especially in insurance contract law. 
480
 Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. (London: LLP, 2002) at para 23-18. 
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called waiver of the right to rescind, lapse of time, and exclusion.481 For the sake of comparison 
with the insurance law of China, it would be helpful to detail the limitation of rescission by lapse 
of time and affirmation. 
 
Lapse of time alone does not bar the right to rescind the insurance contract unless it constitutes 
affirmation. Affirmation means that if the party who has the right to rescind the contract, after 
knowing all the facts giving rise to the right of rescission, still elects to affirm the contract, then he 
will lost the right.482 When the insured, as the case may be, alleges that the insurer has lost right of 
rescission, the ground of the allegation may be either waiver or estoppel, which are conceptually 
different,483 but, whichever the ground is, the affirmation must be unequivocal484 to the degree that 
it will lead the insured to believe that the insurer will not insist upon his strict legal rights.485 The 
affirmation may be made by words, orally or written, or by deed,486 but mere silence cannot 
constitute an unequivocal “representation”, unless the delay to notify the other party of the 
rescission is significant: if an insurer has knowledge of the facts giving rise to the right to rescind, 
he is entitled to take time to consider whether to avoid the contract or not, but after that, further 
delay may furnish evidence that he has decided to affirm the contract.487 It is not decided after 
                                                        
481
 Clarke also mentions other “would-be” limitations, but they are of little relevance with insurance contract: 
performance (Performance does not bar rescission of insurance contract obtained by fraudulent 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure, Kettlewell v. Refge Assurance Co [1908] 1 K.B. 545; as for other cases, 
the Misrepresentation Act 1967 abolished this bar by its section 1. Clarke, Ibid at para. 23-18D), restitution 
(Normally, restitution is a requirement in order to rescind a contract, but this requirement gives little 
difficulty in the law of insurance. Clarke, ibid at para. 23-18E.), third party rights (An assignee of the policy 
is not a third party. Clarke, Ibid at para. 23-18F). 
482
 Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v. Shipping Corp of India (The Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 391; Simner v. New India Assurance Co [1995] L.R.L.R. 240; Hill v. Citadel Ins Co [1997] 
L.R.L.R. 167; Insurance Corp of the Channel Islands v. Royal Hotel [1998] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 151. 
483
 Waiver and estopple are different in conception; so are the principles surrounding them. For further 
knowledge on the difference between them, see John Birds & Norma J. Hird, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law, 
5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 95, 252-254. 
484
 Tan Lee Meng, Insurance Law in Singapore, 2nd ed. (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1997) at 144; Orak 
po v. Barclays Insurance Service [1995] L.R.L.R. 443. 
485





 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co v. Pine Top Insurance Co [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 101 at 107 per Waller J, 
affirmed by [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 496 (C.A.); [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.). 
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what exact period the delay will be regarded as affirmation; it could be that so far as the delay is 
within a reasonable time, the right to rescind is not lost. 
 
In life insurance, the insurer sometimes provides “indisputable policy” which the insurer will lose 
his right to avoid on ground of misrepresentation or disclosure after the policy has been in force 
for a particular time except there is fraud. The legal effect of the indisputable clause was accepted 
in Anstey v. British Natural Premium Life Assurance Ltd.488 
 
3. Remedy in Damage 
 
i. The Westgate Case: at the First Stage 
 
A claim for damages based on the duty of utmost good faith will not be supported by any court in 
England. The leading case on this point of law is Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate 
Insurance Co. Ltd.489 This is a novel and interesting case in that the insured claimed damages for 
the insurer’s breach of duty of disclosure. In this case, a Mr. Ballestero persuaded syndicates of 
banks to enter a series of loan contracts with four companies controlled by him. The principle 
securities in support of each loan were a pledge of gemstones and a credit insurance policy, which 
contained a fraud exclusion clause. The banks were named either as the co-insured or the assignees. 
The borrowing companies defaulted on all the loans and the gemstone turned out to be negligible. 
When the insured banks claimed reimbursements under the policies against the insurers, the 
insurers denied liability on the ground that the loss was caused by Mr. Ballestero’s fraud and the 
                                                        
488
 [1909] 99 L.T. 765. As a contrast, under the Chinese law, it is not a contractual limitation but a statutory 
one that the life insurer will lose his right of rescission after 2 years of conclusion if the right of rescission is 
based on misrepresentation of the age of the insured. See article 54 of the Insurance Law. Discussed in more 
detail at page 137ff., below. 
489
 Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. 
v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); affirming [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 
(C.A.); reversing [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.). Hereafter, the Westgate case. 
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fraud exclusion clause was applicable. The banks then contended that their loss was caused by the 
insurers’ failure to disclose to them a deceit of the broker known to the insurers. In the first 
instance, Steyn J. decided that the duty of disclosure is reciprocal and the insured also has the right 
to be free of concealment; this right must be protect and when it has been infracted in such a way 
that damages are the only adequate remedy, damages must be awarded. His reasoning was almost 
a reprint of the principle “ubi jus ibi remedium”.490 
 
ii. The Westgate Case: in the Court of Appeal 
 
This judgement was quite exciting since the duty of disclosure had hitherto been operating against 
the insured, but the spark was stamped out in the appeal. The Court of Appeal, although agreeing 
that the duty of disclosure was reciprocal, held that: 
 
“… [The appellant submitted] that the breach of a party to a contract uberrimae fidei of his 
obligation of disclosure is itself capable of giving rise to an action for damages in an 
appropriate case. This is a novel claim as yet entirely unsupported by any decision of the 
Courts of this country…”491 
 
The Court of Appeal also denied other routes, including tort, implied terms of contract, etc., by 
which the insured banks pursued its claim for damages. Consequently, Slade L.J., who delivered 
the only judgment, concluded: “If the banks' right to full disclosure of material facts is founded 
neither on tort nor on contract nor on the existence of a fiduciary duty nor on statute, we find it 
                                                        
490
 See Steyn J.’s reasoning in [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 at 96. “Ubi jus ibi remedium”: where there is a right, 
there is a remedy. 
491
 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 at 546. 
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difficult to see how as a matter of legal analysis it can be said to found a claim for damages.”492 
The House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal. 
 
iii. The Westgate Case: the Reasons of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
 
(a) The Power of the Court 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeal was confirmed by the House of Lords on different ground that 
the damages suffered by the banks were not the consequence of the insurer’s non-disclosure.493 
Lord Templeman, with whom the other members494 of the House of Lords agreed, thought that, 
although not necessary, but “it may be helpful to observe that [he] agree[s] with the Court of 
Appeal that a breach of the obligation [of disclosure] does not sound in damages”.495 According to 
him, “[t]he only remedy open to the insured is to rescind the policy and recover the premium,”496 
and he totally agrees with “the cogent reasons advanced by Slade L.J.”497 Slade L.J. put forward 
four policy reasons for not awarding damages for breach of duty of disclosure: 
 
First, the powers of the Court to grant relief in the case of non-disclosure stems from the 
jurisdiction originally exercised by the Court of Equity to prevent imposition, and the power of the 
Court to grant relief in the case of duress and undue influence stems from the same jurisdiction. 
Since duress and undue influence give rise to no claim for damages, there is no reason why non-
disclosure should do so.498 
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 Ibid at 547. 
493
 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 at 387, per Lord Templeman. 
494
 Lord Brandon, Lord Ackner and Lord Jauncey. Lord Bridge reserved his opinion on this question. 
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 Ibid at 387-388. 
498
 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 at 550. 
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Does this reason logically support what it seeks to prove? Is it necessary for non-disclosure to 
have the same remedy as duress and undue influence only because they have the same originality? 
In addition, “how can anyone sensibly justify an English insurance policy to a foreign would-be 
user by explaining that the obligation to make full disclosure is still solely based upon the special 
powers of some separate system of courts which has not exist for over a century?”499 
 
(b) The Decision of the C.T.I. Case 
 
The second reason is the decision in the C.T.I. case500 which establishes that where an underwriter 
is seeking remedy of rescission, the actual effect of the non-disclosure on his mind is irrelevant. If 
the same approach applies reciprocally, it follows that “the Court will be concerned not so much 
with the effect of the non-disclosure on [the insured’s] mind as that of the mind of a prudent 
notional insured in his position”.501 This being so, “it could legitimately be asked how damage 
could be awarded if the non-disclosure had no effect on the insured”.502 
 
Steyn J., the trial judge who advocated remedy in damages, also recognized this difficulty, but this 
argument has no longer been a formidable obstacle preventing damages from being sought against 
the insurer since the Pan Atlantic case, 503  in which it was held that the existence of actual 
inducement, the effect of non-disclosure on the actual insurer, is the condition precedent to the 
right of the insurer to avoid the policy. However, even regardless of the Pan Atlantic case, there is 
a simple answer to the difficulty raised by Slade L.J.: rescission of contract and damages are two 
parallel remedies, and each has its own criteria.504 
                                                        
499
 B.J. Davenport, “The Duty of Disclosure” [1989] L.M.C.L.Q. 251 at 258. 
500
 Container Transport International Inc. v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 476.  
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 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.). 
504
 See Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. (London: LLP, 2002) at para. 23-15C. 
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(c) The Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) 
 
The third reason lies in the fact that the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) does not provide 
damages as a remedy for the breach of the duty of disclosure. Notwithstanding that Slade L.J. has 
mentioned Section 91(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.), he still thinks the silence of the 
Act on this matter is a clear inference that the legislators has no intent to make remedy of damages 
available.505 
 
Section 91(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) provides that “the rules of the common law 
including the law merchant, save in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, 
shall continue to apply”. This provision clearly shows that the Act’s failure to provide damages for 
the breach of the duty of disclosure should not be treated as if the Act were intended to prohibit 
such a form of remedy. It followed that judges are not bound to decide that damages are excluded 
as a remedy. A good example of this approach is demonstrated in the Pan Atlantic case.506 
Knowing that the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) does not require non-disclosure to have 
actual inducement on the particular insurer’s mind, the House of Lords, nevertheless, decided there 
is such a requirement in the common law and such a requirement shall continue valid since it is 
not inconsistent with any provisions of the Act.507 
 
(d) The Possible Harshness 
 
The last reason given by Slade L.J. was that: 
                                                        
505
 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 at 550. 
506
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 (H.L.). 
507
 Pan Atlantic Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 427 per Lord 
Mustill at 466. 
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“A decision that the breach of such an obligation [i.e., the breach of good faith] in every 
case and by itself constituted a tort if it caused damages could give rise to great potential 
hardship to insurer and, even more, perhaps, to insured persons.”508 
 
He added that as the breach of the duty of utmost good faith does not concern itself with whether 
the breach is innocent or not, to create such an absolute liability “could expose either party to an 
insurance contract to a claim for substantial damages in the absence of any blameworthy 
conduct”.509 
 
However, Slade L.J.’s worry that the creation of a new tort of the breach of utmost good faith 
would cause great hardship would not be a problem if damages are limited to non-disclosure other 
than the innocent. Indeed, as Clarke has pointed out, 510  rescission and damage are distinct 
remedies and each should have its own criteria. 
 
iv. Other Approaches besides Utmost Good Faith 
 
Besides principle of utmost good faith, there could be other approaches to seek damages for the 
breach of duty of disclosure under the law of U.K., such as tort under the principle established by 
Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd,511 fiduciary relationship, and fraud. Nonetheless, 
the Court of Appeal in the Westgate case accepted none of these approaches, so the general 
principle has been that no remedy in damage is awarded for the breach of the duty of disclosure, 
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 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 at 550. 
509
 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 at 551. 
510
 “Indeed, it is one thing to say to a man that, if he does not disclose the whole truth as he knows it, the 
other will be able to withdraw from the contract because he did not know enough to give informed consent, 
but another thing to say to the first man that he assumes responsibility for consequential loss suffered by the 
other and will be liable to pay damages for it.” Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. 
(London: LLP, 2002) at para. 23-15C. 
511
 [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.). 
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no matter whether it is the insurer or the insured who breaches the duty.512 However, there might 




Damages are recoverable when the misrepresentation is fraudulent. Where fraud takes the form of 
positive misrepresentation, damages are recoverable for the aggrieved party,513 while, subject to 
some exceptions, mere passive non-disclosure of truth, however deceptive, does not amount to 
deceit in law,514 less possibly to give rise to an action for damage. When fraud is involved, the 
legal basis on which the aggrieved party seeks for damages is not the principle of utmost good 
faith but the tort of deceit.515 Accordingly, the measurement for the damages is tortious. 
 
vi. The Misrepresentation Act 1967 
 
As to non-fraudulent misrepresentation, damages might be available under the Misrepresentation 
Act 1967. Section 2(1) 516  of the act allows the representee to claim damages for negligent 
misrepresentation as if that misrepresentation were made fraudulently. Negligent 
misrepresentation is defined as misrepresentation made without reasonable ground to believe that 
the facts represented were true. Hence, the tortious measurement applies in the damages awarded 
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 Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. 
v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); affirming [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 
(C.A.); reversing [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.). 
513
 HIH Casualty and General Insurance v. Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 61 (H.L.); [2001] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 483 (C.A.); [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 30 (Comm. Ct.). 
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 Heuston, Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts, 21st ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 369-370. 
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 Newbigging v. Adam (1888) L.R. 13 App. Cas. 308, per Bowen L.J. 
516
 Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act: Where a person has entered into a contract after a 
misrepresentation has been made to him by another party thereto and as a result thereof he has suffered loss, 
then, if the person making the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in respect thereof had the 
misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable notwithstanding that the 
misrepresentation was not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable ground to believe and 
did believe up to the time the contract was made that the facts represented were true. 
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against the so-defined negligent misrepresentation. Damages are also available under section 
2(2).517 Where the party entitled to rescind the contract claims to do so, the court or the arbitrator 
may exercise his discretion to award damages “in lieu of rescission, if of opinion that it would be 
equitable to do so, having regard to the nature of the misrepresentation and the loss that would be 
caused by it if the contract were upheld, as well as to the loss that rescission would cause to the 
other party”518 No matter whether or not the representee is entitled to damages under section 2(1), 
namely, whether or not the representation is a negligent one as defined in section 2(1), damages 
under section 2(2) are always subject to the discretion of the court or the arbitrator.519  The 
measures of the damages under section 2(2), as is suggested,520 are different from that under 
section 2(1) and are the measures employed in the breach of contract. In addition, it is noteworthy 
that the court is usually reluctant to apply section 2(2) to insurance contract.521 
 
II. Remedy under the Chinese law 
 
1. The Insurer’s Right to Terminate the Insurance Contract 
 
The word of “termination” is used to describe the insurer’s right against the breach of duty of 
disclosure in the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code. Termination is different from rescission. 
According to the Contract Law 1999, rescission of the contract has retroactive effect: it 
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 Section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act: Where a person has entered into a contract after a 
misrepresentation has been made to him otherwise than fraudulently, and he would be entitled, by reason of 
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 Section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act. 
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 Section 2(3) of the Misrepresentation Act. 
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 Malcolm A. Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts, 4th ed. (London: LLP, 2002) at 751, suggesting this, 
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 Highlands Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 109 at 118. See further 
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extinguishes the contract as if the contract had never existed,522 while termination of the contract 
has effect mainly prospectively and under certain conditions it has retrospective effect. The party 
may demand restoration to the original status in accordance with the situation of performance and 
the nature of the contract.523 As the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code are special laws524 
compared with the Contract Law 1999, article 17 of the Insurance Law and article 223 of the 
Maritime Code shall apply in preference to article 97 of the Contract Law 1999.525 As to what the 
Insurance Law and the Maritime Code does not stipulate, such as limitation of time, the Contract 
Law 1999 applies. 
 
The insurer cannot terminate the contract after the contract has come into being subject to certain 
exceptions provided by law or by the insurance contract.526 Breach of the duty of disclosure is one 
of these exceptional circumstances where the insurer can terminate the contract. As to the marine 
insurance, article 227 of the Maritime Code provides that, “unless otherwise agreed in the 
contract”,527 neither party may terminate the contract after the commencement of the insurance 
liability. This provision should not influence the insurer’s right of rescission against the insured’s 
                                                        
522
 Article 58 of the Contract Law 1999: After a contract becomes invalid or is rescinded, any property 
obtained under the contract shall be returned. If it is impossible or unnecessary to return the property, 
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 Emphasis added. 
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breach of duty of disclosure.528 Similarly, article 35 of the Insurance Law529 should not interfere 
with the insurer’s right of termination either.530 
 
Whether the insurer has the right to terminate the insurance contract as a remedy for the breach of 
the duty of disclosure by the insured, and what effect the termination has, largely depends on the 
state of mind in which the insured breaches the duty of disclosure.531 In Chinese law, the state of 
mind is categorized into intention, negligence, and innocence. The effect of termination of the 
insurance contract can only be understood after the meanings of intention and negligence are made 
clear. 
 
2. Definitions of Intention, Negligence, and Innocence 
 
i. Methodology of Definition 
 
Amongst the three concepts, it is more important to define intention and negligence because 
innocence can easily be defined as the state of mind in which the doer is neither intentional nor 
negligent. Unfortunately, none of the statutes, vis. the Insurance Law, the Maritime Code, and the 
Contract Law 1999 nor the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986 has defined these important 
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 There is a minor logic flaw in article 227 of the Maritime Code in that it provides that neither party can 
terminate the contract “unless otherwise agreed in the contract”, [emphasis added] while article 223 of the 
Maritime Code provides that, in circumstances of the breach of the duty of disclosure, the insurer has the 
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This point of view is accepted by Hu Jihua, gen. ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Bao Xian Fa Shi Yi 
Ji Shi Yong Zhi Nan (The Paraphrase and Practical Guide of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of 
China) (Beijing: China Democracy and Legal System Press, 2002) at 136. 
531
 For how and to what extend, the right to terminate the contract is affected, see iii. 
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concepts though they are frequently used in these statutes. In order to define the meaning of 
intention and negligence, this thesis will use the following reference: the general meaning of the 
two concepts in non-legal context, the definitions of the two concepts in the criminal law,532 and 
the definitions given by some civil law scholars. It is noteworthy that fault in China legal context 
means the state of mind of either intention or negligence.533 
 
ii. Definition of Intention 
 
According to A Grand Dictionary of Chinese, intention means “to have a mind to”, “to cherish 
certain intentions” or “to do something on purpose”.534 In particular, this dictionary has mentioned 
the meaning of this word in the criminal law, saying that: 
 
“Intention is the state of mind of the doer where he clearly knows that his act will produce 
the consequence that will endanger the society, but he still pursues or is indifferent to the 
occurrence of those consequences; the mind of pursuance of the occurrence of the 
consequence is called the ‘direct intention’ and the mind of indifference to the occurrence 
of the consequence is called ‘indirect intention’. If A overthrows B’s car hoping B, his 
personal enemy, to die, this is direct intention; his indifference to the death of the other 
passengers in the car is indirect intention.”535 
 
Article 14(1) of the Criminal Law 1997 provides similar definition as Ci Hai.536 
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 The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 1997 is the only statute that has provided definitions 
for intention and negligent. 
533
 See Wang Liming & Yang Lixin, Qin Quan Xing Wei Fa (Tort Law) (Beijing: the Law Press, 1996) at 69. 
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 Article 14(1) “An intentional crime is a crime constituted as a result of clear knowledge that one’s own 
act will cause socially dangerous consequences, and of hope for or indifference to the occurrence of those 
consequences.” [Translated by the author.] 
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A comparison with the common law results in an interesting finding. The common law does not 
distinguish direct or indirect intention. At first appearance it seems that an intention under the 
common law only includes what is called “direct intention” in Chinese law, but the doctrine of 
transferred malice has the same effect as the “indirect intention”.537 
 
The civil law scholars define “intention” in the context of the civil law quite similarly as the 
Criminal Law 1997. “Intention is the state of mind that the doer has foreseen that his act is capable 
of causing certain consequence while he hopes or is indifferent to the occurrence of the 
consequence.”538 Applying the civil law definition of intention to the principle of utmost good 
faith in the insurance law, the breach of the duty is intentional if, and only in so far as, the 
insured,539 actually knowing something material to the insurer in assessing the risks, fails to make 
truthful disclosure with desire that the insurer would be concealed or misled, or he is indifferent540 
to the consequence that the insurer would be concealed or misled. 
 
So intention requires actual knowledge of the material circumstances. It cannot be said that the 
breach is intentional if the insured does not know the fact even though an ordinary person in his 
circumstances should know it, or if the insured fails to disclosure something because he forgets 
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state of being set to do something.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, 17th ed. at 814.) “An intention is the purpose 
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it,541 or if the insured of a marine insurance contract has remembered certain fact but due to his 
inexperience he fails to appreciate its materiality.542 In addition, intention is “a typically culpable 
state of mind”,543 if a person cannot control his mind, he is in no sense blameable. Therefore, if a 
person with no capacity for civil conduct544  makes misrepresentation or concealment, or if a 
person with limited capacity for civil conduct545 makes misrepresentation or concealment which 
exceeds his intellectual or metal state, the misrepresentation or the concealment is not intentional. 
 
iii. Definition of Negligence 
 
According to Ci Hai, negligence means “fault” in daily context.546 It is a word capable of more 
than one meaning, but in the legal context it has special meaning: 
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Republic of China Governing Foreign-Related Matters (Beijing: the Law Press, 1991). See also Statutes and 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 3, looseleaf (Hong Kong: University of East Asia Press 
and Institute of Chinese law, 1987-1990) Ch. 860412.1. 
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age of 18 subject to article 11(2) of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986, or a mentally ill person 
who cannot fully account for his own conduct. See the relevant articles ibid. 
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 Ci Hai (A Grand Dictionary of Chinese) (Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Press, 1999) at 1169. 
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“Negligence is the opposite to intention… in the criminal law, it is the state of mind of the 
doer that he should have foreseen that his act is capable of producing consequence that 
will endanger the society but he fails to foresee the consequence due to his inadvertence, 
or that he has foreseen the consequence but he readily assumes that it will not occur, so as 
to cause the detrimental consequence. An example of the former is that a driver has not 
foreseen the possibility of the car’s knocking down a pedestrian due to his carelessness 
and hence causes the traffic accident. An example of the latter is that a drive clearly knows 
that driving too fast may cause traffic accident but he readily relies on his driving skill of 
avoiding collision only to result in accident.”547 
 
Article 15(1) of the Criminal Law 1997 provides similar definition as Ci Hai.548 
 
In the civil law, most scholars have made the same definitions for “negligence”. “Negligence 
means that the doer should foresee and could foresee the illegal consequence his act may cause, 
but he fails to do so, or he has foreseen that consequence but he readily believes that it would not 
occur, so as to cause the illegal consequence.”549 What a person should have foreseen is judged by 
what an ordinary people with ordinary knowledge and reasonable care in his circumstances would 
have foreseen, but if he has special knowledge or he has special duty to take more care, then his 
act should be judged according to the higher standard. This definition has imitated that in the 
criminal law; the only difference is that the illegal consequence here has not come to the degree 
that constitutes a crime. According to this definition, negligence can be of two types: the 




 “A negligent crime occurs when one should foresee that one’s act may cause socially dangerous 
consequences but fails to do so because of carelessness or, having foreseen the consequences, readily 
assumes he can prevent them, with the result that these consequences occur.” [Translated by the author.] 
549
 Liang Huixing, Zhong Guo Min Fa Jing Ji Fa Zhu Wen Ti (Some Problems of China Civil Law and 
Economic Law) (Beijing: The Law Press, 1991) at 119. Also see Wei Zhenying, Min Fa (The Civil Law) 
(Beijing: Beijing University Press & High Education Press, 2000) at 692. But see Wang Liming & Yang 
Lixin, Qin Quan Xing Wei Fa (Tort Law) (Beijing: the Law Press, 1996) at 71, where Wang Liming & Yang 
Lixin define that negligence means that “the doer should foresee or could foresee the illegal consequence his 
act may cause…” 
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carelessness, i.e., that the doer should foresee but fails to foresee, and the eoverconfidence, i.e., 
that the doer has foreseen but he readily believes that the consequence would not occur. 550 
Sometimes, it needs complicated philosophical analysis to distinguish the negligence of 
overconfidence and indirect intention which is beyond the task of this thesis.551 
 
So far as the principle of utmost good faith is concerned, the negligent breach of the duty of 
disclosure is any breach due to the insured’s failure to exercise reasonable care, or special care if 
he has duty to take more care552 to gain the material facts or to recall what has come to his mind, 
or any breach due to the insured’s overconfidence that the fact were not material. The person with 
no or limited capacity for civil conduct cannot be convicted of negligence either. 
 
3. The Liability for Intentional Non-Disclosure 
 
In both marine and non-marine insurance, the insured’s liability,553 or the insurer’s remedy, for 
intentional non-disclosure is the same. First, the insurer will have the right to terminate the 
contract, and after that he is no longer liable for any loss of or damages to the insured subject.554 
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 Article 17(2) of the Insurance Law and article 223(1) of the Maritime Code. See these articles at page 21 
and 19 respectively. 
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Second, the insurer is not liable for any loss of or damages to the insured subject occurring before 
the termination.555 Third, the insurer can retain the premiums.556 
 
4. The Liability for Unintentional Non-Disclosure in Marine Insurance 
 
If there is an unintentional non-disclosure, whether negligent or innocent, before the conclusion of 
a marine insurance contract, definitely the insurer can terminate the contract and reject any claim 
for loss or damages occurring after the termination.557 As opposed to circumstances where the non-
disclosure is intentional, the insurer is still liable for any loss of or damages to the insured subject 
occurring before the termination, unless the material circumstances undisclosed or wrongly 
disclosed have an impact on the occurrence of the perils.558 The phrase here need explaining is “an 
impact on the occurrence of the perils.” 
 
First, the impact must be related to the perils which cause the loss or the damages that the insured 
claims for. If the material circumstances have an impact on one peril while the damages are caused 
by another irrelevant peril, the insurer cannot reject the claim for the peril occurring before the 
termination of the contract. 
 
Second, the impact is not equal to the materiality of the undisclosed fact. The undisclosed fact 
must be material before the question of impact could arise. The impact is the influence of the 
                                                        
555
 See article 17(3) of the Insurance Law and article 223(1) of the Maritime Code. See these articles at page 
21 and 19 respectively. It may seem redundant to distinguish the liabilities before and after the termination 




 Article 223(2) of the Maritime Code: “If, not due to the insured’s intentional act, the insured did not 
truthfully disclose to the insurer the material circumstances set out in paragraph 1 of article 222 of this Code, 
the insurer has the right to terminate the contract or to demand a corresponding increase in the premium. In 
case the contract is terminated by the insurer, the insurer shall be liable for the loss arising from the perils 
insured against which occurred prior to the termination of the contract, except where the material 




undisclosed fact on the perils that have actually occurred, while the materiality means the 
influence on the mind of the actual or notional prudent insurer. 
 
Finally, the impact does not mean that the undisclosed fact must be the proximate cause of the 
occurrence of the loss or damages. Not many articles have defined what impact means. It is 
suggested that the impact is not strict legal causation, and an impact is weaker than the effect of 
causal connection.559 In a few cases, the judges have briefly discussed the meaning of impact. In Xi 
Gu Commercial Ins. v. the People’s Insurance Company of China, Qingdao Branch, 560  the 
equipment was shipped on a barge towed by a tug but the insured had not disclosed these 
circumstances to the insurer due to the insured’s overconfidence that the insurer might have known 
the circumstances from local news. The equipment was damaged by gale on the sea. The court 
held that the circumstances undisclosed had an impact on the occurrence of the damages because 
the wind power had been above gale, under which circumstances the shipping of towage would 
not be seaworthy. In another case,561 the fact that insured ship was bound for disassembly was held 
to have an impact on the occurrence of the ship’s breakdown and sinking. In both cases, the facts 
undisclosed are not the prime causes of the occurrence of the damages, 562  nor are they the 
proximate cause. In the second case, the court did not even take the trouble to analyse how the 
undisclosed fact impacted the occurrence of the breakdown; it merely required some relationship 
between the fact and the occurrence. Therefore, in general, for there to be an impact, the 
undisclosed fact can be an indirect cause, or a contributing cause. It could be said that there is an 
impact as far as the undisclosed fact may increase the possibility of the occurrence of the accident 
which actually occurs. 
                                                        
559
 Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd 
ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 82. 
560
 [2002] Lu Min Si Zhong Zi, No. 45, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=752>. 
561
 Chenco International Inc. v. China Pacific Insurance, Shanghai Branch [1997] Hu Hai Fa Shang Zi, No. 
486, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/writ/judgementDetial.php?sId=433>. 
562
 The prime cause in the first case is the gale and in the latter is the cyclone and billow. 
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5. The Liability for Negligent Non-Disclosure in Non-Marine Insurance 
 
Although the question of materiality does not arise when talking about what the insured should 
disclose since the principle applied in non-marine insurance is the inquiry-disclosure, the fact 
undisclosed must be material if the insurer wants to terminate contract where the non-disclosure is 
negligent.563 That is equal to say, if the insurer wants to terminate the contract, he should either 
prove that the non-disclosure is intentional or that the non-disclosure is material.564 The double-
check-test shall apply in determining the materiality.565 
 
Where the insurer has terminated a non-marine insurance contract for negligent non-disclosure, the 
insurer is not liable for any loss which occurred after the termination, but he is still liable for the 
loss occurring before the termination of the contract unless the non-disclosure has a grave impact 
on the occurrence of the risks. This position is basically the same as the Maritime Code. Rather 
than “an impact”,566 the Insurance Law has used “a grave impact”. So a proper interpretation may 
be that, in non-marine insurance, where the non-disclosure is negligent, if the insurer wants to be 
                                                        
563
 Article 17 of the Insurance Law stipulates that, “if the applicant… negligently fails to make disclosure 
thereby which is sufficient to affect the insurer making a decision…” The meaning of materiality is deduced 
from the influence of the non-disclosure on the insurer’s decision. 
564
 Article 10 of The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition 
of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation) (available online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>) suggests that “if the risk is not caused by the material fact 
undisclosed by the applicant… the insurer may not terminate the contract or reject the liability under the 
policy on ground of non-disclosure by the applicant.” But this provision is inconsistent with the statute 
which is of high authority than the judicial interpretation. According to article 17 of the Insurance Law, the 
insurer’s right to terminate the contract does not depend on the linkage between the occurrence of the risk 
and the undisclosed circumstances, so it is wrong to stipulate that the insurer may not terminate the contract 
where the non-disclosure has no grave impact; actually, the insurer is only prohibited to reject the claim in 
such circumstances. That may be why this article has cause great disputes. See the disputes in news report 
online: South Weekend <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20031218/jr/200312170601.asp>. 
565
 The Insurance Law does not stipulate whether “the insurer” in article 17(2) means the prudent insurer or 
the actual insurer. For those reasons given above, this article should be interpreted as a double check 
interpretation, i.e., both the particular insurer and a prudent insurer in his position would be induced to enter 
into the contract. Discussed in more detail at page 105ff., above. 
566
 Article 223 of the Maritime Code. 
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released from the pre-termination liability, the circumstances undisclosed must be at lease the 
main cause of the occurrence of the risks.567 
 
Article 10 of the proposed judicial interpretation suggests that the “grave impact” should mean 
that the fact undisclosed is the “main and decisive cause” of the occurrence of the risk.568 This 
interpretation seems reasonable. However, this article continues to stipulate that “if the risk is not 
caused by the material fact undisclosed by the applicant, the court may regard that that fact 
undisclosed has no ‘grave impact’ on the occurrence of the risk, and the insurer may not terminate 
the contract or reject the liability under the policy on ground of non-disclosure by the 
applicant.” 569  This seems to have confused the difference in the conditions of the right of 
termination and those of the right to reject the claim. According to article 17(2) of the Insurance 
Law, the insurer is entitled to terminate the contract where the non-disclosure is either material or 
fraudulent. The right of termination is not dependent on causation, but causation must be fulfilled 
in order to reject the claim arising before the termination. Therefore, the proposed judicial 
interpretation should delete the italic words “terminate the contract”.570 
 
6. The Defects of the Nexus Approach 
                                                        
567
 See Li Yuquan, Bao Xian Fa (Insurance Law), 2nd ed. (Beijing: The Law Press, 2003) at 65, where Li 
Yuquan rebuts the arguement that the “grave impact” means necessarian causation, so he insists that the 
main cause is enough to establish the grave impact. If a cause will unavoidably cause a certain consequence, 
then there is necessarian causation between the cause and the consequence. 
568
 See article 10 of the Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the 
Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
569
 Ibid. Emphasis added. In addition to the problem mentioned below, there is a verbal problem. The second 
sentence seems redundant and causes misunderstanding. The first sentence has make clear the meaning of 
the grave impact that it is a main and decisive cause, while the second sentence says that “If the risk is not 
caused by the material fact” is misleading. One will be confused why the second sentence does not 
emphasize the “main and decisive” cause. Therefore, the second sentence, if not deleted, should be changed 
to “If the risk is not decisively caused by the material fact undisclosed by the applicant, the court may regard 
that that fact undisclosed has no “grave impact” on the occurrence of the risk…” 
570
 If the insurer had to prove the causation before he can terminate the contract, he could terminate the 
contract only after the loss had occurred, because he can never prove the causation before a given loss has 
occurred. See generally Chen Ken, “Bao Xian Fa Si Fa Jie Shi Zheng Bian Shi Mo (The Disputes in the 
Judicial Interpretation of the Insurance Law)”, Economic News of 21st Century, 17 Dec, 2003, online: 
Southern Daily <http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20031218/jr/200312170601.asp>. 
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The impact of undisclosed matters on the occurrence of the risk is also called the nexus 
approach.571 It has already been alleged that the nexus approach has its defects.572 First, where the 
insurer would not have accepted the contract at all had he known the material fact, it would be 
unfair for him to take responsibility of the loss under the contract because the contract would not 
have existed at all.573 Second, some circumstances can never be said to contribute the occurrence 
of the risk,574 such as the circumstances related to “moral hazard”575 and those related to the 
recoverability of the loss, although these circumstances may be very important in assessing the 
risks. Consequently, the insured would be encouraged to conceal such circumstances in order to 
get lower premiums because the insurer will never be able to reject the claim on ground of non-
disclosure of these circumstances under the nexus approach, and the insurer will be less able to 
accurately identify which risks are good and which are bad and to adjust premium rates 
accordingly.576 
 
There is much force in the arguments above, but this has not held up the adoption of this approach 
in many countries.577 However, the nexus test in both the Maritime Code and the Insurance Law 
should be amended accordingly. First, if the undisclosed circumstances are such that the insurer 
would not have accepted the risk had he known the truth, the insurer should not be liable for the 
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 U.K., the Law Commission, Insurance Law - Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, Law Com. No. 
104, Cmnd 8064 (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) at paras. 4.89-4.97. 
572
 Ibid. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, ALRC Report No. 20 
(Canberra: Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1982) at para. 191. 
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 U.K., The Law Commission, ibid, at para. 4.93. 
576
 Ibid, at para. 4.95. 
577
 This approach has already been adopted in Japan (section 645 of the Commercial Code of Japan) and 
Taiwan (article 64 of the Taiwan Insurance Law). Both of them have the same provision as China. In 
Norway, the causal connection approach is employed; in Australia, this approach is suggested to be added 
into the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth). See infra not 578. 
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loss regardless of whether these circumstances have an impact on the risk.578 In absence of fraud, 
if the insurer would have accepted the risk but on different conditions, the insurer should be 
entitled to avoid liability unless the loss is not attributed to the circumstances that should have 
been disclosed. 579  Second, the insurer should also be able to avoid the liability where the 
undisclosed matter has an impact on the recoverability of the claim, though it may not have an 
impact on the occurrence of the risk.580 
 
7. Could There Be Innocent Non-Disclosure? 
 
Theoretically, an innocent non-disclosure means a non-disclosure committed by the insured due to 
reasons other than his intention or his negligence. Suppose that the insured has tried every shift 
available to inform the insurer of the change of an important circumstance, but due to an act of 
God, or an accident that nobody with reasonable care could anticipate, such a non-disclosure 
should be treated as innocent. 
 
The Insurance Law does not stipulate whether the insured is liable for innocent non-disclosure 
perhaps because of its rareness. Since the Insurance Law has specified the liabilities for intentional 
and negligent non-disclosure while omitting that for innocent non-disclosure alone, the 
interpretation of unius exclusio581 of this article should be that the innocent non-disclosure does 
not give rise to any liability. In addition, according to the General Principles of the Civil Law 
                                                        
578
 This is the position of Norwegian marine insurance law and the Australian Law Reform Commission also 
made this suggestion as to the reform of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth). See Australian 
Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 (Sydney: The 




 For example, where there was a unique clause in the charter party excluding the charterer’s liability and 
the insured shipowner failed to disclose it to the insurer, the insurer would be barred from recover loss 
payable to the shipowner from the charterer. Then the insurer should be able to avoid the liability for the loss. 
See also Wang Jie, “Qian Tan Gao Zhi Yi Wu Fa Lv Tiao Kuan Zai Shi Wu Zhong De Wen Ti (Briefly 
Discuss on the Problems of the Duty of Disclosure Clause in the Practice)” (1999) May, Hai Shang Fa Xi 
Hui Tong Xun (CMLA News Letter) 76. 
581
 See supra note 326. 
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1986,582 force majeure, or an act of God, exempts the person from the performance of any duty 
influenced thereof, so the insured should not be liable for innocent non-disclosure if it is caused by 
force majeure. 
 
8. Limitation to the Right of Termination 
 
In the common law, there is no fixed time limitation to the insurer’s right of rescission of the 
contract in the breach of utmost good faith. “The party defrauded may keep the question open so 
long as he does nothing to affirm the contract… [but] lapse of time without rescinding will furnish 
evidence that he has determined to affirm the contract, and when the lapse of time is great, it 
probably would in practice be treated as conclusive evidence that he has so determined.”583 This 
position would increase the uncertainty of the insured’s arrangement on his life or business 
because he does not know when exactly he can begin to rely on the insurer’s silence. 
 
Both the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code fail to provide any limitation for the insurer’s 
right of termination of the contract against the insured’s non-disclosure with only a small 
exception.584 It is therefore possible for the relevant provision of the Contract Law 1999 to apply. 
                                                        
582
 Article 107 of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986: “Civil liability shall not be borne for failure 
to perform a contract or damage to a third party (a third party should have been translated into other peoples) 
if it is caused by force majeure, except as otherwise provided by law.” Translation available in the Law 
Bureau of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, trans., Laws and Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China Governing Foreign-Related Matters (Beijing: the Law Press, 1991). 
583
 K R Handley, Spencer Bower Turner & Handley Actionable Misrepresentation, 4th ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 2000) at para. 323. Clough v. London and North Western Railway Co. (1871) L.R. 7 Ex. 26 at 
34-35; Torrance v. Bolton (1872) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 118 at 124; Aaron’s Reefs [1896] A.C. 273 at 294 per 
Lord Davey: “lapse of time without rescinding may furnish evidence of an intention to affirm the contract. 
But the cogency of this evidence depends upon the particular circumstances of the case, and the nature of the 
contract in question”. For cases of delay not amounting to affirmation or election, see Mutual Reserve Life 
Insurance Co v. Foster (1904) 20 T.L.R. 715. 
584
 In article 53 of the Insurance Law, it is provided that “If the age of the insured declared by applicant is 
not true to fact, and the actual age fails to be in conformity with the age limit as agreed upon in the contract, 
the insurer may terminate the contract, and return the insurance premium to the applicant after deducting the 
handling fees, however, the contract which has been served for more than two years into since its conclusion 
shall be excluded.” 
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According to article 95 of the Contract Law 1999, the party’s right to terminate the contract may 
be extinguished by the lapse of time.585 According to this article, the right to terminate the contract 
will be extinguished after a reasonable period from the date when the party with right to terminate 
was urged by the other party to exercise the right unless otherwise provided by law or by the 
contract.586 That is to say, unless the insured urges the insurer to exercise the right of termination 
against the non-disclosure, the insurer’s right will always exist. 
 
This result is unfavourable. In deed, article 95 of the Contract Law 1999 has been seriously 
criticised by the contract law scholars for the uncertainty it would cause to the validity of the 
contract.587 First, “a reasonable period” has long been criticised as a very vague definition in the 
Chinese law and has caused much dispute.588 Second, it is alleged that the extinction period was 
intended to prompt the obligee589 to exercise his right timely so that the validity of the contract 
would be ascertained as soon as possible.590 If the extinction period591 starts to run only after the 
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 Article 95 of the Contract Law 1999: “(1) If a time limit for exercising the right to dissolve the contract is 
provided for by laws or by agreement of the parties, and the party concerned does not exercise such right at 
the expiration of the time limit, such right shall vanish. (2) If no time limit for exercising the right to 
dissolve is provided for by laws or by agreement of the parties, but the party concerned does not exercise 
such right within a reasonable period of time after being urged by the other party, such right shall vanish.” 
There are two points requiring explaining. First, it is suggested that the word “vanish” had better be 
substituted by “extinguish”. (See Wu Qifei & Feng Xia, “He Tong Fa Ying Yi Ben Qiu Ci Lu (Flaws in the 
English Version of the Contract Law)”, (2001) December, Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre 
Institute of Politics and Law 118.) Second, “dissolve” in the Contract Law 1999 has the same meaning as 
“terminate” in both the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code because both of the two words are translated 
from the same Chinese words “Jie Chu”. That is to say, in the Chinese original text, “dissolve” and 
“terminate” are the same ostensibly and literally. Therefore, in thesis, these two words will be unified as 
“terminate”. 
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 Article 95(2) of the Contract Law 1999, ibid. 
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 See infra note 588, 590. 
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 It has been strongly criticised for the uncertainty this word will cause. It is also suggested that the 
legislation should use this word as less as possible. See Liang Huixing, “Tong Yi He Tong Fa: Cheng Gong 
Yu Bu Zu (The United Contract Law: The Success and the Defeat)”, (1999) Issue 3, China Legal Science 25 
at 28. 
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 The obligee means the party who has the right to terminate the contract. 
590
 Wang Liming, Wei Yue Ze Ren Lun (The Obligation of the Breach of the Contract), 2nd ed. (Beijing: 
China Politics and Law University Press, 2003) at 716-717. 
591
 The extinction period is a civil law concept which means the period after which a certain right will be 
extinguished. See also supra note 337. 
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urgency of the opposite party,592 it would not coincide with the legislation intention. Finally, 
suppose in an extreme example, where the obligee continued to accept the performance of the 
opposite party without excising his right to terminate the contract for one year. Could the obligee 
terminate the contract thereafter because the opposite never urged him to exercise the right? It 
would be unreasonable if the obligee could do so.593 Therefore, the right to terminate the contract 
should be exercised within a fixed period from the time when the obligee knows the fact which 
gives rise to the right. As far as the insurance contract is concerned, this fixed period is usually set 
by law as one month in many civil law countries.594 China may follow their positions.595 
 
9. The Indisputability Clause 
 
Sometimes, the life insurance policy will include an indisputability clause596 into the policy. This 
has been a custom in the many countries. However, until now, no policy in Chinese insurance 
market has included such an indisputability clause.597 The only exception is that the life insurance 
policy usually contains a clause of the misrepresentation of age which provides that, if the insured 
has misrepresented his age and if the insurer thereby has the right to terminate the policy, the right 
must be exercised within two years from the conclusion of the contract. However, had article 53 of 
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 The opposite party means the party vis-à-vis the party who has the right to terminate the contract. 
593
 In the common law, the rule governing this kind of circumstances is waiver, but there is no rule of waiver. 
Although the court may decide that the obligee cannot exercise the right to terminate the contract as the 
exercise may breach the principle of good faith stipulated in the civil law. See supra note 337 for waiver. 
594
 In German (article 20 of German Insurance Contract Law), Japan (article 645 of Japanese Commercial 
Code), Macau (article 974 of Macau Commercial Code), and Taiwan (article 64 of Taiwan Insurance Law), 
the insurer has to exercise the right to terminate, or rescind, according to the respective provisions, the 
contract within one month of knowing the non-disclosure or misrepresentation. In Italy, the period is three 
months according to article 1893 and 1898 of Italian Civil Code. See Li Yuquan, Bao Xian Fa (Insurance 
Law), 2nd ed. (Beijing: The Law Press, 2003) at 62-64. 
595
 However, whether the period should be one month (as is in German, Japan, and Taiwan) or three months 
(as is in Italy) may be further considered. 
596
 An indisputability clause makes the insurance contract indisputable after it has been in force for a 
particular time, normally two years. The effect of the clause is that the insurer cannot rely upon defences of 
non-disclosure, misrepresentation and certain breach of warranty to avoid the contract or deny the liability 
under the contract. See John Birds & Norma J. Hird, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2001) at 95. 
597
 Xu Zongsheng, “Bu Ke Zheng Tiao Kuan Chu Tan (Primary Research on the Indisputability Clause)”, 
[1997] Issue 4, Insurance Research 35 at 36-37. 
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the Insurance Law598 not stipulated so, it is very doubtful whether the life policy will contain the 
clause of the misrepresentation of age. The lack of the indisputability clause will be a defect in the 
domestic insurers’ competing with the foreign insurers599 after the insurance market was fully 
opened under the agreements of the accession of China into the WTO.600 Moreover, there are 
sufficient reasons to ask why only the misrepresentation of age will be excused after two years 
while others will not. There is no sense that the misrepresentation of age is less material or less 
misleading than others. Therefore, the Insurance Law should make the indisputability clause as a 
compulsory clause in the life insurance. Fortunately, the proposed judicial interpretation601 will 
complement this defect. 
 
10. The Way to Exercise the Right to Terminate the Insurance Contract 
 
Pursuant to article 96 of the Contract Law 1999, the party who wants to terminate the contract 
must notify the other party and the termination does not take effect until the notification reaches 
the other party.602 Article 96 applies to the circumstances specified in articles 93603 and 94.604 Non-
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 See supra note 276. 
599
 Xu Shenliang & Li Xiao, “Bao Xian Fa Ye Yao Zao Ru Shi (The Insurance Law should also ‘Join the 
WTO’ as early as Possible)”, International Finance Newspaper, November 15, 2001, section 6, online: the 
NPC News <http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper12/1/class001200078/hwz211693.htm>. 
600
 Annex 9 of Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China governs the opening of the 
financial service market. Under this annex, China’s insurance market will open to foreign insurance 
companies and they will have a fair competition with the domestic ones. Online: the Ministry of Commerce 
of the People’s Republic of China <http://www.moftec.gov.cn/article/200207/20020700032358_1.xml>. 
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 Article 40 (Application of the Indisputable Clause): After two years from the conclusion of the contract, 
if the insurer does not use the right of termination of the insurance contract stipulated in article 17(2) of the 
Insurance Law, the right is extinct, except where the contract has been ceased. See The Interpretation of the 
People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for 
Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
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 Article 96 of the Contract Law 1999: when a party advocates the dissolution of the contract in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of articles 93 and 94 of this Law, the party shall notify the 
other party. The contract shall be dissolved when the notice reaches the other party. If the other party has 
objection it may apply to a People’s Court or an arbitration institution to determine the validity of the 
dissolution of the contract. 
Where provisions of the laws and administrative regulations require the dissolution of a contract to go 
through approval and registration procedures, such provisions shall govern. 
603
 Article 93: The parties may dissolve the contract upon consensus through consultation. 
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disclosure in insurance contract is not directly mentioned in article 93 or article 94, but it can be 
categorized into the 5th circumstances specified in article 94, i.e., “any other circumstances as 
provided for by law”. Therefore, article 96 of the Contract Law 1999 also applies in the breach of 
the duty of disclosure. The termination of the insurance contract takes effect at the time the notice 
is received by the insured. The way of notification is not specified by law, so it can be in written, 
oral or via any other communication, but the insurer bears the risk that the notice may fail to reach 
the insured since the notice of termination only takes effect after it is received. But if the judicial 
interpretation of the Insurance Law605 is passed, it probably will stipulate that the notice of the 
termination must be in written. 
 
The insurer must be careful that, if he decides to terminate the contract, he should notify the 
insured as soon as possible. The effect of termination of the contract does not automatically relieve 
the insurer from the liability which occurred before the termination; the insurer still bears the 
liability before the termination unless the non-disclosure is intentional 606  or the undisclosed 
circumstances have an impact (in marine insurance) or a severe impact (in non-marine insurance) 
on the occurrence of the risk.607 In some cases, the intention or the impact may be difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The parties may stipulate the conditions for dissolution of the contract by either party. When the conditions 
for dissolution of the contract mature, the party with the tight to dissolve may dissolve the contract. 
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 Article 94: The parties may dissolve the contract under any of the following circumstances: the aim of the 
contract cannot be attained because of force majeure; before the period of performance expires, either party 
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being urged; either party delays the discharge of debt or is engaged in other illegal activities and thus makes 
realization of the aim of the contract impossible; or any other circumstances as provided for by law. 
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 Article 7 (The Duty of Notification on the Termination of the Contract) of the proposed interpretation: 
“After the conclusion of the contract, if one party alleges termination of the contract according to the CIL or 
according to this judicial interpretation, that party should notice the other party in written, and the contract is 
terminated when the notification reaches the other party…” This judicial interpretation is still in draft, and 
this draft is published for public consultancy. Since many of the insurance documents are required to be in 
written form, it is also reasonable to have the notice of termination being so. See The Interpretation of the 
People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for 
Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
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 Discussed in more detail at page 128, above. 
607
 Discussed in more detail at page 129, 131, above. 
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prove, so an experience insurer, after finding the breach of the duty of disclosure by the insured, 
should not wait until the risks occur.608 
 
Article 96 of the Contract Law 1999 allows the party who opposes the termination of the contract 
to request a People’s Court or an arbitration institution to validate the contract. If the contract is 
validated thereby, the termination of the contract is invalid ab initio and the contract keeps valid 
retrospectively to the original time when the contract took effect. If the court or the arbitration 
institution does not validate the contract, the termination of the contract is valid and the contract 
ceases from the time of the notice of the termination. 
 
11. Damages under China Law 
 
i. Damage after the Termination of the Contract 
 
Damages are not available under the Maritime Code or the Insurance Law since neither of them 
mentions damages as a remedy for non-disclosure, but the Contract Law 1999 has filled this gap. 
Under article 97 of this statute, the aggrieved party may claim damages after the termination of the 
contract subject to the situation of the performance and the nature of the contract.609 The General 
Principles of the Civil Law 1986 also stipulates that “a party’s right to claim compensation for 
losses shall not be affected by the alteration or termination of a contract.”610 Damages, termination 
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 This is different to the British position. In U.K., the remedy is avoidance ab initio, so it does not matter 
when the insurer avoid the contract as he can always reject the claim whether it arises before or after the 
avoidance. In China, only where the breach of the duty is intentional or the undisclosed matter has an impact 
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of China Governing Foreign-Related Matters (Beijing: the Law Press, 1991). In Hongfeng Company v. Ping 
An Insurance Company, reported in, Li Ping, Bao Xian Fa Xin Shi Yu Li Jie (New Interpretation and the 
Cases of the Insurance Law) (Beijing: Tongxin Publishing House, 2001) 70, the People’s Court awarded 
damage to the insured but did not based on this article. See the details of this case at 170. 
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of the contract, restitution are parallel and compatible remedies, 611  so the insurer’s right to 
termination the contract does not affect the right to claim damages and the insured may also claim 
damages from the insurer against the insurer’s breach of the duty of utmost good faith.612 Although, 
these articles have clarified that the remedy of damage is not precluded only because the insurer 
has the right to terminate the contract, they do not point out the exact ground for the insurance 
parties to claim damage. 
 
ii. Negligence in the Negotiation of the Contract 
 
The approach for the insurance parties to claim damage is the pre-contract duty of good faith in the 
general contract law, 613  the breach of which is called the “negligence in negotiation of the 
contract”.614 The breach of the duty of disclosure is a type of the negligence in negotiation.615 The 
negligence in negotiation entitles the aggrieved party to claim damage if he can prove that the 
other party’s negligence,616 but the damage is restricted to the loss of “reliance interest” only,617 so 
                                                        
611
 However, there are three circumstances where the party who has terminated the contract cannot claim for 
damage. First, if the contract is terminated by mutual agreement of the parties and the agreement has 
exempted the party’s liability in damage, the other party cannot claim damage after the agreement. Second, 
if the termination of the contract is caused by force majeure and either party could be blamed for the 
termination, then either party cannot claim damage from the other party. Finally, if one party’s termination 
of the contract has sufficiently protected his interest, he cannot claim for damage. See Wang Liming, Wei 
Yue Ze Ren Lun (The Obligation of the Breach of the Contract), 2nd ed. (Beijing: China Politics and Law 
University Press, 2003) at 726-727. 
612
 The insurer’s duty of utmost good faith will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
613
 As for the pre-contract duty of good faith in the Contract Law 1999, see also page 38ff., above. 
614
 The pre-contract duty of good faith is the contingent duty of notification, assistance, disclosure, 
protection, care, secrecy, loyalty and so on which the proposed parties to the contract bear to each other 
according to good faith in the course of negotiation of the contract. The breach of such duty is also called the 
“negligence in negotiation of the contact”. See Wang Liming, Wei Yue Ze Ren Lun (The Obligation of the 
Breach of the Contract), 2nd ed. (Beijing: China Politics and Law University Press, 2003) at 767-813; Feng 
Jianping, “Shi Yong Di Yue Guo Shi Ze Ren De Ruan Gan Wen Ti (Some Problems in Applying the 
Liability of the Fault in the Negotiation of the Contract)”, (2000) Issue 8, People’s Justice 18. 
615
 Li Xuelan, “Dui Bao Xian He Tong Gao Zhi Yi Wu De Fa Lv Si Kao (Thoughts on the Duty of 
Disclosure of the Insurance Contract from the Legal Aspect)”, (2003) Issue 5, Zhejiang Xue Kan 147 at 148. 
616
 Although it is called the negligence in negotiation, an intentional misconduct in negotiation a fortiori 
entitles the aggrieved party to claim damage. Articles 42 and 43 of the Contract Law 1999 have enumerated 
some circumstances of the breach of the pre-contract duty. They are all intentional breach of the duty. But it 
is believed there are other forms of breach of the pre-contract duty which may be negligent, so it is generally 
agreed that an actionable breach of pre-contract duty must be at lease negligent. A judge of the Middle 
 142
either party of the insurance contract may claim damage for loss of reliance interest. Although this 
lets the insured get more protection where the insurer breaches the duty of utmost good faith,618 it 
also causes the dangerous potentiality that the insurer would claim a large amount of damage from 
the insured. 619  However, the People’s Court will surely consider whether the damage is 
reasonable620 and by far no case has been reported where an insurer sues damages from the insured 
for the insured’s non-disclosure. 
 
The article which enables the aggrieved party to claim damage for the negligence in the 
negotiation of the contract is article 42 of the Contract Law 1999. 
 
Article 42 “In the making of a contract, the party that falls under any of the following 
circumstances, causing thus loss to the other party, shall be liable to compensate for the 
loss. 
 
“(1) engaging in consultation with malicious intention in name of making a contract; 
                                                                                                                                                                      
People’s Court has listed some other circumstances not enumerated by law. See Lu Tongmin, “Di Yue Guo 
Shi Ze Ren Li Lun Ji Qi Zai Shen Pan Shi Jian Zhong De Ying Yong (Theory of the Fault in the Negotiation 
of the Contract and Its Application in the Trial Practice)”, (1999) Issue 1, Shandong Law Science 46 at 47, 
48; See Feng Jianping, “Shi Yong Di Yue Guo Shi Ze Ren De Ruan Gan Wen Ti (Some Problems in 
Applying the Liability of the Fault in the Negotiation of the Contract)”, (2000) Issue 8, People’s Justice 18 
at 18; Wang Liming, Wei Yue Ze Ren Lun (The Obligation of the Breach of the Contract), 2nd ed. (Beijing: 
China Politics and Law University Press, 2003) at 767-813; Jiang Shuming, “Xian He Tong Yi Wu Ji Wei 
Fan Xian He Tong Yi Wu Zhi Ze Ren Xing Tai Yan Jiu (On the Pre-Contract Duty and the Forms of the 
Obligation of the Breach of the Pre-Contract Duty)”, (2000) Issue 2, Law and Commerce Research 65 at 67. 
617
 See the text accompanying supra note 627. 
618
 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Comparing with the English case: Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. 
v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. 
[1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); affirming [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 (C.A.); reversing [1987] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.), where the insured’s remedy is only to rescind the contract and to recover the premium. 
619
 However, scholars believe that the damage available to the negligence in negotiation is to compensate for 
the reliance interest of the aggrieved party, instead of the interest that would be gained through the 
performance of the contract. 
620
 For example, the court will consider whether the termination of the contract has been reasonably 
sufficient to protect the insurer’s interest. See supra note 611. In addition, it seems that the insurer cannot 
claim damage for the compensation he has paid or is liable to pay to the insured on ground that the negligent 
non-disclosure does not have an impact on the risk; to hold otherwise would directly go against article 16 of 
the Insurance Law and article 223 of the Maritime Code. 
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“(2) concealing intentionally key facts related to the making of the contract or providing 
false information; or 
 
“(3) taking any other act contrary to the principle of good faith.”621 
 
This article applies to all kinds of contracts. It clearly stipulates that the breach of the pre-contract 
good faith results in damage.622 However, whether the breach of the duty of disclosure in the 
insurance law belongs to “any other act contrary to the principle of good faith” largely depends on 
how the article is interpreted. 
 
The phrase “any other act contrary to the principle of good faith” is very obscure. One 
interpretation is that any other act contrary to the principle of good faith only refers to those acts 
similar to the other two acts listed in section (1) and (2) which are both acts with ill intention,623 
and hence “any other act” should only means acts with ill intention. The other view takes that ill 
intention is not indispensable to constitute the breach of the pre-contract duty of good faith and 
merely negligence is enough. The second is the prevailing view in China. 624  If the second 
                                                        
621
 Translated by the author with reference to the Office of the Law Commission of the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress, trans., Laws of the People’s Republic of China [1999] (Beijing: The Law 
Press, 1999). 
622
 The words “the party … shall be liable to compensate for the loss” in Chinese means that that party 
should assume the liability in damage. For the meaning of intention and negligence, see page 124 and page 
126, below. For the detailed discuss on the damage available to the breach of the duty of disclosure, see page 
140ff., below (the insured’s breach) & page 170ff., below (the insurer’s breach). 
623
 See The Compilers of the Book, Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa Shi Yao (The 
Paraphrase of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: Qi Ye Guan Li Press, 1999) at 
131. 
624
 Hu Kangsheng, ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa Shi Yi (The Paraphrase of the 
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: The Law Press, 1999) at 73. Many scholars call 
the breach of the pre-contract duty of good faith as “the negligence in contract negotiation”. See e.g. Liang 
Huixing, “Guan Yu Zhong Guo Tong Yi He Tong Fa Cao An Di San Gao (On the Third Draft of the Unified 
Contract Law of China)”, (1997) Issue 2, Legal Science 47 at 48; Wen Jingfang, “Xi Di Yue Guo Shi Ze 
Ren De Ren Ding Ji Ze Ren Xing Shi (Analysis of the Recognization and the Liability of the Negligence in 
the Contract Negotiation)”, (1999) Issue 3, Journal of Legal Science 27; Lu Tongming, “Di Yue Guo Shi Ze 
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interpretation is right, the duty of disclosure of the insurance law will be regarded as the 
embodiment of the principle of good faith of the general contract law in the special area of 
insurance. That is to say, the breach of the duty of disclosure in itself constitutes the negligence in 
the “negotiation of the contract” so that the remedy of damage can be applied. This is significantly 
different to the position of the law of U.K.625 where the breach of the duty of utmost good faith 
entitles the aggrieved party only the option to rescind the contract.626 
 
iii. Scope of Damage 
 
It is generally believed that the damage is restricted to the loss of reliance interest, which includes 
the loss of the opportunity to contract with a third party627 and all kinds of expenses directly 
arising from the negotiation. For the latter type of damage, the insurer may directly deduct the 
commission charge and other reasonable expenses in the making of the contract from the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ren Li Lun Ji Qi Zai Shen Pan Shi Jian Zhong De Ying Yong (Theory of the Liability of the Negligence in 
the Contract Negotiation and Its Application in the Trial)”, (1999) Issue 1, Shandong Legal Science 46 at 47. 
625
 In U.K., the law does not recognise that the parties should observe good faith in negotiation of a contract. 
Lord Ackner observed, in Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 A.C. 128 at 138, that the courts are ill-equipped to 
determine whether a proper reason existed for the termination of negotiations and are therefore not prepared 
to recognise the validity of an obligation to negotiate in good faith. “Such a firm rejection of the contract to 
negotiate illustrates once again the triumph of freedom of contract reasoning and its continuing influence on 
English law.” Paula Giliker, Pre-Contractual Liability in English and French Law (Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) at 34-35. However, although the law of U.K. does not recognise good faith as an 
autonomous legal doctrine, a wide range of doctrines are relied in U.K. which have a similar function as the 
doctrine of good faith in civil law countries. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, 
European Law: the Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 172-173. 
626
 See, for example, Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. Banque 
Kerser Ullmann S.A. v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); affirming [1988] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 513 (C.A.); reversing [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.). 
627
 The opportunity cost occurs where A had had the opportunity to contract with a third party, but A at last 
chose to contract with B due to his reliance on B. most scholars in China support the view that the party in 
breach of the pre-contract duty of good faith should compensate for the other party’s loss of opportunity, if 
that opportunity really existed. See Wen Jingfang, “Xi Di Yue Guo Shi Ze Ren De Ren Ding Ji Ze Ren Xing 
Shi (Analysis of the Recognization and the Liability of the Negligence in the Contract Negotiation)”, (1999) 
Issue 3, Journal of Legal Science 27 at 28; Feng Jincai, “Di Yue Guo Shi Ze Ren De Si Fa Shi Yong (The 
Judicial Application of the Obligation of Negligence in Negotiation)”, (2003) Issue 2, Theory Exploration 
81 at 82; Hu Kangsheng, ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa Shi Yi (The Paraphrase of the 
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: The Law Press, 1999) at 73. But see Wang 
Liming, Wei Yue Ze Ren Lun (The Obligation of the Breach of the Contract), 2nd ed. (Beijing: China 
Politics and Law University Press, 2003) at 814-815. 
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premiums that should be returned. 628  Usually the expenses should not exceed the premiums 
otherwise they cannot be regarded as reasonable. A prudent insurer should consider all kinds of 
reasonable expenses before framing the premium rates so the premium should be higher than all 
the expenses otherwise there would be no profit. 
 
iv. Conclusion of Damage and Suggestions 
 
Therefore, unlike the law of U.K., the remedies available in China are not restricted to termination 
only. This significantly increases the choices of remedy in the Chinese insurance law and is a 
superior improvement on the English law position in the sense that damage is far more useful to 
the insured when the insurer breaches the duty.629 Therefore, there is no need to change the nature 
of the duty of utmost good faith to be an implied term of the contract so as to allow the insured to 
claim damages.630  
                                                        
628
 In cases of intentional non-disclosure, the insurer can retain the premiums so there is no question of 
deduction. Where the non-disclosure is innocent, innocence act will not entitle damages according to article 
42 of the Contract Law 1999. The most disputable question is: will negligent non-disclosure entitle the 
insurer to deduct commission charge from the premiums that should be refunded? According to theory of 
pre-contract duty, the insurer is entitled to claim damages. Since the insurer owes premium refund to the 
insured and the insured owes damages for commission charge and other reasonable expenses to the insurer, 
the insurer may offset the debt according to article 99 of the Contract Law 1999. (Article 99: If the parties 
mutually owe matured liabilities, and if the varieties and quality of the targeted matters of the liabilities are 
the same, either party may offset its liabilities against those of the other party, except for liabilities that 
cannot be offset according to the provisions of laws or according to the nature of the contract.) If the insurer 
could not deduct from the premium refund, he must bring an act against the insured. This would increase the 
quantity of litigation. 
629
 Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. 
v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 (C.A.); [1987] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.). 
630
 Under the Insurance Contract Law 1984 (Australia), the duty of utmost good faith is an implied term of 
the contract. Section 13: “The duty of the utmost good faith: A contract of insurance is a contract based on 
the utmost good faith and there is implied in such a contract a provision requiring each party to it to act 
towards the other party, in respect of any matter arising under or in relation to it, with the utmost good 
faith.” The Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth) still insists the traditional nature of utmost good 
faith that it is a statutory duty. Section 23: “A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the 
utmost good faith, and, if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided 
by the other party.” But it is doubtful how long would the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth) goes 
on insisting this position. The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has recommended making good 
faith an implied term of the contract. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 (Sydney: The Commission, 2001) at 10.143-10.150. 
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However, it would be dangerous if the insurer is able to claim damage from the insured for even a 
minor negligence in his performance of disclosure, as few people would like to buy insurance if he 
is potentially faced with a large amount of claim of damage. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
insurance law of China should have a “no other remedies” provision like the Insurance Contract 
Act 1984 (Australia), 631  stipulating that the insurer is not entitled to any remedy other than 
provided by the Insurance Law and the Maritime Code in relation to the duty of disclosure, 
whether or not that remedy is provided by the contract632 or by any other law.633 If such a provision 
is added, the insurer’s remedy would not include damage and the insured will be safe. 
 
12. Refund of Premiums 
 
After the termination of the insurance contract, the insurer may retain the premiums if the non-
disclosure is intentional. The intentional non-disclosure is considered as a fraudulent behavior 
which would highly endanger the insurance business so it is necessary to forfeit the premiums as 
penalty. The position on intentional non-disclosure is the same in both marine and non-marine 
insurance,634 and it in harmony with the common law.635 
 
                                                        
631
 Section 33 (No other remedies): The provisions of this Division are exclusive of any right that the insurer 
has otherwise than under this Act in respect of a failure by the insured to disclose a matter to the insurer 
before the contract was entered into and in respect of a misrepresentation or incorrect statement. 
632
 The standard insurance contracts in China have not had such a clause which enables the insurer to claim 
damage or avail to other remedies stricter than what has been provided by the insurance law, but this cannot 
be precluded in the future. To prevent the dishonest insurer from misusing autonomy of contract, it is 
necessary to have such a “no more remedy provision” in the insurance law. 
633
 It is also necessary to have a “no other remedy provision” to prevent the administrative regulations or the 
local regulations from enlarging the remedies that the insurer may utilise.  
634
 See article 17 of the Insurance Law and article 223 of the Maritime Code. 
635
 Section 84(3)(a) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.): Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the 
insurer as from the commencement of the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that there has been no 
fraud or illegality on the part of the assured; but if the risk is not apportionable, and has once attached, the 
premium is not returnable. 
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As to negligent non-disclosure in non-marine insurance, article 17 of the Insurance Law stipulates 
that the insurer “may” refund the premiums. The phrase “may” seems to suggest that the insurer 
has the option to decide whether to refund or not. However, the phrase should not be so interpreted. 
The purpose of the remedy for non-disclosure is to release the insurer from the misevaluated risks 
rather than to punish the insured who has made slight error. In addition, if the premiums were not 
refundable whether or not the breach is intentional or negligent, article 17 would not have iterated 
it separately in paragraph 4 and 5. A case of non-marine insurance also supports this position, in 
which the judge stated that the insurer should refund the premiums if the insurer cannot prove that 
the misrepresentation is intentional.636 Most of time, the termination of the insurance contract only 
affects the part of the contract that has not been performed, so the insured should be regarded as 
covered before the termination. Therefore, the refund of premiums should be prorated to reflect the 
proportion of the period after the termination to the whole insured period.637 
 
The Maritime Code does not stipulate whether the premium is refundable for unintentional non-
disclosure. Wang Pengnan, in the 1st edition of his textbook, suggested that the premium should be 
refunded to the insured because article 17of the Insurance Law should apply on this issue since the 
                                                        
636
 Technology Import and Export Company of Hubei Province v. PICC Hubei Branch [2002] E Min Si 
Zong Zi, No. 11. This is the final judgment by the People’s High Court of Hubei Province. In this case, it 
was held that the policy was avoided because the insured lacked of insurable interest which was the main 
reason for the judgement, but there was also misrepresentation by the insured. The judge stated that “since 
the insurer could not prove that the misrepresentation was intentional, the premiums should be refunded to 
the insured.” 
637
 See Wang Guiguo & John MO, eds., The Chinese Law (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 714. 
The proposed judicial interpretation of the Insurance Law also has similar rules. See article 6 of the 
Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance Dispute 
Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. Compared with the “none or full” return of premiums under 
section 84(3) (a) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.). This may contribute to the difference between 
the remedies of rescission and termination.  Under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) once the contract 
is avoid, it is avoided ab initio, and the insurer is not liable for any loss. On the contrary, in the Chinese law, 
the insurer can only terminate the contract for negligent non-disclosure and he is still liable for the loss 
before the termination unless the loss is attributed to the non-disclosure. In certain sense, the insured has 
been covered before the termination, so it would be unfair if an insurer had to return the whole premium.  
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Maritime Code has not regulated on it.638 However, in the 2nd edition, he changed the opinion, 
saying that the Maritime Code should have made it clear that the premium is not refundable and 
the Maritime Code should be so amended in the future.639 There seems to be no reason why Wang 
suggested making the premium not refundable in marine insurance and making the position 
different from that of non-marine insurance. The confiscation of the premium in intentional non-
disclosure is to punish those who commit deceit. There should not be punitive remedy in 
unintentional non-disclosure.640 
 




Increase of the premium is a remedy where the insurer may collect additional premium from the 
insured. The additional premium is calculated by what the insurer would have charged minus what 
the insurer actually charged. This is different to the principle of proportionality adopted in 
France.641  The approach of increasing premium also faces the difficulty that the principle of 
proportionality has faced, i.e., the difficulty in calculating what the premium would have been. 
However, the disputes as to what the premium would have been may not be as many under the 
                                                        
638
 Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 1st ed. 
(Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 1996) at 80. 
639
 Wang Pengnan, Hai Shang Bao Xian He Tong Fa Xiang Lun (On Marine Insurance Contract Law), 2nd 
ed. (Dalian: Dalian Maritime University Press, 2003) at 82. Wang did not give reasons why he had changed 
the opinion. 
640
 See also Wang Guiguo & John MO, eds., The Chinese Law (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 
714. 
641
 Under the remedy of proportionality, which is discussed in more detail at page 151, below, the insurer is 
entitled to reduce his liability to pay the proportion of the claim which the actual premium paid bears to the 
premium which would have been payable if the material facts had been disclosed. It may be more 
comprehensible to show the difference with formulations. Under the increase premium rule in the Chinese 
law:  
The additional premium = the would-be premium – the actual premium 
Under the proportionality rule in the French law: 
The insurer’s liability = the claim * (the actual premium / the would-be premium) 
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approach of increasing premium as the principle of proportionality because, under the latter 
principle, a minor difference in the would-be premium will result in a great difference in the 
liability that the insurer should bear, while under the former approach, a minor difference will 
readily be compromised between the parties. 
 
ii. Marine Insurance 
 
The Maritime Code allows the marine insurer to claim for additional premiums instead of 
terminating the contract when the insurer has found the non-disclosure unintentionally committed 
by the insured.642 Where the peril insured against does not occur during the whole insured period, 
or where the insurer does not want to spoil the business relationship with the insured, the remedy 
of termination or rescission of the contract will not be too much value in his eyes. The right to 
claim for additional premiums becomes very useful in these circumstances. The amount of the 
additional premiums that the insurer can claim is the balance of the premiums which should have 
been paid had there been no non-disclosure minus the premiums actually paid. If the insured 
refuses to pay the additional premiums, the insurer can sue him and ask the court to enforce the 
claim. The remedy of additional premiums is not compatible with the other remedies. If the 
contract is terminated, any additional premiums are no longer available. 
 
The Maritime Code does not stipulate whether the insurer can claim for additional premiums 
instead of terminating the contract where the non-disclosure is intentional, but it can be reasonably 
concluded from article 223(2) that the insurer has the right to claim for additional premiums. An 
international breach of the duty of disclosure is of much graveness than a negligent one, and the 
penalty to the former should therefore be more Spartan than that of the latter. Therefore, a penalty 
to the negligent breach definitely may apply to the intentional breach, though the 
                                                        
642
 Article 223(2) of the Maritime Code 
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counterproposition is not necessarily true. If the option for additional premiums is a better remedy 
for the insurer in certain circumstances, the law should not deter the insurer to do so; the insurer 
himself is the best judge for his own interest after all. 
 
iii. Non-Marine Insurance 
 
Claim for additional premium is not available in non-marine insurance, but it is odd that the right 
to claim additional premium is not available in non-marine insurance contract while it is available 
in marine insurance contract. The calculation of the amount of the notionally “would-be” premium 
depends much on a system of fixed tariffs. In life insurance and certain areas of general insurance, 
it is relatively easier to establish such a system; on the other side, the marine insurance premium is 
often set on ad hoc basis. 
 
iv. The Law of Australian on This Point 
 
The remedy to claim additional premiums has been adopted in Australia. The Insurance Contract 
Act 1984 (Australia) provides that the insurer may reduce the liability under the insurance contract 
to the amount that would place the insurer in a position in which the insurer would have been if the 
breach of the duty of disclosure had not occurred.643 This Act applies to non-marine insurance 
contracts. As to marine insurance contracts, the Australian Law Reform Commission also made 
similar suggestions to the reform of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Commonwealth).644 Under 
these provisions, the insurer can deduct the balance between the actual premium, deductible, or 
                                                        
643
 Section 28(3) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984. 
644
 26B (3) (b), Schedule 1, Marine Insurance Amendment Bill 2001. See Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, ALRC Report No. 91 (Sydney: The Commission, 
2001) at 366. The difference between the Marine Insurance Amendment Bill 2001 and the Insurance 
Contracts Act 1884 is that: the former specified the items that could be varied to reflect the position that the 
insurer would have been if the duty of disclosure had not been breached; these items are premium, 
deductible or excess. 
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excess, and the notionally “would-be” premium, deductible, or excess, as the case may be, from 
the compensation payable to the insured. 
 
There are two differences between Australian law and The Chinese law, and each difference 
suggests a virtue of the respective law. The Australian law excels in that it does not limit the 
deduction within premium only. The Chinese law has overlooked the possibility that the insurer 
may have demanded other terms than the premium. On the other hand, the Australian law falls 
short of making the remedy only a “shield”, namely that the insurer can only deduct the balance 
from the compensation payable to the insured. The criticism has that “An incentive is created for 
insureds not to disclose or to misrepresent material facts. By omitting to disclose or by 
misrepresenting, they obtain a reduction in premium… Only in the unlikely event of a claim is the 
additional premium ‘paid’. The penalty for misrepresentation is trivial.”645 As a result, the honest 
insured will pay for the dishonest. The Chinese law allows the insurer to exercise the right 
positively, namely that the insurer can claim for additional premium even where no compensation 
has been alleged, therefore the insured who breaches the duty will pay for his own fault. The 
differences seem to suggest that the two countries’ law should learn from each other. 
 
14. Misrepresentation of Age and the Principle of Proportionality 
 
In China, the principle of proportionality applies only in the misrepresentation of age in life 
insurance. It is stipulated in article 54 of the Insurance Law,646 which shall prevail to the general 
                                                        
645
 Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, ALRC Report No. 20 (Canberra: Australian 
Govt. Pub. Service, 1982) at para. 193. 
646
 Article 54: (1) If the age of the insured declared by applicant is not true to fact, and the actual age fails to 
be in conformity with the age limit as agreed upon in the contract, the insurer may terminate the contract, 
and return the insurance premium to the applicant after deducting the handling fees, however, the contract 
which has been served for more than two years into since its conclusion shall be excluded. (2) If the age of 
the insured declared by the applicant is not true to fact, which hereby causes the applicant paying an 
insurance premium less than the insurance premium payable, the insurer shall have the right to correct it and 
demand the applicant to make up the insurance premium, or pay the insurance benefit according to the 
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remedies available to the breach of the duty of disclosure.647 Article 54(1) provides that, for the 
misrepresentation of age, the insurer may terminate the contract only when the actual age does not 
accord with the age limit as agreed in the contract and he may only exercise this right within two 
years from the conclusion of the contract. Article 54(2) provides that where the insurer cannot 
terminate the contract due to the previous subsection, what he is entitled is an option that he can 
either claim for additional premium648 or he can adjust his liability to pay the proportion of the 
claim which the actual premium bears to the premium which would have been. 
 
The law of U.K. does not have the principle of proportionality in the duty of disclosure. The 
principle of proportionality in France means that the insurer is obliged to pay the proportion of the 
claim which the actual premium paid bears to the premium which would have been payable if the 
material facts had been disclosed.649 The main defect of the principle of proportionality is the 
difficulty in proving the notional would-be premium, or what the insurer would have charged had 
he known the truth.650 Due to this defect, both the Law Commission of U.K. and the Australian 
                                                                                                                                                                      
percentage of the actually paid insurance premium to the insurance premium payable. (3) If the age of the 
insured declared by the applicant is not true to fact, which hereby causes the applicant paying an insurance 
premium more than the insurance premium payable, the insurer shall return the insurance premium collected 
in excess to the applicant. 
647
 Article 54(2) of the Insurance Law is special rule compared with the general remedies available to the 
breach of the duty of disclosure because it is specifies the remedy in the special cases of misrepresentation 
of age in life insurance contract. 
648
 Here the additional premium is calculated in the same way as mentioned at page 148, above. 
649
 Code des Assurances (1930-76), Article 113-9. A more complex set of provisions was adopted in the 
Proposed European Economic Community (EEC) Directive on the Co-ordination of Legislative, Statutory 
and Administrative Provisions relating to Insurance Contracts, a directive aimed at harmonisation of the 
laws of the members of the EEC, where the proportionality does not apply to fraudulent breach of the duty 
of disclosure. See Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, ALRC Report No. 20 
(Canberra: Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1982) at para. 188. 
650
 It is relatively easier to calculate the would-be premium in the area where there is a system of fixed tariffs, 
such as in life insurance. The calculation would be much more difficult to make in areas where the risks are 
unusual ones or where the premiums are set on an ad hoc basis due to competitive pressures. It is the same 
difficult where the undisclosed fact was connected with a moral risk. In addition, where the insurer would 
not have accepted the risk at all, it is almost impossible to calculate what the premium would be. There is 
also the danger that insurer might abuse a system based on their own recalculation of the premium. See U.K., 
the Law Commission, Insurance Law – Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty, Law Com. No. 104, Cmnd 
8064 (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) at para. 4.8; Australian Law Reform Commission, Insurance Contracts, 
ALRC Report No. 20 (Canberra: Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1982) at paras. 189-190. 
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Law Reform Commission have rejected the principle of proportionality as a proposed law reform 
of their countries. 
 
Although the principle of proportionality suffers from the defects mentioned above, the difficulty 
in calculating what the premium does not pose a major problem in the Chinese law, because the 
principle of proportionality here only applies to the misrepresentation of age in life insurance. In 
this area there is a system of fixed tariff, and the effect of the misrepresentation of age on the risk 
is easy to calculate.651 However, the principle of proportionality should not apply to intentional 
misrepresentation of age and the law should allow the insurer to terminate the contract for 
intentional misrepresentation. 
 
15. Summary of the Insurer’s Remedies under the Chinese Law 
 
Under the Chinese law, the insurer is entitled to terminate the contract when and only when the 
non-disclosure is either fraudulent or material. Termination of the contract has the following 
effects: first, the insurer is no longer liable for any loss occurring after the termination; second, he 
is not liable for the loss occurring before the termination if and as far as the undisclosed fact has an 
impact (in marine insurance) or a grave impact (in non-marine insurance) on the occurrence of the 
loss; finally, the premiums must be returned unless the non-disclosure is fraudulent. Termination 
takes effect upon notice in written. The right of termination should be confined to certain period. 
Damages are available for non-disclosure on ground of principles in the general contract law and 
the civil law, but it is suggested that the insurance law should restrict the insurer from availing to 
the right to claim damages. The insurer may also choose to increase the premium in lieu of 
terminating the contract in marine insurance. It is argued that the insurer should be entitled to the 
                                                        
651
 Similarly, the Insurance Contract Act 1984 (Australia) has adopted the principle of proportionality in life 
insurance. See section 29(4) of this act. 
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same right in non-marine insurance. In life insurance, the insurer cannot terminate the contract in 
very limited circumstances; instead, he can adjust his liability to pay the proportion of the claim 
which the actual premium bears to the premium which would have been. In general, there are 
various remedies for non-disclosure under the Chinese law and this has made the law more 
flexible. 
 
Table: Part of the Insurer’s Right against Non-Disclosure under the Chinese Law 
 
The nature of the contract Marine insurance Non-marine insurance 












Whether the insurer has right to 
terminate the contract 
Yes Yes Yes Conditional652 
Whether the insurer is liable for 
loss occurring before the 
termination 
No 
Yes, unless there is 
an impact. 
No 
Yes, unless the 
impact is grave. 
Whether the insurer can retain 
the premiums 
Yes No Yes No 
Whether the insurer can claim 
for additional premium 






                                                        
652
 See page 131ff., above. 
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Chapter 7. The Insurer’s Duty of Utmost Good Faith 
 
I. Insurer’s Duty of Disclosure under the Common Law 
 
1. The Common Law History of the Insurer’s Duty of Disclosure 
 
The principle of utmost good faith was innately a reciprocal duty imposed on both parties to the 
insurance contract. The insurer was under the same duty as the insured to disclose everything 
material to the insured in concluding the insurance contract.653 Lord Mansfield, in the leading case 
of Carter v. Boehm,654 observed that: 
 
“Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other 
into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary.”655 “The 
policy would be equally void, against the underwriter, if he concealed; as if he insured a 
ship on her voyage, which he privately knew to be arrived; and an action would lie to 
recover the premium.”656 
 
Section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) also confirms the reciprocity of the principle 
of utmost good faith: 
 
                                                        
653
 See Poh Chu Chai, Principles of Insurance Law, 5th ed. (Singapore: Butterworths, 2000) at 128. 
654
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
655
 Ibid at 1910. 
656
 Ibid at 1909, emphasis added. 
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“A contract of maritime insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if 
the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the 
other party.”657 
 
Once again, the reciprocity of the principle was iterated in the Westgate case658 the trial judge, the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords all approved that the duty of disclosure is reciprocal, but 
the court held that the remedy available to the insured is restricted to rescission of the contract 
only. 659  In another case of Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association 
(Bermuda) (The Good Luck),660  the court reiterated the reciprocity of the duty of disclosure, 
although it was not necessary to do so.661 
 
The history of the development of the principle of utmost good faith has clearly shown that the 
duty of disclosure is reciprocal. Nobody would have any doubt about the nature of reciprocity of 
the duty. However, the duty of disclosure by the insurer, apart from the above cases and a few 
other cases,662 has rarely emerged in English insurance case law. The duty of disclosure had almost 
unilaterally rested upon the insured. The tendency was also reflected in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 (U.K.), which defines the insured’s duty of disclosure in through via four sections, while it 
                                                        
657
 Emphasis added. 
658
 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 (H.L.); affirming [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 (C.A.); reversing [1987] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.). 
659
 The trial judge’s decision that the insured can claim damage for the insurer’s breach of the duty of 
disclosure is overruled by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
660
 [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (H.L.); reversing [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 238 (C.A.); reversing [1992] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 540 (Note) (Comm. Ct.). 
661
 The House of Lords held that the plaintiff assignee was entitled to the damages from the defendant 
insurance company but not on the ground of utmost good faith. ([1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 at 203-205) The 
Court of Appeal held that the insurer owes a duty to disclose to the insured but not to the assignee. ([1989] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 238 at 261-264) 
662
 There are tendency of the nature of reciprocity of the principle of utmost good faith in a few other cases: 
Re Bradley and Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society [1912] 1 K.B. 415; Horry v. Tate and Lyle 
Refineries [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 416. See also Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract 
Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 182. 
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only indicates the reciprocity of the duty via one section.663 This tendency could be attributable to 
the fact that, when the rule was first applied to marine insurance cases, “underwriting was at its 
infancy, communication facilities were poor, and, in the nature of things, the one who was often in 
a better position to ascertain the special knowledge turned out invariably to be the insured rather 
than the insurer.”664 Now the situations have changed much. An insurance company usually has its 
own data collecting framework which is so powerful that it often helps the insurer to gain some 
information unilateral known by the insurer. Therefore, it seems to be more important now to 
accentuate the insurer’s duty of disclosure for the sake of fair dealing and good faith. 
 
2. The Scope of the Insurer’s Duty of Disclosure under the Law of U.K. 
 
Three questions must be answered inevitably in order to obtain a clear scope of the duty. (1) What 
should the insurer disclose? Namely, does the scope of disclosure extend to both actual and 
constructive knowledge? (2) What is the test for materiality? (3) What is the test for inducement? 
As a whole, these questions could be incorporated by one question, i.e., “Is the scope of the 
insurer’s duty of disclosure the same as that of the insured’s?” 
 
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) offers little assistance in defining the scope of the insurer’s 
duty of disclosure. In Carter v. Boehm,665 Lord Mansfield seemed to suggest a narrow view that 
the insurer’s duty is “restricted to the facts as to the risk which would induce the insured either not 
                                                        
663
 Namely, section 17 which stipulates that “if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the 
contract may be avoided by the other party.” 
664
 Hwee Ying Yeo, “Uberrima Fides - Reciprocity of Duty in Insurance Contracts” (1988) 2 R.I.B.L. 271 at 
272-273; M. Parkington, ed., MacGillivray & Parkington on Insurance Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1981) at paras. 699-700. See also John Birds & Norma J. Hird, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law, 5th 
ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 102-103. 
665
 (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
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to insurer or to insure for a lower premium.”666 In the first instance of the Westgate case, Steyn J. 
adumbrated a rough working definition, which was intended to be refined through future cases: 
 
“… In considering the ambit of the duty of the disclosure of the insurers, the starting point 
seems to me as follows: in a proper case it will cover matters particularly within the 
knowledge of the insurers, which the insurers know that the insured is ignorant of and 
unable to discover but which are material in the sense of being calculated to influence the 
decision of the insured to conclude the contract of insurance. In considering whether the 
duty of disclosure is activated in a given case a court ought, in my judgment, to test any 
provisional conclusion by asking the simple question: did good faith and fair dealing 
require a disclosure?”667 
 
Steyn J.’s definition of the scope of the insurer’s duty of disclosure is quite broad, but it is still 
unsatisfactory. First, it is not clear whether the insurer need to disclose what he is deemed to know 
or what he should know in the ordinary course of his business. Second, the additional requirement 
of “good faith” and “fair dealing” amount to gilding the lily and the variable meanings of “good 
faith” and “fair dealing” would cause a great deal of dispute.668 In addition, according to Steyn J’s 
test for materiality, a circumstance is material if it is “calculated” to influence the decision of the 
insured. “Calculated to influence” would mean that the influence needs not to be decisive in the 
sense that the insured at least would not have had the same contract had he known the truth. This 
seems to embrace the want-to-know test which is the current law on the insured’s duty of 
                                                        
666
 Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 
1996) at 193. Park got this conclusion from the example given by Lord Mansfield that a ship arrives safe. 
This is a fact that diminishes the risk insured against. 
667
 [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Comm. Ct.) at 94. 
668
 For comment on the additional requirement of “good faith” and “fair dealing”, whether these two phrases 
apply conjunctively or disjunctively, and what are the meanings of the phrases, see Hwee Ying Yeo, 
“Uberrima Fides – Reciprocity of Duty in Insurance Contracts” [1988] 2 R.I.B.L 271 at 284-285. 
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disclosure but which has been highly criticized to be bad law.669 The use of “calculated” would 
undesirably extend the duty of disclosure.670 
 
The Court of Appeal offered an alternative yardstick, -- the minimum scope of the insurer’s duty 
of disclosure, a test which the House of Lords endorsed: 
 
The duty falling upon the insurer must at least extend to disclosing all facts known to him 
which are material either to the nature of the risk sought to be covered or the 
recoverability of a claim under the policy which a prudent insured would take into account 
in deciding whether or not to place the risk for which he seeks cover with that insurer.671 
 
The Court of Appeal wisely defined what is surely within the scope of the insurer’s disclosure 
while leaving the question open for future cases to complement the scope of the insurer’s duty of 
disclosure. It is also important that the Court has pointed out the core of the insurer’s duty of 
disclosure, i.e., the recoverability of a claim under the policy which is the most concerned 
information to the insured.672 In the Court’s definition, there are still two points unclear. The first 
is whether the insurer should disclose what he is deemed to know. The second is whether the 
scope of the material facts is limited to those related to the nature of the risk sought to be covered 
or the recoverability of a claim under the policy. However, these could be completed by future 
cases; after all, the Court just stipulated that the duty at least extend to those facts within the actual 
                                                        
669
 See the decisive test & “want to know test”, at page 89ff., above. 
670
 See H. Y. Yeo, “Of Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts” (1991) 11 LS 
131 at 134; Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. 
Co., 1996) at 195. 
671
 [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 at 545(C.A.). [Emphasis added.] 
672
 See also: H. Y. Yeo, “Of Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts” (1991) 
11 LS 131 at 136, where Yeo observed that “there exists ‘rather different reasons for which the insured and 
the insurer require the protection of full disclosure’… On one hand, the insurer is, in the main, concerned 
with matters that will directly affect the risk… On the other hand, the insured, once he has decided that it 
would be prudent to pass the risk on to an insurer, is naturally less concerned with the risk itself but is 
instead more interested in whether he can recover his losses in the event of any contingencies.” 
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knowledge of the insurer. On the whole, the Court’s definition is a mirror image of the duty 
imposed on the insured.673 
 
3. The Remedy for the Breach of the Duty of Disclosure under the Law of U.K. 
 
The remedy for the insurer’s breach of the duty of disclosure is rescission of the contract and 
return of the premium. 674  This position has been consistent 675  since Lord Mansfield. It was 
unsuccessfully challenged only by Steyn J. in the Westgate case.676 The remedy of rescission is 
useful where the insured has been misled, due to ignorance of certain circumstances which the 
insurer should have disclosed, to buy an insurance which he does not need, but it would be of little 
help where the insured becomes unable to recover his loss. 
 
For Lord Mansfield, the insurer’s duty of disclosure is aimed at protecting the insured from being 
misled into a needless insurance contract. This implication is illustrated by the example he gave: 
an underwriter has insured a ship on her voyage which the underwriter privately knows that the 
ship has arrived safe; if the underwriter conceals this matter from the insured, he is in breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith.677 It is observed that Lord Mansfield considered the insurer’s duty of 
disclosure restricted to the facts which would induce the insured either not to insure or to insure 
                                                        
673
 The degree of influence, according to the Court, is also the pure influence test. However, “taking into 
account” is better than “calculated to influence” (the phrase used by Steyn J). 
674
 “Insurance – Utmost Good Faith – Breach – Remedies – Statement of Truth Clause”, Comment [2003] 
9:3 J.I.M.L. 220 at 222. 
675
 For example, see Glasgow Assurance Corp. v. William Symondson & Co. (1911) 16 Com.Cas. 109 at 121, 
where Scrutton J. stated that the only remedy was avoidance. However, this dictum was clearly obiter, 
although it was relied upon by the Court of Appeal in the Westgate case in support of their decision. (John 
Birds & Norma J. Hird, Birds’ Modern Insurance Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) at 128, 
note 80.) 
676
 Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.? sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. 
v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 69 (Com. Ct.). 
677
 Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 at 1909. 
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for a lower premium.678 Therefore, the insured’s right in such circumstances is the rescission of the 
insurance contract and recovery the premium. It is possible that, in Lord Mansfield view, since the 
insurer’s duty of utmost good faith would arise only in these kinds of circumstances, the sole 
remedy of rescission of the insurance contract is adequate for the insured to protect his right. 
 
The question of remedy was recently fully discussed in the Westgate case. The House of Lords at 
last denied the remedy of damage. According to them, the only available remedy to both the 
insured and the insurer in the case of breach of the duty of utmost good faith is rescission of the 
contract at the option of the innocent party.679 However, the reasons why damage should not be 
awarded, which were given by the Court of Appeal and agreed with by the House of Lords, are not 
convincing.680 In fact, rescission is only efficient for the insurer; for the insured, it is far from 
enough in some circumstances. Where the insured becomes unable to recover his loss due to the 
non-disclosure of the insurer, what the insured need is damage. The following discussion on the 
reform of Chinese insurance law will suggest some more remedies for the insurer’s breach of the 
duty of utmost good faith. 
 
II. The Insurer’s Duty of Utmost Good Faith under China Law 
 
1. The Background of China 
 
The insurance contract is a standard contract unilaterally drafted by the insurer beforehand. Most 
of the insureds have not much muscle to change the terms of the contract; they can only accept or 
reject the contract as a whole and actually they have no choice but to accept the contract as far as 
                                                        
678Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 
1996) at 193. 
679
 Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 377 at 387-388. 
680
 Discussed in more detail at page 114ff., above. 
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they want their lives or properties ensured. Moreover, the individual insured can seldom 
understand the whole contract which is full of legal and insurance glossaries.681 Therefore, most of 
the time, an insurance contracts cannot be considered to be a contract freely entered into by the 
insured. It is especially so in China as in the most places of China there is only one insurance 
company available. 682  In addition, it has been discussed by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on the problem of agents of insurance companies misleading the 
insured to enter into insurance contract with some insurance companies even abetting the agents in 
misleading the insured.683 Therefore, it is very important to protect the insured from being misled, 
and this is the task of the law on the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith. The insurer’s disclosure 
would help the insured, especially those without much knowledge of insurance, to decide whether 
to buy the insurance. 
 
2. Introduction of the Insurer’s Duty of Utmost Good Faith under China Law 
 
                                                        
681
 For example, in Guardian Insurance Co v. Underwood Constructions Pty (1974) 48 A.L.J.R. 307 at 308, 
Mason J. described a policy as a “jumble of ill-assorted documents expressed in the distinctive style which 
insurance companies have made their own.” In Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher [1989] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 331 (H.L.), Lord Bridge of Harwich commented on a Lloyd’s reinsurance policy in the following 
terms:”… the only people who can expect to profit from the ambiguities of the present form … are the 
lawyers.” See Julie-Anne Tarr, Disclosure and Concealment in Consumer Insurance Contracts (London: 
Cavendish, 2002) at 1, in note 2. Tarr also analyses in details on the unevaluability of the terms of the 
insurance contract from economics view. See Julie-Anne Tarr, ibid, at 13-20. 
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former occupied 73.74% income of the national property insurance market and the latter occupied 57.05% 
income of the national life insurance market. See “2001 Nian Zhong Guo Bao Xian Shi Chang Bao Fei Shou 
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Tong Xun (Forum Newsletter), December 10, 2002, online: China Reform Forum 
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 The Report of the Legal Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Amendment of “Bill of 
Amendment of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft)”, suggestion 3 and 4, in Hu 
Jihua, gen. ed., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Bao Xian Fa Shi Yi Ji Shi Yong Zhi Nan (The 
Paraphrase and Practical Guide of the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: China 
Democracy and Legal System Press, 2002) at 49-50. 
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The insurer’s duty of utmost good faith in China is not a complete and integrated duty like it is 
under the common law where the insurer is required to disclose everything material to the decision 
of the insured.684 The insurer’s duty of utmost good faith under China law includes two aspects. (1) 
General explanation of the terms of the insurance contract.685  (2) Special explanation of the 
exemption clauses in the insurance contract.686 These two duties are stipulated in the Insurance 
Law and apply to both marine and non-marine insurance contract since the Maritime Code does 
not have rules on these issues. It is argued that these duties are duty of explanation; they are 
different from the duty of disclosure.687 However, since the interpretation of the clauses of the 
contract belongs to the circumstances which would influence the insured on whether to buy the 
insurance, the duty of explanation may be treated as a type of disclosure. Anyway, it is widely 
believed that the duty of explanation is a pre-contract duty of utmost good faith.688 
 
3. General Explanation of the Terms of the Insurance Contract 
 
i. Introduction to the Duty of General Explanation 
 
Article 17 of the Insurance Law states in general words that “Before an insurance contract is 
signed, the insurer shall disclose to the applicant the contents of clauses of the contract, and also 
may make inquiry on conditions relating to the subject-matter to be insured or the person to be 
insured.” From the wording of this article, it can be said that the insurer’s duty to explain the terms 
of the insurance contract is the reciprocal duty to the insured’s duty of disclosure. The explanation 
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 See the proposed definition given by the Court of Appeal in the Westgate case, at page 159, above. 
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 Article 17(1) of the Insurance Law. 
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 Article 18 of the Insurance Law. 
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 See e.g. Liu Min, “Bao Xian Fa Shang De Gao Zhi Yi Wu (The Duty of Disclosure of the Insurance 
Law)”, (2003) Issue 11, Contemporary Legal Science 152; Li Yuquan, Bao Xian Fa (Insurance Law), 2nd ed. 
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 See e.g. Li Ximei, “Qian Lun Zui Da Cheng Xin Yuan Ze Zhong De Gao Zhi Yi Wu Ji Qi Lv Xing (On 
the Duty of Disclosure and Its Performance in Context of the Principle of Utmost Good Faith)”, (2003) Issue 
2, Sichuan Administrative College Transaction 33; Li Yuquan, ibid. 
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usually includes, but not is limited to, the nature of the risk covered, the liability of the insurer, the 
exemption clauses,689 the duty of the insured, the payment of the premium, and the recovery of 
loss and damages. The requirement of explanation means that the insurer must correctly explain 
the terms of the contract; he can neither keep silent nor wrongly explain them. The duty of 
explanation is a voluntary duty whether or not the insured has inquired. 
 
As comparison, under the law of U.K., it is the broker’s duty to explain the content of the contract 
to the insured.690 The reason why China makes it the duty of the insurer instead of the broker is 
due to the fact that there are not many brokers in the industry691 and most of the contracts are not 
reached through brokers.692 
 
ii. The Degree of Explanation 
 
To what extent the explanation should be is not specified by law. The insurance companies and 
some judges allege that “insurers will usually list the terms of the contract on the back of the 
policy and this has satisfied the requirement of article 17(1) of the Insurance Law.693 That is to say, 
the insurer need to do nothing and the terms listed on the back of the policy explains by 
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 The explanation of the exemption clauses will be further discussed infra. 
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themselves. According to them, the meaning of “to explain the terms” has no difference with that 
of “to show the terms”. Comparatively, a more reasonable interpretation of article 17(1) of the 
Insurance Law is found in the proposed draft of the judicial explanation on the Insurance Law.694 
Article 8 of the draft proposes that 
 
The insurer should, according to article 17(1) of the Insurance Law, explain the terms of 
the insurance contract to the insurance applicant to the extent that an ordinary person 
would understand the explanation, but the insurer may explain to different extent 
according to the applicant’s experience on insurance application.695 
 
It is reasonable to stipulate that the explanation should be capable of being understood by an 
ordinary person, but the latter part of article 8 (the italic words) has blurred the standard imposed 
on explaining. Suppose that the extent to which insurer explains the terms of the contract may be 
varied according to the experience of the applicant, what is the use of the general standard of an 
ordinary person? In addition, does it mean that the insurer should first find out whether the insured 
is experienced or not before the insurer make any explanation? In the author’s view, just like a 
prudent insurer means a reasonable insurer “in that type of insurance”,696 an ordinary person 
means an ordinary man in that type of insurance and this standard shall apply consistently to all 
circumstances except where the insured is apparently inexperienced; in that exceptional case, the 
insurer shall make further effort to make the insured understood. 
 
iii. The Liability for Non-Performance of the Duty of General Explanation 
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 Article 8 of The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition of 
Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
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(a) The Contra Proferentem Rule 
 
The law does not make it clear what liability will arise from the insurer’s failure to perform the 
duty of general explanation. Does this mean that the insurer has no liability if he has breached the 
duty of general explanation? If no, then what kind or kinds of liability will arise from such breach? 
In the absence of any statutory authority, the question could only be answered by analysis of the 
legal theory of the civil law. 
 
Every breach of a duty is accompanied by a liability, otherwise the duty is no longer compulsory 
and the duty is no long a duty. The purpose of the duty of the insurer to explain the terms of the 
insurance contract is to prevent the insurer from taking advantage of the insured’s inexperience 
and similarly so in respect of the duty of special explanation. If the insurer fails to perform the 
duty of explanation, the insured is deprived of the right-to-know. But a duty cannot exist if the 
breach of the duty would not cause any liability. To protect the insured’s right, there must be 
liability for the breach of the duty of general explanation. 
 
The duty of explanation in the insurance contract is alien to the law applied to other standard 
contract697 and the most suitable remedy may also come from the provisions within the Insurance 
Law. Article 31 of provides that 
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 If the standard contract is not insurance contract, the provider of the standard contract is only obliged to 
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voluntary. This rule is stipulated in article 39 of the Contract Law 1999. “If standard clause are used in 
making a contract, the party that provides the standard clauses shall determine the rights and obligations 
between the parties in accordance with the principle of fairness, and shall call in a reasonable manner the 
other party’s attention to the exemptible and restrictive clauses regarding its liability, and give explanations 
of such clauses at the request of the other party. ‘Standard clauses’ means the clauses that are formulated in 
anticipation by a party for the purpose of repeated usage and that are not a result of consultation with the 
other party in the making of the contract.” [emphasis added] 
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“When the insurer has disputes on the contents of an insurance contract with the applicant, 
the insured or the beneficiary, the People’s Court or arbitration organ shall make 
interpretation and explanation favourable to the insured and the beneficiary.”698 
 
Combined with article 31, article 17(1) should be interpreted to mean that, if the insurer fails to 
explain a term of the contract, and if that term has caused disputes between the parties, the court or 
arbitration organ should interpret the term favourably to the insured and the beneficiary. As far as 
the insurer breaches the duty of general explanation, this “contra proferentem rule” should apply 
regardless of the clause left unexplained, whether the unexplained clause is material or minor, 
whether the insured’s own negligence may have contributed to the loss. In Shenzhen Hualian Food 
& Cooking Oil Co. v. Hua’an Property Insurance Company,699 the insurer failed to explain the 
                                                        
698
 Article 41 of the Contract Law 1999 provides that the terms of a standard contract should be interpreted 
first according to the ordinary meaning of the words. If there are more than one ordinary meanings, then the 
contra proferentem rule applies. So it would be wrong if article 31 of the Insurance Law were interpreted as 
that whenever there is a dispute over a term of the insurance contract, that term would be interpreted in 
favour of the insured regardless of the ordinary meaning of the term. Fortunately, the proposed judicial 
interpretation of the Insurance Law will clarify this ambiguity. Article 20 stipulates that “where the insurer 
has dispute with the applicant, the insured or the beneficiary on the terms of the contract, the People’s Court 
should interpret according to the common understanding, with reference to the relevant wording of the 
insurance contract, any relevant terms, the purpose of the contract, the trade practice and the principle of 
good faith, so as to ascertain the true meaning of the term, and the People’s Court may ascertain the meaning 
of the term according to the following rules: (1) where the written stipulation is different to the oral one, the 
former prevails; (2) where the stipulation on the insurance application and policy is different to that on other 
insurance documents, the former prevails; (3) where the special stipulation is different to the standard clause, 
the former prevails; and (4) where the content of the clause is different due to the inconsistence of the way 
of recording or due to the time of the recording, the postil prevails to the text, later postil prevails to the 
earlier postil, pasted postil prevails to postil in text, and what is written by hand prevails to what is printed. 
After common understanding interpretation, if there are still two or more than two understandings, the 
People’s Court should make interpretation according to article 31of the Insurance Law. However, if the 
insurance contract is drafted by the applicant, the interpretation should be favorable to the party who 
accepts that contract.” [Emphasis added.] See The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on 
Several Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-
Lib.com <http://www.law-lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
699
 Shenzhen Hualian Food & Cooking Oil Co. v. Hua’an Property Insurance Company, online: China 
Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial <http://www.ccmt.org.cn//hs/news/show.php?cId=939>. In 
this case, the insured and the insurer entered into an “all risk” contract which provided that “All Risks: 
Aside from the risks covered under the F.P.A. (Free Particular Average) and W.A. (With Average) 
conditions as above, this insurance also covers all risks of loss of or damage to the insured goods whether 
partial or total, arising from external causes in the course of transit.” Later, the cargo was damages by 
external cause, but what was exactly the cause could not be found out. The insured alleged that, since the 
contract was an all risk contract, the insured did not have the duty to prove what exactly the cause of damage 
was. The insurer alleged that the “all risk” was in fact “named risks” because the wording of the contract 
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term “all risk” which the insurer alleged to have different meaning from the common 
understanding. The court applied “contra proferentem rule” and interpreted “all risk” in favour of 
the insured. As the result of such interpretation, the contract was hold to have covered the loss that 
the insured claimed. 
 
Therefore, the insurer has to explain the contract especially when the terms of the contract have 
unusual meanings. If he has explained, those terms should be interpreted according to his 
explanation, but if he has failed to explain, they will be interpreted contra proferentem. 
 
(b) Avoidance of the Contract 
 
However, if the remedy to the breach of the duty of general explanation is only the application of 
the “contra proferentem rule”, it may not prove adequate for the insured. For example, where the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
should be interpreted as “all Risks = F.P.A. + W.A. + risks arising from external causes”, and the “risks 
arising from external causes” means 11 named risks according to the explanation of the People’s Bank of 
China, the administrative competent authority for the insurance industry in China. In response to a request 
for guidance on the coverage of the People’s Insurance Company of China (All Risks) Clauses, the Bank 
stated, inter alia, that: 
“External causes only refer to theft, pilferage and non-delivery (TPND), fresh water and/or rain 
damage, shortage, mixture and contamination, leakage, clash and breakage, taint of odour, sweat 
and heating, hook damage, breakage of packing, rust.” 
Therefore, the insurer argued that the risks covered by the policy were name risks and thereby the insured 
had the duty to prove that the cause of the damage fell within the named risks arising from that 11 external 
cause. The Maritime Court of Guangzhou held that, although the People’s Bank of China had interpreted the 
“external causes” as those 11 causes, the layman of insurance would not know it and they could only 
understand the contract through the terms on the back of the policy, but the insurance company did not 
clarify in the policy that the “all risks” were in fact named risks, and neither did it attached the interpretation 
of the People’s Bank of China to the policy, and neither did it explain the “all risks” clause during the 
acceptance of the risks, and this caused the conflicting understandings of the clause. In such circumstances, 
the disputed clause should be interpreted in favour of the insured or the beneficiary, namely the external 
causes are not restricted to those 11 risks, therefore it is the insurer’s duty to prove that the cause of the 
damage in this case does not fall within the scope of cover. In addition, the Court held that the interpretation 
of the People’s Bank of China is not binding because the Bank, as a regulatory authority of the insurance 
industry, does not has the right to explain the contract between the parties. The insurance company appealed. 
The People’s High Court of Guangdong Province fully agreed with the Maritime Court and dismissed the 
appeal. The decision of his case is contrary to some previous cases where the facts were similar. For those 
previous judgements on this point, see Zhang Xianwei, “Marine Insurance in China: Coverage of the PICC 
All Risks Clauses”, online: China Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial 
<http://www.ccmt.org.cn/english/explore/exploreDetial.php?sId=267>. 
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insured, who fails to understand the scope of the coverage which the insurer did not explain, has 
bought an insurance which he actually does not need, the proper remedies for him are avoidance of 
the contract and refund of the premium. Actually, the insured may also avoid the contract on 
ground of “grave misunderstanding”700 which is explained in the following paragraph, but there 
are more difficulties in proving grave misunderstanding than just proving the insurer’s failure to 
explain.701 
 
According to article 54 of the Contract Law 1999,702 the party may avoid the contract ab initio for 
grave misunderstanding.703 This refers to the situations where the party has misunderstanding on 
the type, quality, or quantity of the subject matter, or the nature of the contract, and the 
misunderstanding has caused the effect that the contract has gone against the party’s true will and 
has caused considerable loss.704 However, there are great disputes as to the detailed meaning of 
grave misunderstanding. 705  According to scholars’ interpretation, in order to prove the grave 
misunderstanding, the party must show that he has been induced to enter the contract by the 
misunderstanding. 706  The misunderstanding may either be mutual or unilateral 
misunderstanding.707 
 
                                                        
700
 Grave misunderstanding is similar to the common law concept mistake; it is just a different usage of 
phrase. 
701
 If the insured relies on the ground of grave misunderstanding to avoid the contract, the insured has to 
prove that the insurer’s failure to explain has caused grave misunderstanding on the part of the insured, in 
addition to proving the insurer’s failure to explain. 
702
 See also article 59 of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986. It has similar provision as article 54 
of the Contract Law 1999. 
703
 The party may also ask the People’s Court or an arbitration organ to reasonably alter the contract instead 
of avoiding the contract. See article 73 of the Opinions of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several 
Questions of the Enforcement of the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986 (provisional). 
704
 Article 71 of the Opinions of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Enforcement of 
the General Principles of the Civil Law 1986 (provisional). It is something like mistake under the common 
law. 
705
 Sui Pengsheng, “Guan Yu He Tong Fa Zhong Zhong Da Wu Jie De Tan Tao (Discussion on the Grave 
Misunderstanding in the Contract Law)”, (1999) Issue 3, China Legal Science 104; Zhang Xiaoyong & Fan 
Lin, “Lun Ke Che Xiao He Tong (On the Avoidable Contracts)”, (2000) Issue 2, Politics and Law Forum 56 
at 57. 
706




Therefore, if the insurer’s non-performance of the duty of explanation has caused the insured to 
gravely misunderstand the nature of the coverage or any other material matter of or related to the 
contract, the insured may avoid the contract thereby. This position was supported by the People’s 
Court.708 
 
(c) Damage to the Insured 
 
In some very exceptional circumstances, damage may be the only proper remedy. First, the insured 
may claim damage on ground of negligence in negotiation just as the insurer may claim damage 
on this ground too.709 Second, if the insured is able to avoid the contract on ground of grave 
misunderstanding, he can claim damage thereafter. This position has been repeatedly supported by 
the People’s Court.710 
 
In Hongfeng Company v. Ping An Insurance Company,711 a car was insured with the replacement 
value being 300,000 Yuan. Later when the car was damaged in a road accident, the insured 
claimed 294,000 Yuan loss. The insurer alleged that the replacement value of that car was actually 
at least 600,000 Yuan and denied the claim on ground of misrepresentation. This case ended in 
judicial conciliation.712 In the conciliation document, basing on article 59713 and 61(1)714 of the 
                                                        
708
 See Hongfeng Company v. Ping An Insurance Company, reported in, Li Ping, Bao Xian Fa Xin Shi Yu Li 
Jie (New Interpretation and the Cases of the Insurance Law) (Beijing: Tongxin Publishing House, 2001) 70. 
This case is discussed in more detail at page 170, above. 
709
 The insurer’s right to claim damage is discussed at page 140ff., above, where the author suggested adding 
a “no more remedies rule” into the Insurance Law so that the insurer may not claim damage. But under the 
current law, either party may claim damage for the loss of reliance interest. 
710
 See Hongfeng Company v. Ping An Insurance Company, reported in, Li Ping, Bao Xian Fa Xin Shi Yu Li 
Jie (New Interpretation and the Cases of the Insurance Law) (Beijing: Tongxin Publishing House, 2001) 70; 
Wang B v. PICC, reported in Liu Zhixin, ed., Zhong Guo Dian Xing Shang Shi An Li Ping Xi (China Typical 
Commercial Cases and Comments) (Beijing: The Law Press, 1997) at 351-352. The first case is discussed in 
more detail at page 170, above, and the second case is discussed in detail in supra note 340.  
711
 Hongfeng Company v. Ping An Insurance Company, ibid. 
712
 Judicial conciliation is often used in civil cases. Most of civil disputes end in judicial conciliations. The 
settlement agreement reached under judicial conciliation has the same enforceable effect as the verdicts. In 
the trial of civil cases, the People’s Court should make clear the facts and distinguish between right and 
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General Principles of the Civil Law 1986, the People’s Court held that although the insured could 
not be compensated under the contract, the insurer was still liable for a large part of the loss 
because the insurer’s failure to explain the meaning of “replacement value” and failing to strictly 
check the application form were the main causes to the insured’s inability to secure coverage 
under the insurance.715  As a result, the insurer was adjudged to bear 85% of the loss. This 
conciliation was thought to be justice and reflective of what the law should be.716 The People’s 
Court, through repeated judgements, has also developed a scale to measure the percentage of each 
party’s contribution.717 
 
4. Special Explanation of the Exemption Clauses 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
wrong, and conduct conciliation between the parties on a voluntary basis. It is believed that the People’s 
Court must make clear the wrong and right of the parties in the conciliation unless both parties require not 
doing so. That is why the attitude of the People’s Court can be found in the conciliation documents, even if 
the case ended in conciliation. See article 85, 89 and 90 of the civil procedure law 1996; Ma Yuan, Min Shi 
Shen Pan De Li Lun Yu Shi Wu (The Theory and Practice of Civil Procedure) (Beijing: Publishing House of 
the People’s Court, 1992) at 292-293; Chen Jiadao, et al, “Min Shi Tiao Jie Qian Tan (Discuss on the Civil 
Conciliation)”, [1995] Issue S1, Heilongjiang Social Science 71. Conciliation is different from compromise. 
Compromise is voluntarily reached by the parties outside the court. The conciliation document has the same 
legal force as a verdict of the People’s Court, so it can be compulsorily executed by the Execution Tribunal 
of the People’s Court, while the settlement agreement reached through compromise cannot be executed by 
the Execution Tribunal of the People’s Court; it has to go through normal trial procedures before obtaining a 
verdict. 
713
 Article 59: “A party shall have the right to request a People’s Court or an arbitration agency to alter or 
rescind the following civil acts: (1) those performed by an actor who seriously misunderstood the contents of 
the acts; (2) those that are obviously unfair. Rescinded civil acts shall be null and void from the very 
beginning.” 
714
 Article 61(1): “After a civil act has been determined to be null and void or has been rescinded, the party 
who acquired property as a result of the act shall return it to the party who suffered a loss. The erring party 
shall compensate for the other party for the losses it suffered as a result of the act; if both sides are in error, 
they shall each bear their proper share of the responsibility.” 
715
 See Li Ping, Bao Xian Fa Xin Shi Yu Li Jie (New Interpretation and the Cases of the Insurance Law) 
(Beijing: Tongxin Publishing House, 2001) 70. 
716
 Ibid at 72-74. 
717
 The scale is not law; it is just a guide to predict what the People’s Court may decide. If A has intention or 
grave negligence, while B has only slight negligence, B’s contribution is below 10%. If A has intention or 
grave negligence, while B has ordinary negligence, B’s contribution is 10%-25%. If A has intention, while B 
has grave negligence, B’s contribution is 25%-50%. If both parties have intention or grave negligence to the 
same degree, each party’s contribution is 50%. See Wang Liming & Yang Lixin, Qin Quan Xing Wei Fa 
(Tort Law) (Beijing: the Law Press, 1996) at 215. Although this book is on the tort law, the contribution 
proportionality of negligence also applies to other civil liabilities where the liability is shared by the parties 
according to their proportion of negligence. 
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i. The Liability for Failure to Explain the Exemption Clauses 
 
The liability for failure to explain the exemption clauses is clearly set out by article 18 of the 
Insurance Law that: 
 
“Where an insurance contract contains clauses on liability exemption of the insurer, the 
insurer shall disclose them clearly to the applicant before the insurance contract is signed, 
and if the insurer fails to make it clear to the applicant, such clauses will not have binding 
force.” 
 
The effect of an exception clause being not binding is that the coverage of the contract has been 
enlarged. For instance, where the insurer does not clearly explain to the insured a clause of 
property insurance contract which provides that the insurer is not liable for any loss caused by 
earthquake, the insurer later may not reject the claim on the ground that earthquake is an exempted 
risk. However, it does not mean, for example, a fire insurance contract will thereby cover the loss 
from earthquake unless the wording of the scope-of-cover clause is broad enough to include 
earthquake. Therefore, the contract has to be interpreted as a whole. Where an exemption clause is 
not clearly explained and thereby is not binding, the contract should not be interpreted as if there 
were a clause providing coverage of that exempted risk; instead, it should rather be interpreted as 
if that clause did not exist. 
 
A breach of the duty of special explanation certainly constitutes a breach of the duty of general 
explanation,718 so the remedies applied to the breach of the duty of general explanation may also 
equally apply to that of special explanation at the request of the insured. However, it seems that 
                                                        
718
 The duty of special explanation requires “clear explanation” of the exemption clause while the duty of 
general explanation requires explaining all the terms in the contract. The latter includes the former. 
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the insured cannot require the clause to be non-binding and at the same time to be constructed 
contra proferentem as the clause must be treated as binding if it is to be constructed favourably to 
the insured. 
 
ii. The Scope of Exemption Clauses 
 
The exemption clauses should not be restricted to those with a title of “exemption clause”;719 
otherwise the insurer may disguise the exemption clauses in the name of other clauses by 
technically drafting the wording and avoid the duty of clear explanation therewith. So any clauses 
that extend the insured’s duty or limit the insurer’s liability may be regarded as exemption clauses. 
These would include three categories. The first is exemption clauses which exclude or restrict 
certain risks which are covered by the “scope of cover clauses”.720 The second kind of these 
clauses imposes on the insured the duties or obligations, the breach of which will enable the 
insurer to terminate or rescind the contract, or to avoid or reduce the liability of indemnity.721 The 
third kind limits the amount of indemnity, such as the franchise clause, the deductible clause, and 
the pro-rata clause.722 
 
The proposed judicial interpretation of the Insurance Law723 regretfully does not make clear the 
scope of exemption clauses, but it has this tendency. Article 13 stipulates that if the insurance 
contract includes the warranty clause, the insurer should make clear explanation during the making 
                                                        
719
 The Second Civil Tribunal of the People’s High Court of Fujian Province, “Bao Xian He Tong Jiu Fen 
An Jian Ruo Gan Fa Lv Wen Ti Yan Jiu (Research on Some Legal Problem of Insurance Contract Dispute 
Cases)”, in Wang Liming et al, eds., Pan Jie Yan Jiu (Judgement Research), vol. 9 (Beijing: The People’s 
Court Press, 2002) 61 at 67. But see Li Yuquan, Bao Xian Fa (Insurance Law), 2nd ed. (Beijing: The Law 
Press, 2003) at 60-61. 
720
 For example, a clause to exclude the fire set by the insured. See The Second Civil Tribunal of the 






 The full name is The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the 
Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
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of the contract to the insured in accordance with article 18 of the Insurance Law; if the insurer fails 
to do so, the warranty clause is invalid. The judicial interpretation regards warranty clause the 
same as an exemption clause in the sense that the insurer has to clearly explain them. The warranty 
clause can be categorised into the second kinds of clauses mentioned above. 
 
iii. The Way to Explain and the Onus to Prove 
 
The insurer may explain the contract orally or in written form,724 but for the evidential purpose, a 
written explanation by the insurer is well advised, though it is the insured’s onus to prove that the 
insurer has not made the explanation.725 In the proposed judicial interpretation of the Insurance 
Law, it is suggested that it should be the insurer’s onus to prove that he has performed the duty of 
explanation.726 If it is passed in the future727 without change, the insurer is more likely to explain in 
written form. 
 
Although the onus to prove still rests on the insured, in order to avoid disputes, the insurer usually 
prints on the insurance application form or the policy a note which states that the insured confirms 
that the insurer has made clear explanation on every term, including the exemption clauses, of the 
                                                        
724
 General speaking, if the law does not requires the form of a civil activity, the party is free to do it orally 
or in written form. For example, the Contract Law 1999 does not require the contract to be in written form, 
so an oral contract is valid. The Insurance Law does not stipulates whether the explanation must be in 
written form, so the insurer is free to explain the contract either orally or in written form. Article 11 of 
proposed judicial interpretation of the Insurance Law provides that both oral explanation and written 
explanation are valid. See the Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the 
Inquisition of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
725
 Article 2(1) of Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures: The 
parties concerned shall be responsible for producing evidences to prove the facts on which their own 
allegations are based or the facts on which the allegations of the other party are refuted.  
726
 Article 11 of the Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition 
of Insurance Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
727
 The exact time is still unknown, but it is believed it will be soon, 
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contract and the insured has fully understood the explanation made by the insurer. 728  The 
prevailing view in China is that the statement, if signed by the insured, is binding on the insured.729 
However, this statement should not been treated as a term of the contract nor as the insured’s 
waiver of the insurer’s performance of the duty of explanation. The statement should have effect at 
most as evidence that the insurer has performed the duty of explanation, and the insured must be 
allowed to challenge it with contrary evidence. 
 
Article 11 of the proposed judicial interpretation of the Insurance Law730 has thoroughly specified 
some issues about the insurer’s duty of special explanation. 
 
Article 11 (the clear explanation of the exemption clauses): The “clear explanation” in 
article 18 of the Insurance Law means that the insurer, when making the insurance 
contract with the applicant, should make clear reminders on the policy or other insurance 
documents in such a way that is sufficient to call the applicant’s attention to the exemption 
                                                        
728
 See e.g. “Gold Cow” Investment Guarantee Style Family Property Insurance Application Form of the 
People’s Insurance Company of China; Hull Insurance Policy of the People’s Insurance Company of China; 
Application for Hull Insurance of the People’s Insurance Company of China. The statement is often on the 
front of the form just above the signature of the insured, so it is in notable place. On the application form of 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, there is also a similar statement the wording of which varies 
according to the kind of coverage but always contains that “the insured has understood the exemption 
clauses.” 
729
 See The Second Civil Tribunal of the People’s High Court of Fujian Province, “Bao Xian He Tong Jiu 
Fen An Jian Ruo Gan Fa Lv Wen Ti Yan Jiu (Research on Some Legal Problem of Insurance Contract 
Dispute Cases)”, in Wang Liming et al, eds., Pan Jie Yan Jiu (Judgement Research), vol. 9 (Beijing: The 
People’s Court Press, 2002) 61 at 68-69. The insurer often uses three means to perform the duty of 
explanation: (1) There is significant indication on the application form that prompts the insured to read the 
terms of the contract especially the exemption clauses. (It is not the practice in marine insurance however. 
Contrary example: Application for Hull Insurance of the People’s Insurance Company of China Dalian 
Branch.) (2) The terms of the contract are printed on the back of the application form and the exemption 
clauses have been boldfaced. (3) The statement that the insured confirms that the insurer has made clear 
explanation on every term, including the exemption clauses, of the contract and the insured has fully 
understood the explanation made by the insurer. It is then believed that after doing these, the insurer has 
performed the duty of explanation perfectly accordant to the requirement of the law. 
730
 The Interpretation of the People’s Supreme Court’s on Several Questions of the Inquisition of Insurance 
Dispute Cases (Draft for Consultation), online: Law-Lib.com <http://www.law-
lib.com/law/lfbj/lfbj_view.asp?id=10276>. 
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clauses, and the insurer should make oral or written explanation on the content of 
exemption clauses to the applicant. 
 
The insurer bears the obligation to prove that he has performed the duty of clear 
explanation. The exemption clauses in the contract in themselves can not prove that the 
insurer has performed the duty of explanation. 
 
When a branch of an insurance company makes an insurance contract with the insurance 
applicant, that branch can not be released from the performance of the duty of “clear 
explanation” stipulated in article 18 of the Insurance Law only because another branch of 
the insurer has had the same kind of insurance contract with that applicant. 
 
The proposed interpretation will clarify many ambiguities in the current law and it will change 
some points of law more reasonably. First it clarifies that the insurer should not only remind but 
also explain the exemption clauses. Second, it shifts the onus to prove from the insurer to the 
insured, and it confirms that the exemption clauses in themselves can not prove the performance of 
the duty. This judicial interpretation fails to mention what is the evidence rule regarding the 
general explanation. The result of this failure is that the general law731 will apply and the insured 
will bear the onus to prove that the insurer has not performed the duty of general explanation and 
it will be very difficult for the insured to do so. In addition, there seems to be no reason to apply 
totally different evidence rules to the explanation of the exemption clauses from that of the other 
clauses. Therefore, it seems that this evidence rule (article 11) should not be restricted to 
explanation of exemption clauses only, and the insurer should be obliged to prove that he has 
explained the terms of the contract as specified in article 17(1) of the Insurance Law. 
                                                        
731
 See Article 2(1) of Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures in 
supra note 725. 
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III. A Comparison and Suggestions for Reform of the Insurer’s Disclosure 
 
1. The Scope of the Insurer’s Duty of Disclosure: Unitary or Piecemeal 
 
The pre-contract duty of utmost good faith falling on the insurer under the law of U.K. is aligned 
by one definition,732 and the insurer is required to disclose everything material.733 In contrast, in 
Chinese law, the scope of the insurer’s duty of disclosure734 is not an integrated obligation; it is 
more like an aggregation composed of two plates: one plate is the duty of general explanation, and 
the other plate is the duty of special explanation. There is no general rule which will incorporate 
the two plates and draw a clear line between what should be disclosed and what need not. 
Moreover, there is no requirement that the insurer should disclose everything material to the 
insured. 
 
The absence of a general rule results in the ambiguity whether the insurer will be liable for non-
disclosure of other matters besides the two duties of explanation. If the insurer would be liable, 
e.g., for the non-disclosure of a material circumstance which would influence the insured’s 
                                                        
732
 The insurer is required to disclose everything material to the risk or to the recoverability of the claim. See 
Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.; sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. v. 




 It is alleged that there is a post-contract duty of good faith imposed on the insurer i.e., the insurer’s 
liability in delay of the payment of the compensation. According to article 24, “[t]he insurer shall, after 
receiving claims for indemnity or payment of insurance benefit from the insured or the beneficiary, timely 
come to a decision, as for those within the insurance liability, he shall execute the liability of indemnity or 
payment of the insurance benefit within 10 days after reaching an agreement over the indemnity or payment 
of the insurance benefit with the insured or the beneficiary. If the insurance contract has the stipulations on 
insured amount and the period for indemnity or payment, the insurer shall, as contracted, execute the 
liability of indemnity or payment of the insurance benefit. Apart from paying the insurance benefit, the 
insurer who fails timely to execute the liability as provided in the preceding paragraph shall indemnify the 
insured or the beneficiary for losses therefrom.” However, the author does not think that this should be 
regarded as a type of the duty of utmost good faith because wherever a party delays payment in whatever 
contract, that party will be liable for such delay; there is nothing particular in the Insurance Law on this 
issue. To make the liability of delay on the payment a duty of utmost good faith is meaningless.
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decision on whether to have the contract with this insurer, one must face the question: where are 
the legal bases for this position? The People’s Court does not have the power to create a law. On 
the other hand, it would be unfair if the insurer were not required to disclose every material 
circumstance while the insured is. The Court, in its quest to realize justice, might have to rely on 
some basic principles of the civil law735 and make the judgements inconsistent from one to another. 
Therefore, the Insurance Law should learn from the common law to have a general rule stipulating 
the insurer’s duty of utmost good faith. 
 
The proposed duty of disclosure imposed on the insurer shall apply to both marine and non-marine 
insurance. The insured’s duty in non-marine insurance is governed by the principle of inquiry-
disclosure, nevertheless, this is because the inexperienced insured need more protection, so it 
would be odd if the insurer’s duty is based on the principle of inquiry-disclosure in non-marine 
insurance. 
 
2. A Proposed Definition of the Insurer’s Duty of Disclosure 
 
When formulating the rules of the insurer’s duty of disclosure, it is necessary and reasonable to 
refer to the rules of the duty of the insured, but it is not desirable to copy without any change 
because some areas of the duty of the insured also need changing. It is preferable to refer to the 
“good law” of the rules of the insured’s duty of disclosure. Therefore, the constructive knowledge, 
the test for materiality, degree of influence and inducement should be stipulated to reflect what the 
law should be. By this way, the formulation of the insurer’s duty of disclosure would include the 
                                                        
735
 For example, the Court may give a broad interpretation to article 42 of the Contract Law 1999 so that the 
words “any other act contrary to the principle of good faith” would include the insurer’s non-disclosure of 
the material circumstances. The Court may also conclude that the insurer’s non-disclosure is intentional if 
the insurer knows that the circumstance would have influenced the insured’s decision. 
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rules of the insurer’s constructive knowledge, the reasonable insured test for the test of materiality, 
decisive influence and actual inducement: 
 
1. Before the contract is concluded, the insurer should disclose to the insured, every 
material circumstance within his knowledge. If the insurer fails to do so, the insured may 
avoid the contract and claim for whole refund of the premium. (This is a general statement 
of the insurer’s duty, imitating the duty as per section 18(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 (U.K.) mutatis mutandis. As for the remedy, please refer to page 183, below.) 
 
2. The insurer is deemed to know everything he ought to know in the ordinary business 
practice. (The same as the insured’s constructive knowledge.) 
 
3. The insurer is not required to disclose those circumstances that the insured actually 
knows or ought to know, unless inquired by the insured. (A mirror image of article 222(1) 
of the Maritime Code.) 
 
4. A circumstance is material if the insured would not, and a reasonable man in his 
position would not, contract with that insurer, or would contract with that insurer but only 
under a different term, had he known that circumstance. (Here the first “insured” should 
be interpreted as the actual insured, and the second means the notional reasonable insured. 
The double check rule, which should also be adopted in the insured’s duty of disclosure, 
functions both as the test of materiality [a reasonable insured test] and the actual 
inducement. The decisive influence is employed, which is also suggested to be the rule of 
the insured’s duty of disclosure.) 
 
3. The Reasoning of This Definition 
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A good definition of the disclosure duty falling on the insurer must incorporate all the important 
circumstances that the insured need to know when deciding to buy the insurance, while it must not 
impose on the insurer too much obligation to the extent that it will substantially increase the cost 
of insurance and ultimately increase the premium. Bearing this in mind, the author will examine 
whether the proposed definition is workable. 
 
The Court of Appeal in the Westgate case has suggested two categories which are potentially 
material from the insured’s perspective: the circumstances related to the recoverability of the claim 
and the risk sough to cover. Under the first category, there would be circumstances related to: (1) 
the financial credibility of the insurer;736 (2) the payment record of the insurer;737 (3) the fact that 
some of agents, staffs or employees of the insurance company are not reliable; for instance, they 
may be anxious to conclude more contract to earn more commission,738 which is common in 
China;739 (4) any special or unusual interpretation of the term of the contract, or the interpretation 
of any term that is difficult to understand for a layman if the insured apparently inexperienced;740 
(5) the existence of the duty of disclosure in marine insurance.741 
 
                                                        
736





 Ibid at 142. 
739
 In China’s insurance market, not only the market agents have their income associated with the sale 
amount, but almost all the staff in every department have their income so associated. Sometimes, even the 
non-marketing staff have sale quota to fulfil. This phenomenon is also associated with the highly 
undevelopment of insurance brokers which is the insured’s agent. 
740
 This has been regulated by articles 17(1) and 18 of the Insurance Law. 
741
 In China, the non-marine insurance is governed by the principle of inquiry-disclosure, so the insurer does 
not need to warn the insured of the existence of the duty of disclosure. It is alleged that the marine insured is 
more experienced than those individual insured so there is also no need to warn of the existence of the duty 
of voluntary disclosure. Considering that a simple warn will not cause much difficulty to the insurer, while it 
can avoid possible disputes arising from non-disclosure by the insured due to his inexperience in 
underwriting or obliviscence of the duty, it is just and fair to impose such a duty.  
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As to the second category, Lord Mansfield has hinted that the disclosure only includes those 
circumstances decreasing the risk.742 There is an interesting query as to whether the insurer should 
disclose any circumstance within his knowledge that increases the risk running on the property 
insured.743 The answer seems to be no. Not only has Lord Mansfield hinted so, but subsection 3(a) 
of section 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (U.K.) stipulates that in the absence of inquiry the 
insured need not disclose any circumstance which diminishes the risk. The reason behind 
subsection 3(a) is that the disclosure of circumstances which diminish the risk helps the insured, 
not the insurer, so the rule of the insured’s duty of disclosure, which is to protect the insurer, need 
not punish the non-disclosure of such circumstances. Similarly, assuming that the insurer privately 
knows that, e.g., war is imminent, he is quite unlikely to provide war risk for the proposed insured. 
Conversely, if the insurer would like to cover the increasing risk anyway, he will inform the 
insured of that circumstance with great pleasure. The insurer will not, in any cases, obtain any 
additional benefit from concealing that kind of circumstance.744 
 
These two categories of circumstances suggested by the Court of Appeal in the Westgate case are 
both incorporated in the proposed definition of the insurer’s duty of disclosure: the insured would 
not have any contract with the insurer if the insured knows that the insurer is not credible or not 
reliable, or if the insured knows that the risk is much lower than he has supposed. As for others 
circumstances that do not fall within the two categories, the insurer may still be obliged to disclose 
                                                        
742
 The example given by Lord Mansfield in Carte v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905. 
743
 See John Birds, “Insurer's Duty of Utmost Good Faith; Damages for Nondisclosure” Case Comment 
[1986] J.B.L. 439; H. Y. Yeo, “Of Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts” 
(1991) 11 LS 131 at 142. 
744
 Possibly, it may further be argued that even if this particular insurer would be unlikely to underwrite the 
additional risk, it does not mean all the other insurers in the market will not underwrite it, so the insured will 
lose the chance of getting covered from other insurer if this insurer does not disclose the circumstances 
which increase the risk. However, it has been observed by the Court of Appeal in the Westgate case that a 
particular insurer is not bound to disclose that another insurer “would be prepared to underwrite the same 
risk at a substantially lower premium.” (Banque Finacière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Insurance Co. Ltd.? 
sub nom. Banque Kerser Ullmann S.A. v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co. [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513 at 545.) 
similarly, a particular insurer should not be bound to disclose that another insurer would like to underwrite 
the risk which this particular insurer would not underwrite. 
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them according to the general rule of the insurer’s duty of disclosure if that circumstance is caught 
by the proposed definition. For example, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission has 
promulgated an administrative regulation which requires the insurer to disclose the potential risks 
in certain investment insurance.745 However, it should be noted that one should be very prudent in 
interpreting a circumstance which does not fall into either of the categories to be material to the 
decision of the insured; otherwise the duty of disclosure would be unduly expanded and become 
“an engine of oppression”746 against the insurer.747 Whether a particular circumstance is material is 
a matter of fact in every case. 
 
One may ask whether the insurer is obliged to disclose that the rival insurer may underwrite the 
same risk at a substantially lower premium. Many scholars do not believe that the insurer is so 
obliged.748 Then, how can the proposed definition exclude the circumstances of the rival insurer 
from what the insurer should disclose? These circumstances are what the insurer at least ought to 
know and they certainly have a substantial impact on the insured’s decision. However, they are 
what the insured ought to know. The premium provided by particular insurer is information open 
to public. The insured does not have much difficulty in gaining the information through broker or 
through his own market investigation. Therefore, the insurer does not need to disclose what a 
prudent insured ought to know. 
 
                                                        
745
 The Regulations Regarding Information Disclosure Regarding New Personal Insurance promulgated by 
the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (the CIRC). (This regulation is available online: CIRC 
<http://www.circ.gov.cn/policy/list_detail.asp?auto_id=171>.) Similarly, the Beijing Insurance Regulatory 
Commission also made local regulations requiring the insurer to disclose the adversity of the insurance 
product to the insured. 
746
 The insured’s duty of disclosure has been described as “an engine of oppression”. See H. Y. Yeo, “Of 
Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contracts” (1991) 11 LS 131. 
747
 For example, Semin Park opposes the approach of including in the scope of disclosure any circumstances 
neither related to the risk nor to the recoverability of the claim. Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in 
Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 195. 
748
 For example, see Semin Park, The Duty of Disclosure in Insurance Contract Law (Brookfield, Vt.: 
Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1996) at 197; H. Y. Yeo, “Of Reciprocity and Remedies - Duty of Disclosure in 
Insurance Contracts” (1991) 11 LS 131 at 135. 
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4. The Remedy for Breach of the Proposed Duty of Disclosure by the Insurer 
 
As said above, the insurer’s duty of disclosure under Chinese law is composed of two plates and 
each plate of duty has its own remedy. The breach of the duty of general explanation of the terms 
of the contract makes the terms unexplained interpreted unfavourably to the insurer, the breach of 
the duty of explanation of exemption clauses renders the clause unexplained invalid, and, in 
marine insurance, the breach of the duty to inform the insured of the non-existence of the risk 
enables the insured to avoid the contract.749 If the proposed definition of the insurer’s duty of 
disclosure is introduced into Chinese law, what is the remedy for the breach of it? And what is the 
relationship between this remedy and those specific remedies for the breach of those two duties? 
 
The basic remedy for the breach of the proposed duty by the insurer should be avoidance of the 
contract at the option of the insured and recovery of the premium, firstly because, in most 
circumstances, the remedy of avoidance is adequate, for example, where what the insurer fails to 
disclose are the circumstances that diminish the risk. Where the circumstances are about the 
credibility of the insurer, if the insured is unable to recover the loss that was covered by the policy 
due to the insolvency of the insurer and wants to claim damage alternatively, the insured may base 
his claim on article 24(2) of the Insurance Law.750 
 
Secondly, making the avoidance of the contract as the basic remedy has the benefit that avoidance 
is “unconditional”: to claim damage, one has to prove the causal connection, the reasonable 
                                                        
749
 Strictly, one should say, the insured’s remedy is to recover the premium paid or refuse to pay premium if 
not paid yet, but the legal effects are the same. If the proposed duty of the insurer’s disclosure is introduced 
into The Chinese law, the insurer’s duty in marine insurance to disclose any circumstances showing the non-
existence of the risk sought to cover will no longer need to be set out in the Maritime Code since it is 
completely incorporated in the new proposed definition. 
750
 Article 24(2) is on the liability of the insurer for delaying payment of the claim. Article 24(1) provides 
that the insurer should pay for the claim within ten days after the insurer and the insured have concluded the 
payment agreement unless otherwise provided by the insurance contract. “Apart from paying the insurance 
benefit, the insurer who fails timely to execute the liability as provided in the preceding paragraph shall 
indemnify the insured or the beneficiary for losses therefrom.” 
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amount of the loss and the intention or negligence of the other party, while avoidance of contract 
never encounters these problems. 
 
Thirdly, the insured’s avoidance of the contract should not affect his rights to claim damage or 
avail himself of other remedies under the Insurance Law or other laws if he is so entitled unless 
the remedies are incompatible. For example, avoidance of the contract and damage are compatible 
remedies, but if the insured has avoided the contract, he cannot ask the judge to interpret the terms 
of the contract unfavourably to the insurer, nor can he allege that the exemption clause invalid and 
that the insurer should pay the indemnity which is exempted otherwise. The insured has right of 
option to choose among these incompatible remedies. Therefore, where the basic remedy of 
avoidance of the contract is inadequate, the insured has many other choices to give full protection 
to his rights. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions of Law Reform Suggestions 
 
The comparison between the Chinese law and the common law has led to the conclusion that, as to 
the principle of utmost good faith in pre-contract stage, the Chinese law and the common law have 
many parallel concepts and they also share some similar problems, although there are also some 
problems peculiar to China. Most of the problems of the Chinese law mentioned above may be 
resolved through legal interpretation, and only a few require the law modification, so the judicial 
interpretation of the Insurance Law which is still in draft is highly expected to amend these 
problems and the author has also discussed this interpretation in relation to the principle of utmost 
good faith. 
 
In both China and common law countries, the insured’s duty of disclosure is defined from four 
aspects, i.e., knowledge and constructive knowledge, circumstances which the insured need not 
disclose, the meaning of materiality and the actual inducement. The author has found that the 
Chinese law requires careful interpretation regarding, in particular, four aspects. First, the author 
has suggested that an object test should apply to what an insured ought to know, as well as what 
the insurer ought to know. An object test requires the insured/insurer to know what a reasonable 
insured/insurer in his position would know. Second, it has been suggested that the Chinese 
insurance law should stipulate that the insured need not disclose any circumstance which 
diminishes the risk, which is the subject of warranty, which the insurer has waived and which is 
the spent convictions. Third, the Chinese law should have both concepts of the materiality and the 
actual inducement, but they can be contained in one test, the “double check test”, which means 
that the insured only has to disclose material circumstances, and a circumstance is material if a 




As to the remedy system, the two jurisdictions have much difference. The Chinese law is more 
flexible, but there are also some ambiguities to be clarified. First, in China, the insurer and the 
insured are both eligible for the remedy of damages under the general contract law or the civil law. 
Thus, the insured has a more valuable relief where the avoidance or termination of the contract is 
not sufficient, but, to avoid the potential threat that the insurer may misuse the remedy of damage, 
it has been suggested that the insurance law should prohibit the insurer from utilizing other 
remedies which are not provided by the Insurance Law or the Maritime Code. Second, China has 
applied the nexus approach in non-fraudulent non-disclosure, but its defects must be noticed. Third, 
the author has suggested that the right to terminate the insurance contract cannot be perpetual and 
it should be limited as the time lapses. Fourth, the insurer has the right to increase premium instead 
of terminating the contract in marine insurance, but it has been argued that he should also have 
such a right in non-marine insurance. 
 
The insurer’s duty of utmost good faith is peculiar in china. The insurer is obliged to explain the 
terms of the contract, failing which, the author suggests, the remedy should be interpreted contra 
proferentem. The insurer is also obliged to clearly explain the exemption clauses failing which the 
clause is not binding on the insured. It has been suggested that the Chinese law should have a 
unified duty of utmost good faith on the insurer instead of the piecemeal solution. 
 
Since China has entered WTO, China’s insurance market will soon become highly open to 
foreigners. A fair competition and a market with good faith are urgently needed. A consummate 
insurance law on the principle of utmost good faith will certainly conduce to the establishment of 
fair competitions and good faith environments, which will benefit both parties of the insurance 
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